CA Unpub Decisions

Joel Martin Castaneda appeals from the judgment entered after a jury convicted him of first degree murder (Pen. Code, 187, subd. (a)) and attempted murder. (Pen. Code, 187, subd. (a), 664.) Castaneda contends that the trial court conducted an improper inquiry into a mid-deliberation claim of juror misconduct, coercing a juror to switch his vote from acquittal to conviction. Court reverse.

The Los Angeles County District Attorneys Office filed a petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, alleging that Fernando A. (minor) committed willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder (Pen. Code, 187, subd. (a); 664, subd. (a) (count 1))[1] and threatened to use force on a witness ( 139, subd. (a) (count 2)). The petition also charged that minor used a firearm during the commission of the attempted murder. ( 12022.53, subd. (b).) The juvenile court sustained the petition as to count 1, declared minor to be a ward of the court, ordered minor placed in a long-term Camp Community Placement program, and determined the maximum period of confinement to be 19 years. Minor appeals from the order, claiming there is insufficient evidence to establish that he intended to kill the victim. He also argues that if the court properly found him guilty of attempted murder, it erred by finding that the attempt was willful, deliberate, and premeditated. Court agree with the latter contention. Thus, Court affirm the juvenile courts order sustaining the attempted murder count in the petition, but reverse its finding that the attempt was willful, deliberate, and premeditated.

Appellant Rudy Rodolfo Padilla challenges his second degree murder conviction on the grounds that, apart from appellants admissions, the evidence was insufficient to establish the corpus delicti, the trial court erred by admitting a videotape and transcript, instructing the jury upon flight, and staying, instead of striking, two Penal Code section 12022.53 enhancements. We conclude the corpus delicti was adequately established. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the edited videotape or transcript. The court properly instructed upon flight and stayed superfluous Penal Code section 12022.53 enhancements. The judgment is affirmed.

Appellants Arthur and Anne Leeds (appellants) appeal from a judgment dismissing their complaint, which was entered after the trial court sustained respondents Galpin Motors, Inc. and Galpin Jaguar Lincoln Mercurys (respondents) demurrer to appellants second amended complaint (SAC) without leave to amend. Appellants also appeal from an award of attorney fees entered in favor of respondents. Court affirm.

Defendant and appellant Manolo Morataya appeals from his second conviction of the second degree murder of Noe Alvarado. Court reversed his first conviction because the jury was not instructed on the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter (case No. B179525) (Morataya I). In this appeal, he contends: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction; and (2) the trial court erred in imposing a security fee. Court affirm.

Davond Gordon appeals from the judgment entered following a jury trial in which he was convicted of selling a controlled substance, heroin (Health & Saf. Code, 11352, subd. (a)) and his admission that he suffered a prior conviction or juvenile adjudication of a serious or violent felony within the meaning of the Three Strikes law (Pen. Code, 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d) and 667, subds. (b)-(i)) and a prior conviction within the meaning of Health and Safety Code section 11370.2, subdivision (a). He was sentenced to prison for the middle term of four years, doubled by reason of the strike conviction, for a total of eight years. He contends increasing the punishment based upon a prior juvenile adjudication violates the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. He also requests that this court review the sealed transcript of the Pitchess motion. For reasons stated in the opinion Court affirm the judgment.

Defendant and appellant Jason Robert Walton was convicted by jury of the first degree murder of William Cox (Pen. Code, 187, subd. (a))[1]and the attempted willful, deliberate, premeditated murder of Edward Williams ( 664/187, subd. (a)). The jury also found defendant personally and intentionally discharged a firearm, and his discharge of the firearm proximately caused death and/or great bodily injury. ( 12022.5.53, subds. (c)-(d).) Defendant was sentenced to a total of 50 years to life in state prison.
In this timely appeal, defendant argues as follows: (1) the prosecutor improperly injected racial animus into the trial, and the trial courts failure to remedy the misconduct violated defendants constitutional rights; (2) the evidence is insufficient to establish the element of premeditation as to the murder and attempted murder convictions; (3) the Judicial Council of California Criminal Jury Instructions (2006-2007) CALCRIM Nos. 521 and 601, do not properly differentiate between the element of intent to kill and premeditation; (4) the trial court erred in instructing the jury on suppression or fabrication of evidence pursuant to CALCRIM No. 371; (5) denial of access to juror contact information prejudiced defendants ability to investigate potential grounds for a new trial; (6) denial of the motion for new trial was error, because the verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence; and (7) the cumulative effect of the errors violated defendants right to due process under the state and federal constitutions.
The judgment is affirmed.

Appellant Bernards Bros. Inc. (Bernards) appeals from the trial courts denial of its petition to compel arbitration of a dispute with respondent Craneveyor Corp. (Craneveyor). Court affirm.

Jose Dominguez Vasquez appeals from the judgment after a jury convicted him of first degree murder (Pen. Code, 187, subd. (a), 189) (count 1),[1]assault with a semiautomatic firearm ( 245, subd. (b)) (count 2), second degree robbery ( 211) (count 3), possession of a firearm by a felon ( 12025, subd. (b)) (count 4), and carrying a loaded firearm by a member of a criminal street gang ( 12031, subd. (a)(1), (2)(C)) (count 7). The jury made true findings with respect to the firearm and gang allegations as to all counts. The court sentenced appellant to a term of 50 years to life, plus 29 years 4 months in state prison. The court imposed a $200 restitution fine ( 1202.4, subd. (b)) and imposed and suspended a parole revocation fine ( 1202.45) in the same amount. Appellant also was ordered to pay $8,733 in direct victim restitution ( 1202.4, subd. (f)), a $10 fine ( 1202.5), and a $20 court security fee ( 1465.8, subd. (a)(1)). He was given credit for 911 days of presentence custody.
Court order the trial court to amend the abstract of judgment to reflect four $20 fines pursuant to section 1465.8 and affirm the judgment in all other respects.

In this trip and fall case, Audrey Lacasto appeals from the judgment entered after the trial court granted a motion for summary judgment filed by the City of Santa Barbara (City), respondent. Appellant contends that triable issues of material fact existed as to whether the City had constructive notice of the dangerous condition. Court affirm.

Defendants Christopher Ray Woods and Kevin Eugene Warner were convicted by a jury of first degree robbery (Pen. Code, 211[1]- count III), with the jury finding true that defendants acted in concert with two or more other persons in committing the robbery within an inhabited dwelling. ( 213, subd. (a)(1)(A).) The jury found true special enhancement allegations that Woods personally used a firearm during the commission of the robbery ( 12022.5, subd. (a), 12022.53, subd. (b)) and that during the commission of the robbery a principal was armed with a firearm. ( 12022, subd. (a)(1).) The jury found Woods guilty of being a felon in possession of a firearm. ( 12021, subd. (a) - count VII.) The jury acquitted Warner of false imprisonment by force or menace, but found him guilty of the lesser included offense of false imprisonment. ( 236 - count VI.) The jury acquitted defendants of several other charges, two counts were dismissed by the trial court under section 1118.1, and the court set aside improper jury verdicts regarding lesser included offenses to the robbery.
The judgments are affirmed.

Defendant Kenneth Bowers entered into a plea bargain that called for his plea of no contest to possession of cocaine base for sale and his sentence to be six years in state prison. During the same court hearing at which defendant entered his plea, the trial court released defendant on his own recognizance (O/R) pursuant to an agreement with defendant that defendant could be sentenced to up to 10 years in state prison if he did not appear at the time set for sentencing, November 3, 2005. Defendant did not appear at the time set for sentencing; he was picked up on a bench warrant; and, at sentencing, the trial court imposed a term of eight years in state prison. On appeal, defendant contends his conviction and sentence should be reversed and he should be allowed to withdraw his plea. He argues that his O/R release agreement, which provided for a greater sentence if he did not appear at sentencing, was not part of the plea bargain so that he should be allowed to withdraw his plea.
Court conclude defendants failure to obtain a certificate of probable cause is fatal to his appeal.

After 12 years of marriage appellant Robert M. Mead and respondent Carolyn Inez Williams divorced. As sometimes happens, the divorce settlement spawned lengthy, acrimonious litigation. Robert moved to set aside the judgment and filed a motion to quiet title. The trial court denied the motion. Robert, proceeding in propria persona, appeals, challenging the trial courts decision and arguing, among other things, that he was under the influence of the drug Vicodin when he agreed to the settlement. Court affirm the judgment.

Defendant Cecelia Antionette Zepeda entered a negotiated plea of guilty to dissuading a witness by force or threat (Pen. Code, 136.1, subd. (c)(1) count 6) and being an accessory after the fact ( 32 count 7), and was sentenced to an aggregate term of four years eight months in state prison, consisting of the upper term of four years on count 6, and a consecutive eight months (one third the middle term) on count 7.
On appeal, defendant claims (1) the trial court erred in refusing to stay her sentence on count 7 under section 654; (2) imposition of the upper term on count 6 violates the Sixth Amendment under Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. [166 L.Ed.2d 856] (Cunningham); and (3) the trial court erred in imposing the upper term by relying in part on two facts that are elements of one of the offenses to which she pleaded guilty. Court affirm the judgment.