CA Unpub Decisions

Julie M. appeals from an order terminating her parental rights (Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.26) to her pre-school aged son and daughter. Appellant contends the court erred by rejecting her argument that termination would be detrimental to the children based on their parent/child relationship ( 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A)). On review, Court affirm.

Petitioner in pro. per. seeks an extraordinary writ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.450-8.452) to vacate the orders of the juvenile court terminating reunification services and setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing. Court deny the petition.

Petitioner, in pro. per., seeks an extraordinary writ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.450, 8.452) to vacate the juvenile courts order setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing as to her infant daughter S. Court conclude her petition fails to comport with the procedural requirements of California Rules of Court, rule 8.452 (rule (8.452). Accordingly, Court dismiss the petition as facially inadequate.

Angel Torres along with Clinton J. Berg II, Richard Aguirre, Jim Chavez and Damien were employed by the respondent Auto Chlor Systems of Northern California, Inc. (Auto Chlor) against whom they asserted a claim for failure to pay overtime, illegal deductions from wages and relief under Business and Professions Code section 17200. They were employed as route sales technicians at Auto Chlor where they sold and serviced dishwashers made by Auto Chlor. During the same period that these plaintiffs claimed overtime, another employee of Auto Chlor, Merarl Richison, made a similar claim to the labor commission where the claim for overtime compensation was denied with the statement: The plaintiffs earnings exceeded one and one-half times the minimum and more than half of the plaintiffs earnings represented commissions. [] Under the Order overtime wages are not applicable. By reason thereof, plaintiff take nothing from the defendant. Wage Order No. 7 of California Code Regulations, title 8, section 11070(3)(d) provides provisions of subsections (A), (B), and (C) above shall not apply to any employee whos earnings succeed one and one half (1 1/2) times the minimum wage if more than half of that employees compensation represents commissions.
The motion for summary judgment was granted by the trial court on the ground that they were barred by the doctrine of res judicata as a result of his earlier voluntary dismissal and his failure to amend to raise any triable issue of fact.

Appellant, Angel Torres, concurrently appeals from the judgment and subsequent order awarding attorney fees and costs. The judgment and fee award order were entered after the trial court granted respondent, Auto Chlor of Northern Californias, motion for summary judgment on appellants complaint seeking damages for unpaid overtime and illegal wage deductions. Here, Court separately consider the appeal from the order awarding attorney fees pursuant to Labor Code section 218.5. Finding no error or abuse of discretion, Court affirm the judgment.

The Santa Clara County District Attorney charged defendant Timphony Orlando Walker with robbery and petty theft with a prior conviction and further alleged that he had two prior strike convictions. (Pen. Code, 211 2312.5, subd. (c), 666, 667, subds. (b)-(i).) Defendant pleaded not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. After the guilt phase of the trial, the jury convicted defendant of the two offenses. After the sanity phase, the jury found defendant not guilty by reason of insanity. After a court trial, the court found the prior conviction allegation true. At sentencing, the court committed defendant to the California Department of Mental Health for a maximum period of 25 years to life plus a consecutive 16 year term. (1026.)
On appeal from the judgment, defendant claims the court abused its discretion in denying his request for a continuance. Court reverse the judgment.

Appellant pleaded guilty to one count of murder and one count of conspiracy and admitted the personal use of a firearm. (Pen. Code, 187, 182, subd. (a)(1), 12022.53, subd. (d).) The trial court denied appellant's motion to withdraw his plea and sentenced him to a state prison term of 50 years to life. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Court reverse.

Following the denial of his motion to suppress evidence (Pen. Code, 1538.5),[1] defendant Wendell Retuta pleaded no contest to receiving stolen property ( 496, subd. (a)) and misdemeanor possession of controlled substance paraphernalia (Health & Saf. Code, 11364). The court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on probation for three years with various terms and conditions. On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress, as the search of his motel room was unreasonable. As Court find the probation search of defendants motel room to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, Court affirm the judgment.

Under a plea agreement, Demetris Wimberely pled guilty to assault with a semiautomatic firearm (Pen. Code,[1] 245, subd. (b)) and admitted he personally used a firearm within the meaning of section 12022.5, subdivision (a). The trial court sentenced Wimberely to the middle term of six years on the assault offense and to the middle term of four years on the firearm allegation for a total of 10 years in prison; this was in accord with the plea bargain, which called for maximum sentence lid of 10 years. Wimberely appeals, contending the court abused its discretion by denying probation. Alternatively, Wimberely claims the court should have imposed the lower terms for the assault and firearm allegation because the factors in mitigation outweighed the factors in aggravation. The judgment is affirmed.

In April 2006 in case No. SCN209428, Todd Schachter entered a negotiated guilty plea to possessing methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, 11377, subd. (a)). The court suspended imposition of sentence and placed him on three years' Proposition 36 drug treatment probation (Pen. Code, 1210.1). In May the court revoked probation when Schachter failed to appear at a review hearing. In July Schachter agreed to "self terminate" from Proposition 36 probation, and the court converted his probation to formal probation for an additional three years. In September the court revoked probation after a complaint was filed in case No. SCN217089. In October in case No. SCN217089, Schachter entered a negotiated guilty plea to possessing methamphetamine and three misdemeanor appropriating lost property (Pen. Code, 485, 488), possessing drug paraphernalia (Health & Saf. Code, 11364) and possessing marijuana (Health & Saf. Code, 11357, subd. (b) and admitted a prior prison term (Pen. Code, 667.5, subd. (b)). The court sentenced Schachter to three years in prison: the three year upper term for possessing methamphetamine in case No. SCN209428 and a stipulated three year concurrent sentence in case No. SCN217089 (the two year middle term for possessing methamphetamine, one year for the prison prior and concurrent terms for the misdemeanors). Schachter appeals. Court affirm.

Marco Antonio Dominguez entered a negotiated guilty plea pursuant to People v. West (1970) 3 Cal.3d 595 to transporting cocaine base (Health & Saf. Code, 11352, subd. (a)) that was not for personal use (Pen. Code, 1210, subd. (a)) and possessing cocaine base for sale (Health & Saf. Code, 11351.5). The court placed him on three years' probation. Dominguez appeals. Court affirm.

jury found Drafton Bunch guilty of selling cocaine base (Health & Saf. Code, 11352, subd. (a)) (count 1) and possessing cocaine base for sale (Health & Saf. Code, 11351.5) (count 2). The court sentenced him to 10 years in prison: the four-year middle term for selling cocaine base, a stayed term (Pen. Code, 654) for possessing cocaine base for sale, and, at issue in this appeal, three years each for two Health and Safety Code section 11370.2, subdivision (a) enhancements.[1] Bunch appeals, contending he never admitted, and the People never proved, the allegations underlying these enhancements, or allegations of a third Health and Safety Code section 11370.2, subdivision (a) prior conviction; three Penal Code section 1203.07, subdivision (a)(11) probation denial prior convictions;[2]four Penal Code section 1203, subdivision (e)(4) probation denial prior convictions;[3]and prior prison terms (Pen. Code, 667.5, subd. (b), 668). Court conclude there was insufficient evidence to support the court's findings the allegations were true.

L.G. and Elva G. (together the parents) appeal orders declaring their minor children Elizabeth G. and K.G. (K.) (together the minors) dependents of the juvenile court under Welfare and Institutions Code[1]section 300, subdivisions (b) and (f) and removing them from parental custody under section 361, subdivision (c)(1). The parents contend: (1) the facts did not support a finding Elva confessed to murdering the minors' sibling; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support the court's dispositional order removing the minors from L.G.'s custody; and (3) the court abused its discretion by failing to apply the relative placement preference of section 361.3 and Family Code section 7950. We conclude the court did not find Elva confessed to murder, but direct the court to amend the petitions, as sustained, to conform to its oral findings in this regard. In all other respects, Court affirm the orders.

Anthony appeals a judgment of the juvenile court terminating his parental rights to his minor children, Christopher D., R.W., and Trenton W., (together minors) under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.[1] Anthony contends the court erred by denying his section 388 petition for modification seeking either return of the minors to his care, or alternatively, for additional services. He also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court's finding the beneficial parent child relationship exception of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) did not apply to preclude terminating his parental rights. Court affirm the judgment.