CA Unpub Decisions

R.S. and Andrew L. (together the parents) appeal a judgment of the juvenile court terminating their parental rights to their minor daughter Caitlyn L. under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. The parents challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court's finding the beneficial parent child relationship exception of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) did not apply to preclude terminating parental rights. They also contend the court erred by denying R.S.'s request for a continuance to complete a bonding study. Court affirm the judgment.

In November 2005 the Orange County Superior Court adjudged Amber M. a ward under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 after sustaining a true finding for misdemeanor battery. After a series of transfers between Orange County Superior Court and San Diego Superior Court, in August 2007, Amber began living with her mother again in Oceanside and her case was returned to San Diego Superior Court. San Diego Superior Court set the case for detention hearing on August 24, 2007. When Amber did not appear for the hearing, the court issued a bench warrant. Police arrested Amber on the warrant on September 12. The order of September 13, 2007, detaining Amber pending the September 27 disposition hearing is reversed, and the matter remanded to superior court for further proceedings as appropriate.

Defendant Jerome Eads appeals from his conviction of the first degree murder (Pen. Code,[1] 187, subd. (a)) of Mario Gutierrez, Sr. Eads contends (1) the trial court violated his rights to due process of law and to a jury trial by refusing his request for a separate jury; (2) or, in the alternative, his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to move for severance; and (3) the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that it could consider voluntary intoxication in determining whether he deliberated and premeditated or harbored express malice aforethought at the time of the killing. In addition, each defendant joins in the arguments of the other defendants to the extent such arguments accrue to their benefit. Court find no prejudicial error, and Court affirm.

Salvatore A. Buono (Husband) appeals from the judgment of dissolution of his marriage to Carolyn N. Beggs (Wife). He challenges the trial courts order awarding the couples residence to Wife, setting child support at $454 per month, awarding custody of the minor child to Wife, and limiting Husbands visitation. The judgment is affirmed.

Defendant was charged in an information with one count of receiving stolen property (Pen. Code, 496, subd. (a)), and it was also alleged that defendant had three prison prior terms ( 667.5, subd. (b)). Defendant filed a written motion to suppress evidence under section 1538.5. The trial court denied the motion. Following trial, the jury found defendant guilty as charged. The trial court granted the Peoples request to dismiss one prison prior allegation and found the remaining two prison priors to be true. The trial court sentenced defendant to the middle term of two years for receiving stolen property, plus a consecutive one year term for each of the two prison priors. The judgment is affirmed.

A jury found defendant guilty of assault with a firearm (Pen. Code, 245, subd. (a)(2), count 1),[1]discharging a firearm in a grossly negligent manner ( 246.3, count 2), and being a felon in possession of a firearm ( 12021, subd. (a)(1), count 3).[2] As part of count 1, the jury found true the allegation that defendant personally used a firearm during the commission of a felony. ( 12022.5, subd. (a).) In a bifurcated proceeding, the court found, as to all counts, that defendant suffered a prior conviction for a serious or violent felony. ( 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d).) The court sentenced defendant to 17 years 4 months in state prison.
Defendant contends the charge in count 3, felon in possession of a firearm, is necessarily included in the offense of assault with a firearm when enhanced with the findings that he personally used a firearm and suffers from a prior conviction for a serious or violent felony. Alternatively, defendant contends his sentence for count 3 must be stayed pursuant to section 654. Defendant further contends the court violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial by sentencing him to the upper term for the enhancement of personally using a firearm based upon facts that were not found by a jury to be true beyond a reasonable doubt. Court affirm the judgment.

Appellant A.T. (mother) is the mother of three minors, Marco R., J.T., and G.S. (the children). Mother appeals from the juvenile courts decision at a hearing held under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26[1]to terminate her parental rights to the children. Specifically, mother argues that the courts ruling should be reversed because the court erred when it found that the requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C 1901, et seq.) (ICWA), had been complied with. Specifically, the juvenile court should have required the childrens fathers to fill out a JV-130 form regarding any possible Native American heritage. As discussed below, Court find that mother did not make the required showing of prejudice and thus affirm the juvenile courts ruling terminating parental rights.

Defendant Central Unified School District (CUSD) appeals from a judgment entered in favor of plaintiff Pauline Dedekian (Dedekian) after a court trial on her claim that CUSD violated the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov. Code, 12900 et seq.[1]) when it failed to engage in a good faith interactive process to identify reasonable accommodations of her disabilities and awarding Dedekian attorney fees. On appeal, CUSD contends (1) the trial court erred by failing to find CUSD was not required to engage in the interactive process as a matter of law; (2) the trial courts decision is not supported by substantial evidence; and (3) the trial court abused its discretion in determining the amount of attorney fees. As Court explain, Court affirm both the judgment and the post judgment order awarding attorney fees.

K.B. (Mother) appeals a dispositional order dated December 1, 2006, entered with respect to now one-year-old B. and six-year-old A. (collectively, the minors). Mother contends the evidence was insufficient to support the juvenile courts findings that B. was within the courts jurisdiction under Welfare and Institutions Code[1]section 300, subdivision (e), and that A. was within the courts jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (a) and subdivision (b). Mother also challenges the courts order removing A. from her care and custody. Court affirm.

Appellant, Jeffrey Todd Eastman, Jr., stands convicted of two counts of committing a lewd or lascivious act upon a child under the age of 14 (Pen. Code, 288, subd. (a))[1], following his negotiated plea of no contest to both counts. He appealed, and in People v. Eastman (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 688 (Eastman I), this court reversed the judgment and ordered, inter alia, that the trial court hold a hearing on appellants Marsden motion, i.e., his motion for appointment of substitute counsel under People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden). (Eastman I, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at p. 699.) On February 16, 2007, the court conducted a hearing on appellants Marsden motion, denied the motion, and reinstated the judgment. The instant appeal followed. The judgment is affirmed.

The sole issue raised on this appeal is whether the superior court erred in dismissing the action based upon the nonjoinder of a party under Code of Civil Procedure section 389. Court conclude that the courts ruling does not adequately address the requirements of section 389. Accordingly, Court reverse and remand for a reconsideration of defendants demurrer and motion to dismiss for nonjoinder of a party.

A jury convicted defendant Carlos Hernandez of 30 counts of lewd or lascivious acts upon a child under the age of 14 in violation of Penal Code section 288, subdivision (a). On appeal, defendant asserts four errors: (1) the trial court erred when it denied his Batson/Wheeler[1] motion; (2) the introduction of evidence of uncharged sexual offenses to show defendants propensity to commit sexual offenses violated his rights to due process and a fair trial; (3) the use of generic testimony violated his rights to present a defense and due process, and was insufficient as a matter of law; and (4) the order that defendant pay restitution in the amount of $10,000 to each of his two victims was unconstitutional. Court agree that the restitution order was improper, but affirm the judgment of conviction in all other respects.

A jury convicted defendant Sonya Deniece Rankin of two counts of conspiracy (Pen. Code, 182, subd. (a)(1));[1] 10 counts of grand theft ( 487, subd. (a)); and one count of possession of stolen property ( 496). The jury found that the loss was over $150,000 within the meaning of section 12022.6, subdivisions (a)(2) and (b), and over $100,000 within the meaning of section 1203.045, subdivision (a). The jury further found that the crimes involved a pattern of fraudulent conduct and a taking of over $500,000 ( 186.11, subds. (a)(1), (2)), and that defendant was out on bail when she committed four of the crimes ( 12022.1).
Defendants upper term and consecutive sentences are appropriate. Defendants argument that Sandoval invalidates jury determined aggravating circumstances is moot. The judgment and sentence are affirmed.

Defendant City of Oakland (City) appeals from a judgment awarding Carl J. Navarra damages for personal injuries he sustained in a vehicular accident. The City contends the evidence of causation was insufficient to support the jurys verdict, the trial court made various erroneous rulings, and the verdict should be set aside for juror misconduct. Court affirm.