CA Unpub Decisions
California Unpublished Decisions
A.Q. and Jaime Q. appeal an order terminating parental rights to their daughter Tiffany Q. and placing her for adoption. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.26, 395.)[1] On appeal, they claim the juvenile court erred in failing to ensure that the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C.A. 1901 et seq.) notice requirements were met.
The order terminating Jaimes and A.s parental rights is conditionally reversed, and the matter is remanded to the juvenile court with directions that the Department conduct further investigation and provide all known ancestral information to the identified tribes. |
The defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of attempted pimping of a minor and lewd or lascivious act on a child without force. The court, after holding a hearing on appellants claim of presentence credit, sentenced the defendant to nine years in prison and gave him 15 days of credit for actual time served plus two days of conduct credit for a total of 17 days.
The appellant raises a single issue in this appeal, namely that he is entitled to additional presentence custody credit because of a period of nine months that he spent in prison resulting from parole revocation. Court affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Appellant was convicted, pursuant to a plea agreement, of false imprisonment and battery with serious bodily injury. On appeal, he contends the trial courts imposition of an upper term sentence was unconstitutional because the court relied on factors not found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. He also contends the imposition of consecutive terms was improper both because the reason stated by the court was inadequate to justify its decision and because the court relied on factors not found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Court agree that imposition of an upper term sentence was unconstitutional and shall therefore remand to the trial court for resentencing. Court otherwise affirm the judgment.
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Defendant Jeffery Martin Wolf appeals from a judgment entered following his guilty plea to, among other things, one count of assault with a deadly weapon. He contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his plea pursuant to Penal Code section 1018.[1] He argues that his plea was defective because he was not advised that under section 1203, subdivision (e), his admission of the aggravated assault created a statutory presumption against probation. Court conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion because, when his plea was accepted, there was not a climate of real anticipation that probation was likely. (People v. Vento (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 876, 879 (Vento).)
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In this action concerning the sale of PT Cruiser automobiles, plaintiff Harry Allen appeals from two orders by the trial court: (1) a December 16, 2004 statement of decision granting summary adjudication for defendant DaimlerChrysler Motors Company LLC (DCMC) on all claims except a single claim brought under the Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA) (Civ. Code, 1750 et seq.) and (2) a March 9, 2006 order denying class certification based on Allens sole remaining claim. Court conclude that the December 16, 2004 statement of decision is not an appealable order. Accordingly, we dismiss this portion of Allens appeal. We also conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Allens motion for class certification. Court thus affirm the March 9, 2006 order.
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Lawrence Gore, defendant, pleaded no contest to vandalism causing damage in excess of $400. (Pen. Code, 594, subd. (a).) Defendant also admitted allegations of a prior strike conviction ( 1170.12, subds. (a)(d)) and three prior prison terms ( 667.5, subd. (b)). The court sentenced him to nine years in prison. Following a contested restitution hearing, the court also ordered defendant to pay the victim restitution in the amount of $3,211.43. On appeal, defendant contends that the court abused its discretion in determining the amount of the restitution.
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Joseph L., born September 1989, appeals an order of the juvenile court declaring him a ward of the court (Welf. & Inst. Code, 602) and ordering his out-of-home placement after the court found he had committed sodomy (Pen. Code, 286, subd. (c)) and a lewd act on a child under 14 years old (Pen. Code, 288, subd. (a).) His counsel has advised that examination of the record reveals no arguable issues. (Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738; People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Counsel has informed his client in writing that a Wende brief was being filed and that defendant had the right to personally file a supplemental brief in this case within 30 days. No supplemental brief has been filed.
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Plaintiff Maria Montoya was injured when the city bus she was riding stopped suddenly. Following discovery, defendant City and County of San Francisco (the City) moved for summary judgment. The City supported its motion with deposition testimony from the bus driver, who explained that he stopped in order to prevent a traffic accident with a reckless motorist. Plaintiff submitted no evidence contradicting the drivers explanation. Finding that plaintiff had failed to demonstrate a prima facie case of negligence, the trial court granted summary judgment. Court affirm.
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David L. Strong (defendant) pleaded guilty to one count of felony brandishing for the benefit of a criminal gang (Pen. Code, 417, subd. (a)(2); 186.22, subd. (d)). He waived his right to appeal except for sentencing error. He also waived the possibility of a misdemeanor disposition, the right to a jury trial on sentencing factors, and the right not to have dismissed counts considered at sentencing. In accordance with the terms of the plea the court dismissed the remaining counts of assault with a firearm ( 245, subd. (a)(2)) with an allegation of personal firearm use ( 1192.7, subd. (c)(8); 12022.5, subds. (a) & (d)) and being an accessory after the fact to an assault with a deadly weapon ( 32). The sentence was left open to the court, and it imposed the upper term of three years.
Defendants sole contention on appeal is that the court abused its discretion in imposing the upper term. Court find that the selection and imposition of the upper term was within the courts discretion, and affirm the judgment. |
Defendant Jesse Howard Chidester III appeals from a judgment imposing a two-year prison sentence upon his plea of no contest to attempted unlawful taking of a vehicle and his admission of a prior strike. His attorney has filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 requesting this court to independently review the record, which we have done. Defendant was advised of his right to file a supplemental brief but has not done so. Court affirm.
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Defendant Randy Conk appeals from a judgment and sentence after revocation of his probation and imposition of sentence. His court appointed counsel has filed a brief seeking our independent review of the record, pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738, in order to determine whether there is any arguable issue on appeal. Court find no arguable issue and affirm.
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On January 22, 2007 petitioner Jesus Lopez filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in San Francisco County Superior Court, challenging the Governors December 21, 2006 reversal of the Board of Parole Hearings August 10, 2006 decision to grant him parole. Thus, pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 4.551(a)(3)(A), petitioner was entitled to a ruling on his petition by March 23, 2007. When no decision was issued, taking the appropriate step provided for by rule 4.551(a)(3)(B), petitioner filed a motion in the superior court, dated May 20, 2007, seeking a ruling from the superior court within 60 days. This decision is final as to this court immediately. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.264 (b)(3).)
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A multiple count information was filed against appellant Manuel DeJesus Hernandez, alleging, inter alia, that he had engaged in lewd acts upon a child. The judgment following appellants first trial was reversed, and the matter was remanded for retrial. At appellants second trial, a jury found appellant guilty on all counts. Court affirm the judgment following the second trial.
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Charles Smith was convicted of second degree commercial burglary (Pen. Code,[1] 459) and sentenced to a total of seven years in prison. He appeals on the ground that the imposition of the upper term sentence violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial as set forth in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 (Apprendi), Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296 (Blakely), and Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. [127 S.Ct. 856] (Cunningham). Court affirm.
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