CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant, Conrrado Figueroa, appeals from his conviction for willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder. (Pen. Code, 187, subd. (a). 664, subd. (a).) Also, the jurors found defendant personally used and discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury and the attempted murder was committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang. ( 186.22, subd. (b)(1), 12022.53, subds. (b), (c), (d), (e)(1).) Defendant argues: the trial court improperly refused to excuse a juror; there was insufficient evidence to support the criminal street gang finding; and the definition of reasonable doubt in CALCRIM No. 220 violated his federal due process rights. The judgment is affirmed.

Defendant, S&W Towing and Storage Corporation, purports to appeal after pleading guilty to nine felony charges. We noted that we may not have jurisdiction. We have a duty to raise issues concerning our jurisdiction on our own motion. (Jennings v. Marralle (1994) 8 Cal.4th 121, 126; Olson v. Cory (1983) 35 Cal.3d 390, 398.) Hence, we issued an order to show cause concerning possible dismissal of the appeal and set the matter for oral argument. The appeal is dismissed.

Glen Mason (Mason) appeals from the trial courts order denying his petition for writ of error coram nobis. On May 3, 1979, Mason pled guilty to two counts of second degree burglary (Pen. Code, 459)[1]and was granted three years probation on the condition he serve the first eight months in county jail. On December 12, 2006, Mason filed in the superior court a petition for writ of error coram nobis, alleging use of his 1979 convictions to enhance his sentence in a 1997 Orange County Superior Court case was improper. Mason urged use of his 1979 convictions in this way amounted to a direct breach of the contract or negotiated plea entered into with the State/Government [i]n . . . 1979.
Court affirm the judgment (order denying the petition for writ of error coram nobis).

Hopeton P. appeals from the adjudication and disposition orders issued on February 9, 2007 with respect to the Welfare and Institutions Code section 777 petition filed on January 19, 2007.
Court appointed counsel to represent minor in this appeal. After examining the record, counsel filed a letter pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441, in which she indicated that she was unable to file an opening brief on the merits on minor's behalf. On September 18, 2007, we advised minor that he had 30 days in which to personally submit any contentions or arguments he wished us to consider. No response has been received to date. Court have reviewed the entire record and are satisfied that minor's appellate attorney has fully complied with her responsibilities and that no arguable issues exist. (People v. Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 441.) The judgment is affirmed.

Michael Fabricant appeals from the judgment entered following his guilty plea to unlawfully taking to driving a car. (Veh. Code, 10851, subd. (a).) Pursuant to the negotiated plea, appellant admitted two prior prison term enhancements (Pen Code, 667.5, subd. (b)) and pled guilty in a second case (case no. 2006006387) to conspiracy to transport marijuana. (Pen. Code, 182, subd. (a)(1); Health & Saf. Code, 11360.) The trial court sentenced appellant to an aggregate term of five years state prison and ordered him to pay restitution fines totaling $600 (Pen. Code, 1202.4, subd. (b)), parole revocation fines totaling $600 (Pen. Code, 1202.45), and $3,542 victim restitution (Pen. Code, 1202.4, subd. (f)). Court appointed counsel to represent appellant in this appeal. After examination of the record, counsel filed an opening brief in which no issues were raised. The judgment is affirmed.

Following a joint jurisdictional hearing for minors E.J. (hereafter appellant) and J.H. (hereafter Chris), the juvenile court sustained charges against each minor of conspiracy to commit murder (Pen. Code, 182, subd. (a)(1), 187)[1]and, as to appellant only, a charge of making a criminal threat ( 422). Each minor was declared a ward of the court and ordered to serve time in juvenile hall to be followed by formal probation in the home of his parents.
Appellant contends (1) the evidence is insufficient to support either charge; (2) remand is required for the juvenile court to declare whether the offense of making a criminal threat was a felony or misdemeanor; and (3) the court violated his federal and state constitutional rights when, as a condition of probation, it ordered him not to associate with anyone on probation. Court affirm the sustaining of the conspiracy charge, reverse the criminal threat finding, and modify the probationary condition.

Following a joint jurisdictional hearing for minors J.H. (hereafter appellant) and E.J. (hereafter Alex), the juvenile court sustained a charge against each minor of conspiracy to commit murder (Pen. Code, 182, subd. (a)(1), 187)[1]and, as to Alex only, a charge of making a criminal threat ( 422). Each minor was declared a ward of the court and ordered to serve time in juvenile hall to be followed by formal probation in the home of his parents. On appeal, appellant contends (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the conspiracy finding, (2) the juvenile court erred when it found he was both ineligible and unsuitable for deferred entry of judgment, and (3) a probation condition that he not associate with anyone on probation is constitutionally vague. We reject appellants first two claims, but agree with the third and, accordingly, Court modify the probation condition.

Defendant was convicted by a jury of possession of a firearm within 10 years of having been convicted of misdemeanor battery. (Pen. Code, 12021, subd. (c)(1).) Imposition of sentence was suspended and defendant was placed on probation for five years. He appealed, challenging the denial of his suppression motion and one of the conditions of probation.
On June 21, 2007, Court issued an opinion affirming the judgment in its entirety, concluding the suppression motion was properly denied and defendant forfeited his challenge to the probation condition by failing to object below. Defendant filed a petition for rehearing, arguing our determination of fofeiture conflicts with a recent decision of the state Supreme Court, In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875 (Sheena K.). Court granted the petition. Court now reissue our opinion, affirming the judgment but modifying the probation condition.

A jury convicted defendant Gregory Scott Woodcox of using a false compartment with intent to transport a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, 11366.8, subd. (a)). In bifurcated proceedings, the court found four prior prison term allegations (Pen. Code, 667.5, subd. (b)) to be true. Sentenced to state prison, defendant appeals, contending the trial court erroneously denied his request to represent himself with advisory counsel. Court disagree and affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted defendant Andre Leon Hoffman of corporal injury to a cohabitant (Pen. Code, 273.5, subd. (a); unspecified section references that follow are to the Penal Code), and the trial court found prior convictions and prison term allegations to be true. ( 667.5, subd. (b), 1170.12.) The trial court sentenced defendant to the upper term of four years, resulting in an aggregate sentence of 10 years under the three strikes law. The court also ordered defendant to pay $1,831.65 in victim restitution. ( 1202.4, subd. (f).) On appeal, defendant contends that (1) the trial courts imposition of the upper term sentence violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial under Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. [166 L.Ed.2d 856] (Cunningham), and (2) his attorney was ineffective in failing to request a restitution hearing. Court remand for a restitution hearing and otherwise affirm the judgment.

In a fit of anger, defendant James Robertson ripped two hanks of hair from the head of his fiances six year old son when he picked the child up by his hair. Thereafter, defendant pleaded guilty to one count of willfully and unlawfully inflicting cruel and inhuman corporal punishment and injury, resulting in a traumatic condition, upon a child in violation of Penal Code section 273d. (Unspecified section references that follow are to the Penal Code.) The court sentenced defendant to state prison. On appeal, defendant contends the court had no jurisdictional power to make the no contact order; the People concede the error. The no contact order is stricken and the judgment is otherwise affirmed.

Defendant Kevin Davenport was convicted of various crimes connected to his theft of a video camera. Pursuant to the Three Strikes law, he was sentenced to 25 years to life in prison. On appeal, he contends (1) the prosecutor committed misconduct in closing argument by diluting the reasonable doubt standard and by urging the jurors not to deliberate, (2) the trial court deprived defendant of a jury trial on the issue of identity regarding the prior conviction allegations, (3) the trial court abused its discretion by denying his Romero[1]motion to dismiss his prior convictions, and (4) his 25-year to life sentence is cruel and/or unusual punishment. Court affirm the judgment.

Defendant Michael Thomas Scott, a truck driver, was convicted of grand theft and vehicle theft after he failed to deliver a load of goods and disappeared with his employers truck. Pursuant to the Three Strikes law, he was sentenced to 25 years to life. On appeal, he contends (1) the trial court abused its discretion by denying his Romero[1]motion to dismiss his prior convictions, (2) his 25 year to life sentence is cruel and/or unusual punishment, and (3) the trial court failed to hold the required hearing to determine whether defendant had the ability to pay a $250 presentence report fee, and the courts implied finding that he had the ability to pay the fee was not supported by substantial evidence. Finding no merit in defendants contentions, Court affirm the judgment.

Plaintiff Genesis Commercial Capital, LLC (Genesis), a California limited liability company, sued defendants Olivier Video Productions, Inc., a Texas corporation, and Jay Olivier, a Texas resident, doing business as Olivier Productions (collectively the defendants), for the return of motion picture equipment leased to the defendants, as well as additional rent allegedly incurred by the defendants since the original equipment lease terms ended. The defendants filed a motion seeking, inter alia, dismissal of the complaint based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The trial court granted the defendants motion on that ground, ordered the action dismissed without prejudice, and denied the defendants subsequent motion seeking prevailing party attorney fees pursuant to the subject equipment lease agreements. Genesis appealed from the order of dismissal, and the defendants appealed from the order denying them prevailing party attorney fees.
Because Court reverse the trial courts order dismissing the action, the defendants contention the trial court erred by failing to award them prevailing party attorney fees is moot.