CA Unpub Decisions

This is an appeal from an order denying a motion to certify a class action in causes of action alleging defendants violation of the California Franchise Investment Law (Corp. Code section 31000 et seq. (CFIL)) and common law intentional misrepresentation. We find that the trial court made erroneous assumptions of law in finding that individual issues predominated over common issues of law and fact with regard to reliance. Plaintiff has alleged facts which create at least an inference of plaintiffs reliance on defendants representations, which induced plaintiff to agree to amend a franchise agreement. The trial courts finding that individualized proof would be required on the issues of causation and damages used inappropriate criteria. The need for individual proof of causation and damages does not defeat class certification. This analysis also applies to plaintiffs cause of action for intentional misrepresentation. Court reverse the order denying the class certification motion.

The jury convicted appellant of multiple offenses against his former girlfriend, Lena Taylor, occurring over a one-week period in March 2004. He was convicted of stalking (Pen. Code, 646.9, subd. (a)),[1]first degree residential burglary ( 459), two counts of assault with a firearm ( 245, subd. (a)(2)), misdemeanor assault ( 240), misdemeanor battery ( 242), misdemeanor battery against a person who is the parent of appellants child ( 243, subd. (e)(1)), and criminal threats ( 422). The jury also found that appellant had personally used a firearm in the commission of the assault ( 12022.5, subd. (a); 1203.06, subd. (a)(1)). He was acquitted of numerous other charges. The court sentenced appellant to a total term of 16 years 4 months in state prison.
The judgment of conviction is affirmed.

Kamlesh Banga (Banga) filed suit against her former mortgage lender Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (Countrywide), alleging federal and state law claims relating to Countrywides disclosure of allegedly inaccurate information regarding the status of Bangas loan account. The trial court granted Countrywide summary judgment. Banga, who has represented herself throughout these proceedings, asks this court to reverse both the judgment and a post judgment attorney fee order. Court affirm.

Barry Creath Whitley appeals from an order extending his commitment to the Department of Mental Health for treatment and confinement at Coalinga State Hospital, entered after the trial court found him to be a sexually violent predator under the Sexually Violent Predators Act (SVPA). (Welf. & Inst. Code, 6600 et seq.) Court affirm the order.

Defendant appeals from the sentence imposed by the trial court following a jury trial. He contends that imposition of the upper term violated his federal constitutional right to a jury trial. In light of the California Supreme Courts recent decision in People v. Black (2007) 41 Cal.4th 799 (Black II ), Court affirm the judgment.

Appellants, an attorney and his law firm, recorded a lis pendens after initiating a quiet title action against respondent.[1] Respondent in turn sued appellants and others on a slander of title theory and succeeded in defeating appellants motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. The trial court correctly determined that appellants satisfied their burden under the first prong of the anti SLAPP statute but, since the litigation privilege affords immunity to the underlying activity of recording the lis pendens, it erred in concluding that respondent had shown a probability of prevailing on the merits of her claim. Accordingly, Court reverse the order denying appellants section 425.16 motion to strike.

In 1991, plaintiff Mui Ung gave a promissory note to defendant Henry Koehler, secured by a deed of trust on real property. Over 10 years later, defendant filed a notice of default and sought nonjudicial foreclosure to recover unpaid sums under the note. In an earlier lawsuit, which was appealed to this court, plaintiff unsuccessfully contended that the notice of default was time barred.Rather than appeal entry of the injunction, defendant moved to strike portions of the complaint on the same res judicata theory. When that was unsuccessful, defendant asked the trial court to modify or dissolve the injunction, again on res judicata grounds. Defendant has now appealed the trial courts denial of the latter motion. Court affirm, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to modify or dissolve and that res judicata does not bar plaintiffs claim for redemption.

This is an appeal challenging the validity of a guilty plea entered by appellant Bernard Warren on one count of grand theft of property. Appellant seeks reversal of the sentence and judgment against him on the ground that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Court affirm.

Pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), appellant appeals from an order of the Sonoma County Superior Court revoking his outpatient status pursuant to Penal Code section 1608. As authorized by Wende, appellant asks us to examine the record and determine if there are any issues which are deserving of further briefing and, if so, to order the same. Court have done so, have found no such issues, and thus affirm the section 1608 order appealed from.

On April 6, 2007, defendant and appellant Michael Masliakoff (appellant) filed a notice of appeal with respect to superior court case number 194190/municipal court case number 2183755 (hereinafter case number 194190/2183755). Appellants counsel has filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, asking that we independently review the record in order to determine whether it contains any arguable sentencing issues or other post plea issues. Having done so, Court affirm.

Edward R. (Father) seeks an extraordinary writ to set aside an order of the Solano County Superior Court, Juvenile Division, which denied him reunification services and set a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 to select permanent plans for Robert R. (born Dec. 2006). As discussed below, Court find no prejudicial error and deny his petition on the merits.

D.A. appeals from an order of wardship pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 upon a finding that he committed a second degree robbery on victim Alvaro H. (Pen. Code, 211), assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury also on victim Alvaro H. (Pen. Code, 245, subd. (a)(1)), and simple battery on victim Jorge Z. (Pen. Code, 242/243, subd. (a).) Appellant was placed in a camp community placement program for six months and he contends the inadequacy of the record on appeal requires reversal of the order of wardship. Additionally he claims the juvenile court erred by failing to declare on the record whether the assault offense was a felony or a misdemeanor and that the juvenile court should have stayed the assault offense pursuant to Penal Code section 654. For reasons stated in the opinion Court affirm the order of wardship and remand the matter for the juvenile court to exercise its discretion to declare the previously sustained assault offense a felony or misdemeanor.

The juvenile court sustained four petitions alleging that appellant Anthony P. had engaged in attempted carjacking, carjacking, and kidnapping during the commission of carjacking, and ordered appellant placed with the California Youth Authority (CYA) for a maximum term of life plus 13 years. Court affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

In this action for injunctive relief and damages, the trial court denied plaintiffs request for a jury trial and, after conducting a bench trial on the parties dispute over the express or implied contractual right to use an access road, entered judgment for defendants. Court conclude that plaintiffs were not entitled to a jury trial of the contract dispute, and that portion of the judgment is affirmed. As for the fourth and ninth causes of action for tort damages, which were not tried, that portion of the judgment is reversed for the limited purpose of allowing the plaintiffs to present any additional evidence.