CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant and respondent Edward Elio Galantes attorney, Simon Bull, obtained a writ of arrest in Zimbabwe against plaintiff and appellant Topaz Summerfield, as part of Galantes attempt to recover property from his estranged wife, who is Topazs sister. Topaz and her infant daughter, plaintiff and appellant Sable Summerfield, were arrested and incarcerated after Zimbabwe authorities arrived to serve the writ of arrest. A Zimbabwe judge later ruled that there was no factual basis for the writ of arrest as to Topaz. Upon their return, Topaz and Sable filed an action against Galante in Los Angeles.we reverse the judgment as to the causes of action for false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious continuation of a civil proceeding. In all other respects, Court affirm the judgment.

Appellant Anthony Bravo was convicted, following a jury trial, of one count of possessing an assault weapon in violation of Penal Code section 12280, subdivision (b),[1]one count of possessing a firearm while having a prior conviction in violation of section 12021.1 and one count of possessing ammunition in violation of section 12316, subdivision (b)(1). The trial court found true the allegations that appellant had suffered two prior serious or violent felony convictions within the meaning of sections 667, subdivisions (b) through (i) and 1170.12, subdivisions (a) through (d) and had served two prior prison terms within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b). The court sentenced appellant to a total term in prison of 25 years to life.
Appellant appeals from the judgment of conviction, contending that the trial court erred in the procedure it followed in ruling on his motions to suppress evidence and to quash and traverse the warrant, and further contending that there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction for possession of ammunition. He also contends that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to strike one of his prior convictions. Court affirm the judgment of conviction.

A jury convicted appellant Eduardo Linares of second degree murder as a lesser included offense of felony murder during a robbery. The jury found true the allegation that a principal was armed with a firearm in the commission of the murder. (Pen. Code, 187, subd. (a); 12022, subd. (a)(1).) The trial court sentenced appellant to prison for a total of 16 years to life. Appellant appeals on the grounds that: (1) he was denied his constitutional right to due process of law because the evidence was insufficient to support his second degree murder conviction; (2) the trial court erred when it denied appellants new trial motion on the ground that the jurys verdict was contrary to the evidence; alternatively, the trial court erred when it failed to identify the target crime and describe the elements of the target crime under the natural and probable consequence doctrine; (3) the court committed reversible error, lessened the Peoples burden of proof, and denied appellant his right to trial by jury and due process of law by giving a legally incorrect definition of malice; (4) the trial court committed prejudicial error when, in response to the jurys first request for more clarification on second degree murder and manslaughter, and its third request for clarification of the words intentional act, it directed the jury back to the given jury instructions; and (5) the cumulative effect of the instructional errors requires reversal. The judgment is affirmed.

Appellant Stanley Lebron Heath (Heath) was convicted on two counts of assault on a peace officer with a semiautomatic firearm (Pen. Code, 245, subd. (d)(2));[1]one count of carrying a concealed firearm ( 12025, subd. (a)(2)); three counts of second degree robbery ( 211); one count of making a criminal threat ( 211); and one count of false imprisonment ( 236). He was sentenced to 27 years in state prison. On appeal, Heath advances the following contentions: (1) the trial court erred when it denied his motion for the appointment of substitute counsel pursuant to People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden); (2) there was insufficient evidence to convict him for assault on a police officer with a semiautomatic weapon; and (3) he was prejudiced when the trial court failed to instruct the jury on a lesser included offense of assault on a nonpeace officer with a semiautomatic weapon. Court affirm.

This action concerns the priority of defense obligations between two insurers with respect to an underlying trademark infringement action against their mutual insured, Skechers U.S.A., Inc. (Skechers). Appellant, Hartford Casualty Insurance Company (Hartford), denied coverage under a commercial general liability insurance policy it issued to Skechers and refused to defend Skechers in the underlying action. Hartford contends the judgment must be reversed because it owed no duty to defend Skechers in the underlying action, and because equitable principles preclude the trial court from imposing on Hartford the entire burden of defending Skechers. Court affirm the judgment.

This is an appeal from a sanctions order (Code Civ. Proc., 2025.430, 2023.030, subd. (a)) in the amount of $14,792. Court affirm.

After plaintiff and respondent Merrilee Reid (Merrilee)[1]sued Elaine Featherstone[2]and defendants and appellants Richard Knickerbocker and the Knickerbocker Law Corporation (collectively, Knickerbocker) for malicious prosecution, Featherstone filed a motion to dismiss the action under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (the anti-SLAPP statute).[3] Knickerbocker joined the anti-SLAPP motion. The trial court initially granted the motion; however, it subsequently denied the motion after finding Merrilee was entitled to relief under section 473, subdivision (b), based on the mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect of her attorney. In Knickerbockers timely appeal, it is contended the trial court erred in granting the section 473 motion because (1) Merrilee was jurisdictionally limited to seeking relief via a motion for reconsideration under section 1008, and Merrilee failed to establish an entitlement to relief under that section, and (2) even if the trial court had authority to grant relief under section 473, it exceeded its discretion in doing so. Alternatively, Knickerbocker contends the denial of the anti-SLAPP motion was erroneous. Court agree with the second contention and, therefore, have no occasion to reach the others: Although the evidence supported the trial courts finding that counsels error was caused by the emotional strain he was suffering during the time, the discretionary relief provision of section 473, subdivision (b) does not afford relief for the kind of mistakes in legal advocacy that was made in this case. Accordingly, Court reverse.

Defendant, Dayvon Tomore Betterson, appeals after he was convicted of first degree murder count (Pen. Code, 187, subd. (a)) and three counts of willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder. (Pen. Code, 187, subd. (a), 664, subd. (a).). The jury also found: defendant personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing death in the commission of the first degree murder; defendant inflicted great bodily injury in the commission of one of the attempted murders; and all of the offenses were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang. (Pen. Code, 186.22, subd. (b)(1), 12022.53, subd. (c), (d).) Defendant argues the eyewitness statements should have been excluded because they were unreliable and coerced and the photographic lineup was impermissibly suggestive. The Attorney General argues the trial court should have imposed additional court security fees. Court affirm with modifications.

This case arises under Welfare and Institutions Code, section 300 et seq. The mother, F. B., appeals from a January 8, 2007 placement order concerning the child, D. H. Court affirm.

Defendant, Arlandis Hinton, purports to appeal from the denial of a habeas corpus petition. We noted that the order under review may not be appealable. We have duty to raise issues concerning our own jurisdiction on our own motion. (Jenningsv. Marralle (1994) 8 Cal.4th 121, 126; Olsonv. Cory (1983) 35 Cal.3d 390, 398.) As a result, Court issued an order to show cause concerning possible dismissal of the appeal and set the matter for oral argument.
The appeal is dismissed.

A jury convicted defendant Francisco Galvan Chavarria of rape of an incapacitated person (Pen. Code, 261, subd. (a)(3)),[1]sexual battery ( 243.4, subd. (e)(1)), residential burglary ( 459, 460), and petty theft. Defendant was sentenced to state prison for seven years four months. On appeal, defendant contends (1) his conviction of sexual battery must be reversed and dismissed because it is a necessarily included offense of rape of an incapacitated person; (2) if sexual battery is not a necessarily included offense of rape of an incapacitated person, the sentence imposed for the battery must be stayed pursuant to section 654; (3) the evidence was insufficient to support the burglary and petty theft convictions; (4) if the evidence is sufficient to support the burglary and petty theft convictions, the concurrent term for the petty theft must be stayed pursuant to section 654; (5) prosecutorial misconduct requires reversal of all convictions; and (6) imposition of consecutive terms violated his right to a jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt as set forth in Blakely v. Washington (2005) 542 U.S. 296 [159 L.Ed.2d 403]. With the exception of defendants second and fourth contentions, which we conclude have merit, we reject his other claims. Accordingly, pursuant to section 654, Court stay the sentences imposed for the sexual battery and petty theft convictions.

Beginning in August 2000, a group of young East Indian men picked up prostitutes on Stockton Boulevard in Sacramento, kidnapped and sexually assaulted them. Defendant joined the group on one outing. A jury convicted him of robbery (Pen. Code, 211) and four counts of rape in concert, with kidnapping allegations (Pen. Code, 264.1; 667.61, subds. (d)(2) & (e)(1)). The trial court sentenced defendant to 25 years to life in prison plus a determinate term of 24 years. On appeal defendant contends he was deprived of a fair trial because his trial counsel had a conflict of interest and provided inadequate representation by failing to present a defense of third party culpability. Court affirm.

A jury found defendant Pedro Fernandez Orozco guilty of first degree murder and false imprisonment and found true the special circumstance that the murder was intentional and involved infliction of torture. The trial court sentenced defendant to life in prison without the possibility of parole, imposed a $10,000 restitution fine, and stayed a $10,000 parole revocation fine. On appeal, defendant contends: 1) the torture special circumstance must be stricken as it was necessarily included within his first degree murder conviction; 2) punishment for the special circumstance should be stayed pursuant to Penal Code section 654; and 3) the parole revocation fine was unauthorized in light of his life without possibility of parole sentence. Court strike the parole revocation fine and otherwise affirm the judgment.

A modification decision.