CA Unpub Decisions

In this appeal from a judgment following a jury conviction, appellant Kao Lio Saeteurn (Saeteurn) contends insufficient evidence supports his conviction for first degree burglary. (Pen. Code, §§ 31, 460, subd. (a).) We affirm.

This matter returns to us after we vacated one of the convictions of defendant Pedro Luis Rodriguez and remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing. (People v. Rodriguez, case No. A134782, filed Nov. 3, 2014.) Defendant again appeals, contending the trial court misunderstood the scope of its discretion when it resentenced him. We shall affirm the judgment.

Following defendant Frederick Marc Cooley’s convictions for misdemeanor false imprisonment and misdemeanor simple battery on a former cohabitant, the trial court granted a three-year term of probation. The trial court also imposed a criminal protective order and various fines and fees. The court subsequently vacated defendant’s probation period due to earned custody and conduct credits, but it did not vacate the protective order or imposed fines and fees. Defendant contends on appeal the protective order and imposed fines and fees issued at sentencing must be stricken as they were issued in excess of the court’s jurisdiction and without the requisite findings. We agree substantial evidence supports issuance of the protective order, but we remand for the limited purpose of assessing the appropriate duration of the order based on the factors set forth in section 136.2, subdivision (i)(1). We also agree fees related to defendant’s probation must be stricken.

A jury convicted Juan Rios-Herrera of possessing and transporting methamphetamine for sale. Rios-Herrera contends the court erred when it failed to instruct the jury sua sponte that it must agree unanimously on the specific criminal acts underlying the methamphetamine charges against him. He also contends the court erred when it denied his new trial motion based on the prosecutor’s failure to provide a police report before trial. We affirm the judgment.

Humberto Dias was convicted by a jury of oral copulation with a child under 10. He contends the court committed prejudicial error when it (1) admitted expert testimony on Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome (CSAAS), and (2) declined to modify CALCRIM No. 330, the standard instruction on evaluating the testimony of child witnesses. Neither contention is persuasive, so we affirm the judgment.

Defendants Derrick Ware and Robert McNeally were convicted by jury of kidnapping for sexual purposes as well as several other sexual offenses and related enhancements, and the trial court sentenced them to lengthy prison terms. In these consolidated appeals, defendants argue the court erred by (1) giving incorrect instructions to the jury about the kidnapping charge and about assessing witness credibility, (2) denying mistrial motions and making related rulings in connection with jurors’ potential observations of defendants in restraints in the courthouse hallway, (3) failing to investigate or excuse a juror for alleged misconduct, and (4) excluding expert testimony proffered by the defense. We find no reversible error and therefore affirm.

Defendant, appellant, and cross-respondent City of Glendale appeals from portions of a judgment in favor of plaintiff, respondent, and cross-appellant Glendale Coalition for Better Government in this case challenging the City’s water rates. On appeal, the City contends the water rates properly (1) included a public fire protection fee; (2) allocated variable base costs to residential ratepayers in tiers based on volume of use; and (3) distinguished between outdoor water use by residential and irrigation ratepayers. We conclude: The public fire protection fee provided through hydrants is not a service available to the general public in substantially the same manner as it is to the property owners who pay the fee. Charging the fire protection fee to property owners, therefore, did not violate article XIII D, section 6, of the California Constitution. The City failed to support that its tiered rates for residential ratepayers were proportional to the cost of its base services. The

The City of Glendale (the City) operates its own electric utility, Glendale Water and Power (the Utility). The City increased the Utility’s electric rates in 2013 based on a rate study that included revenue for an annual transfer of funds from the Utility to the City’s general fund. Petitioner and respondent Glendale Coalition for Better Government (the Coalition) filed a petition for declaratory relief and a writ of mandate on the grounds that the City had failed to follow accounting provisions of the city charter and the annual amount transferred to the general fund was a tax requiring voter approval. The trial court ordered the City to adhere to the charter’s accounting provisions and found the 2013 rates were a tax, because the annual transfer was not a cost of providing electric service. The City appeals from the portion of the judgment finding the new rates were a tax and ordering credits to ratepayers. The City contends on appeal that: (1) the action is barred by the

A charter city operating its own electric utility increased electric rates in 2013 based on a rate study that allocated an annual amount to the city’s general fund. A utility employee and his union filed a petition for declaratory relief and a writ of mandate on the ground that the annual amount transferred to the general fund was a tax requiring voter approval. The trial court found the new rates were a tax, because the annual transfer was not a cost of providing electric service. On appeal, the City contends the lawsuit is barred by the 120-day statute of limitations provided in Public Utilities Code section 10004.5. We conclude, however, that the city waived this statute of limitations defense by failing to timely raise Public Utilities Code section 10004.5. The City further contends the electric rates imposed in 2013 were not a tax requiring voter approval. We find that the rates set in 2013 exceeded the city’s reasonable costs in providing electric services. The amount

This case concerns a family of five children: one boy, J.G. age 14; and four girls, T.C. age 10, A.G. age 9, J.G. age 7, and W.C. age 5. J.T. (Mother) has been the sole parent, as the fathers of the children have not been in the picture. Their parental rights, and Mother’s, were terminated in January 2018. The permanent goal for the boy is legal guardianship, and the permanent plan for the four girls is adoption in two groups of two half-siblings each. Mother appeals, contending (1) there is insufficient evidence the four girls are adoptable; (2) the beneficial sibling relationship exception to termination of parental rights should have been applied; (3) the beneficial parental relationship exception should have been applied; and (4) the permanent plan for the girls should have been guardianship instead of adoption. We find no error and affirm the juvenile court’s judgment.

A jury convicted Bryan Taylor Kough of assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a) (4)) and the trial court sentenced him to probation for three years subject to various conditions. Kough contends the condition requiring him to obtain his probation officer’s permission before traveling outside of the state (travel condition) is unconstitutionally overbroad. He also argues the trial court improperly delegated its authority to the probation officer to determine whether he is required to enroll in the Community Corrections Service Center program (program enrollment condition), which, if required, entails mandatory chemical testing and prohibits non-prescription drug use (drug condition or drug/chemical testing condition). Kough contends the drug condition is invalid under People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 (Lent). We conclude the travel condition is within constitutional bounds. However, we remand the matter to permit reconsideration of the

Perry Freeman appeals from a judgment sentencing him to a so-called split sentence under realignment (two years in custody and two years on supervised release pursuant to Penal Code section 1170, subd. (h)(5)) after a jury convicted him of four counts related to his driving of and flight from a stolen car and the court found prior prison enhancements true. He contends: (1) he was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel when the court withdrew a favorable plea offer based on his failure to accept the offer within a period of almost one month; (2) the prosecution did not present substantial evidence that “shaved” keys used to start the stolen car were burglary tools; and (3) the prosecutor committed misconduct in arguing facts not in evidence. We affirm.

Plaintiff Deborah Todd appeals the trial court’s denial of her request for renewal of a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against her ex-husband, defendant Andrew Hoffman. Todd argues the trial court abused its discretion by applying the wrong legal standard to conclude Hoffman’s conduct did not constitute “abuse” within the meaning of the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA) (Fam. Code, § 6200 et seq.). We conclude the trial court applied the correct standard when it found that Todd did not demonstrate a reasonable fear of future abuse by Hoffman, and the court’s exercise of discretion in this regard did not exceed the bounds of reason. Accordingly, we affirm.

Anil Sagar appealed from a judgment of conviction and sentence entered after a jury found him guilty of assault with a deadly weapon. He contended a sentence enhancement imposed for a prior prison term (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)) must be stricken, because an enhancement was also imposed for a serious felony (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)). We affirmed the judgment because the trial court had stayed the section 667.5 enhancement. The California Supreme Court has directed us to reconsider the matter in light of the advent of Senate Bill 1393, which amends section 667 and section 1385 such that a trial court has discretion to strike a prior serious felony conviction under section 1385. We therefore vacate our earlier decision and, having considered the parties’ supplemental briefing, remand the matter to the trial court to decide whether to strike Sagar’s prior serious felony conviction. We affirm the judgment in all other respects.