CA Unpub Decisions

Petitioner in pro. per. seeks an extraordinary writ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.450, 8.452) to vacate the orders of the juvenile court issued at a contested six-month review hearing terminating reunification services and setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing[1]as to her son C. Court deny the petition.

A modification decision.

Defendant Oscar Bringas Garcia appeals his conviction on one count of committing a lewd and lascivious act on a child under the age of 14 (Pen. Code, 288, subd. (a)), with an additional finding that defendant had substantial sexual contact with the child. ( 1203.066, subd. (a)(8).) Defendant claims that his statements to the police were involuntary and that an expert witnesss testimony should not have been permitted. Court find that neither contention has merit and affirm.

Defendant Victor Rodriguez was convicted of two counts of committing a lewd act on a child and two counts of child annoyance. Defendant, then a 48-year-old high school music teacher, placed his hand on the stomachs and chests of four female students, under their clothing, ostensibly to show them the location of their diaphragms and to help them learn proper breathing techniques to improve their singing. Defendant argues there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions. Court affirm.

Plaintiff and cross-defendant Ofelia Hernandez appeals from a judgment in favor of defendant and cross-complainant Ana Osorio on plaintiffs complaint brought under the Home Equity Sales Contracts Act (the Act; Civ. Code, 1695 et seq.; all further statutory references are to this code unless otherwise stated). Plaintiff sued, among others, Genesis International LLC (not a party to this appeal) alleging it was a home equity purchaser who was subject to the Act because it bought her residence while it was in foreclosure, and defendant, alleging she was a subsequent purchaser with knowledge of the wrongful acts of Genesis. After a bench trial the court found the Act did not apply because the residence was not in foreclosure at the time Genesis bought it. It also found defendant was a bona fide purchaser for value and plaintiff had no right to rescind the sale. Plaintiff asserts these findings were error and that the residence was in foreclosure as defined under the Act as a matter of law. She also appeals from a judgment on defendants unlawful detainer action, claiming the measure of damages was erroneous. Court disagree with each of these contentions and affirm.

Petitioners seek relief from juvenile court orders terminating reunification services and setting a hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26[1]to select a permanent plan for the 19-month-old child, Ariel B. The mother, Ariel Y., argues the child should be returned to her because there was insufficient evidence of continued risk. Both the mother and the father, Jesus B., assert they were not offered reasonable services. Court find these contentions to be without merit and deny the petition.

On April 28, 2006, defendant Felipe Jesus Gonzalez was convicted at jury trial of inflicting corporal injury on his spouse, Jeanina, violating a protective order resulting in physical injury to her in doing so, and aggravated sexual assault predicated on sexual penetration by a foreign object by force on his then 14 year old step daughter, Elena. Defendant was sentenced to 15 years to life for the sexual assault with a consecutive three year prison term for inflicting corporal injury on a spouse. On appeal, defendant claims he was denied a fair trial because of procedural, evidentiary, and instructional errors that tilted the outcome in the prosecutions favor in what, otherwise, was a close case. The judgment is affirmed.

Defendant Luis Rodrigo Galvan Olalde pleaded no contest to theft or unauthorized use of a vehicle (Veh. Code, 10851, subd. (a)), with an enhancement for committing the offense while out of custody on his own recognizance (Pen. Code, 12022.1); driving with a blood alcohol level of 0.08 percent or higher (Veh. Code, 23152, subd. (b)), with the additional allegation that defendant was under the age of 21 years at the time (Veh. Code, 13202.5); and grand theft of personal property of a value over $400 (Pen. Code, 484; 487, subd. (a)), with an enhancement for committing the offense while out on his own recognizance (Pen. Code, 12022.1). The trial court placed defendant on probation for three years, provided he serve seven months in county jail and pay restitution in the amount of $485 to Jaqueline Arevalo, the victim, and $1,500 to Pablo Arevalo, the victims father, among other terms and conditions. For reasons that Court explain, Court find no merit in defendants contentions and, therefore, Court affirm the order for restitution in its entirety.

Veronica C., the mother of D.W., appeals from an order terminating her reunification services after the six-month review hearing. Appellant contends that reversal is required, because the Santa Cruz County Human Resources Agency (Agency) failed to comply with the notice requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). Court find no error and affirm.

Defendant was charged with one count of possession of heroin in state prison, a violation of Penal Code section 4573.6. The information alleged defendant had one prior serious or violent felony strike conviction: a conviction of second degree murder. (Pen. Code 667, subds. (b)-(i); 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d).) Defendant was serving a prison sentence for that conviction at the time of the current offense. Defendant entered a plea of not guilty and denied the strike allegation. During trial, defendant admitted the prior conviction. The jury found defendant guilty as charged. On December 4, 2006, the court sentenced defendant to state prison for the upper term of four years, doubled to eight years for the prior strike conviction, to be served consecutive to the term already being served. Defendant appeals, contending the upper term sentence was improperly imposed and must be reduced to the midterm sentence. The judgment is affirmed.

Defendant Marsell Rayshan Willis timely appeals from a November 29, 2005 judgment sentencing him to seven years in prison. On October 17, 2005, a jury found defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter and found true an allegation he had personally used a knife during the killing. (Pen. Code, 192, subd. (a) [voluntary manslaughter], 12022, subd. (b)(1) [personal use of deadly weapon].) Defendant makes the following arguments on appeal: (1) the trial court erred when it allowed questioning regarding defendants prior arrests for petty theft and robbery; (2) the trial court improperly excluded testimony which it ruled was inadmissible double hearsay; (3) the trial court erred by failing to instruct sua sponte on involuntary manslaughter; and (4) defense counsel provided ineffective assistance at trial by withdrawing a request for such an instruction. Court conclude these arguments lack merit, and Court affirm.

In June 2007, the juvenile court sustained allegations of a supplemental dependency petition and found that removal of minors Amanda and Aaron A. from the home of petitioner Marie F.-A. was required. It denied reunification services and set an October 16 date for a permanency planning hearing. (See Welf. & Inst. Code,[2] 366.26.) Marie petitions for review of the removal order. (See 387.) She challenges the juvenile courts finding that a substantial risk of detriment to Amanda and Aaron existed if the minors were returned to her care, contending that this finding was not supported by clear and convincing evidence. She also challenges the juvenile courts July order terminating reunification services, asserting that the juvenile court erred by failing to offer her continued reunification service once the supplemental petition was sustained. Finally, Marie seeks a stay of the scheduled permanency planning hearing. Real party in interest San Mateo County Human Services Agency opposes her petition. Court deny the petition on the merits.

Based upon incidents that occurred within a three-week period at eight different commercial establishments, a jury convicted defendant Jose Matamoros of seven counts of robbery and one count of attempted robbery. In addition, in each of those eight incidents, defendant was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The jury found true the enhancement allegation that defendant personally used a firearm during the robberies and attempted robbery. The court found defendant had suffered a 1997 robbery conviction charged under the Three Strikes law. The court sentenced defendant to a term of 61 years and 8 months. On this appeal, defendant attacks the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his convictions arising out of three incidents. In regard to the first incident, he argues that the evidence was insufficient because the victim only testified that defendant looked similar to the man who robbed him. In regard to the second incident, he argues that the jury should not have credited the victims out-of-court identifications of him because at trial she testified that defendant was not the robber. We find no merit to either argument and therefore affirm the convictions arising out of those two incidents. In regard to the third incident, he urges that the hearsay statements of the victim who did not testify at trial were inadmissible in light of Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 (Crawford). We conclude that although introduction of the victims statements violated Crawford, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (See People v. Cage (2007) 40 Cal.4th 965, 984-986, 991 (Cage).)
Court conclude, under People v. Black (2007) 41 Cal.4th 799 (Black II), that there was no Sixth Amendment error.

The juvenile court denied appellant Jose G.s motion to suppress evidence and found him to be a ward of the court, for possession of a firearm near a school and possession of live ammunition by a minor. He was committed to a short-term camp program. He contends that the suppression motion should have been granted, as the officers had no objectively reasonable suspicion that he had committed a crime, before they detained him and frisked him. The contention lacks merit, because the police were acting on information from a school bus driver, whose observations of appellant justified a reasonable suspicion that appellant had a gun hidden under his shirt.
The motion to suppress was heard concurrently with the adjudication hearing. Court therefore find that the motion to suppress was correctly denied.