CA Unpub Decisions

On September 25, 2018, the juvenile court denied Anthony B. (father) and M.H. (mother), parents of now 14-year-old J.B., 12-year-old Felicity B. and 11-year-old Vanessa B., reunification services (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 361.5, subd. (b)(3)) and set a section 366.26 hearing for January 23, 2019. Father in propria persona seeks an extraordinary writ directing the juvenile court to return the children to his custody and terminate its dependency jurisdiction or order reunification services. Mother did not challenge the court’s orders. Because substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s ruling, we deny father’s petition.

A Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 petition was filed on behalf of then four-year-old Jonathan P. (Jonathan) on July 21, 2017, by the Tulare County Health and Human Services Agency (agency). Ultimately, reunification services were denied to both father and mother and a section 366.26 permanent plan hearing was set. Father filed a section 388 petition seeking reunification services, which was denied. The trial court terminated both parents’ parental rights at the section 366.26 hearing.
Father appeals contending the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying his section 388 petition. Mother appeals contending the juvenile court erred by not finding the beneficial parent-child relationship exception applied to preclude termination of parental rights. Both parents join in the other’s argument on appeal. We affirm.

Appellant Gloria Denise Gittens appeals from the trial court’s denial of her petition for resentencing (Pen. Code, § 1170.18) with respect to some of her convictions for second degree burglary (§ 459/460, subd. (b)). Following independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, we affirm.

After separating from defendant John Ruhlman, L.R., his wife, obtained restraining orders prohibiting contact. Nevertheless, defendant called and emailed her continuously, showed up at her apartment complex, and rummaged through her car. On one occasion defendant went to the residence of the deputy sheriff who had served him with the restraining order, because he thought L.R. was having an affair with the officer. He was eventually charged and convicted of stalking in violation of Penal Code section 646.9, subdivision (b), driving without a license in his possession (Veh. Code, § 12500, subd. (a)), and driving on a suspended license (Veh. Code, § 14601.1, subd. (a)), and placed on formal probation. Defendant appeals.
On appeal, defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the incident in which defendant went to the home of the deputy sheriff under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b); and (2) the trial court erroneously refused to instruct th

A jury convicted defendant and appellant, Raul Martinez, of attempted murder and assault with a deadly weapon. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 245, subd. (a)(1), 664.) The jury also found defendant had committed the attempted murder willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation; he had personally inflicted great bodily injury on his victim; and he had committed his offenses for the benefit of or in association with a criminal street gang. (§§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1), 189, 664, 12022.7, subd. (a).) With the addition of enhancements for a prior strike and a prior serious felony (§§ 667, subds. (a)(1), (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)), the court sentenced defendant to life in prison with the possibility of parole, plus an aggregate determinate term of 18 years.

A jury convicted Nikko Jovar Quarles of second degree robbery (Pen. Code,
§ 211; count 1) and being a felon in possession of a firearm (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 2). It found true allegations that Quarles personally used a firearm in the commission of the count 1 robbery (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)). Quarles thereafter admitted he had suffered five prior prison terms (alleged as prior offenses 2 through 6; § 667.5, subd. (b)) and the trial court found true allegations he had suffered a sixth prior prison term (alleged as prior offense 7). The court sentenced Quarles to 18 years in state prison consisting of the lower term of two years, plus 10 years for the firearm enhancement, plus six years for the prior prison terms, and a two-year sentence on count 2, stayed under section 654.

S.M., father of the minor, appeals from the judgment and orders entered at a jurisdictional and dispositional hearing, during which the juvenile court found the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.) does not apply to this case. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 395.) Father contends the Siskiyou County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) failed to comply with ICWA's investigatory and notice requirements, and the Agency agrees. We will vacate the juvenile court’s finding that ICWA does not apply and remand the matter for further ICWA compliance proceedings.

After a failed attempt to steal socks from a shoe store, defendant Ronald Brown returned to the store a short time later and stole several shoes. He was charged with robbery and criminal threats arising from the shoes incident. Defendant contends the prosecution violated his due process rights by failing to clearly communicate its election of the underlying act for the lesser included petty theft charge, i.e., the charged shoes incident versus the uncharged socks incident. Defendant maintains the jury could have found him guilty of petty theft relating to the socks incident, and if so, he was denied his constitutional right to a unanimous verdict by the unclear election.

Defendant Joel Foster Bumgarner pleaded no contest to felony evading an officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.2), and two misdemeanors, driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a)) and resisting an officer (Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1); statutory section references that follow are to the Penal Code unless otherwise set forth). He was placed on three years’ formal probation subject to various conditions including paying victim restitution to be determined at a later time.

Mouna Kiwan appeals from a postjudgment order denying her motion to set aside the judgment dissolving her marriage to Elias Kiwan. On appeal, Mouna contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying her motion and ignoring several of her claims in the trial court. She asks this court to set aside the stipulation for settlement and “remand the case to the trial court.” We affirm the orders of the trial court.

After defendant Brett Darren Herring stole a loaded trailer, a jury found him guilty of grand theft, vehicle theft, and possession of burglary tools. On appeal, he contends: (1) as to the grand theft count, the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that the value of the stolen property is calculated by its fair market value; and (2) as to the vehicle theft count, the court erred in failing to instruct the jury that the vehicles’ value must exceed $950. We affirm.

Defendant Scott Everett Papenhausen appeals from the trial court’s orders denying his petition to resentence him on a prior prison term enhancement (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)) pursuant to section 1170.18. He contends that designating as a misdemeanor the prior felony conviction that forms the basis of a prior prison term enhancement invalidates that enhancement. We originally held the prison prior remained valid.

S.E. (mother) appeals from the findings and order terminating her parental rights under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Mother contends the court erred in finding inapplicable the parental relationship exception to termination of parental rights under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i). We affirm.

Eva T. (mother) appeals from an order denying her request to represent herself in a dependency proceeding involving her son, T.F. She contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by denying her request because the court applied the wrong legal standard and its ruling was not supported by substantial evidence. We conclude the court appropriately applied the law, and that substantial evidence supports its denial of mother’s request. Accordingly, we affirm the order.