CA Unpub Decisions

Christopher Robert Pollak appeals from the judgment entered after his conviction by a jury of first degree robbery in an inhabited dwelling. (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 212.5, subd. (a).) The jury found true an allegation that he had personally used a deadly weapon, a metal dinner fork. (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1).) The trial court found true allegations that he had been convicted of a prior serious felony within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (a)(1), and a prior serious or violent felony within the meaning of California’s “Three Strikes” law. (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d).) Appellant was sentenced to prison for 14 years.

K.E. appeals an order of the juvenile court sustaining a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition finding he committed second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211) and assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (id., § 245, subd. (a)(4)). We conclude, among other things, that substantial evidence supports the judgment. We affirm.

Gerald Willard, administrator of his mother’s estate, appeals from a probate court order granting attorney Larry D. Lewellyn statutory and extraordinary attorneys’ fees. Because the probate court overruled Willard’s objections without affording him an evidentiary hearing, we reverse the order and remand for a hearing.

E. Patrick Jenevein III, president of Tang Energy Group, Ltd., secretly recorded conversations with a business associate, Sherman Xuming Zhang, president of AVIC International USA, Inc. (AVIC USA), and later introduced the recordings as evidence in contractual arbitration. The arbitrators ultimately issued an award in favor of Tang Energy.
After the arbitration, Zhang and AVIC USA filed this action against Jenevein for invasion of privacy and eavesdropping on or recording confidential communications in violation of Penal Code sections 632 and 637.2. Jenevein filed a special motion to strike under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (section 425.16). The trial court denied the motion, ruling that neither making the recordings nor using them as evidence in the arbitration was protected activity.

A jury found Johnny Mata guilty of murdering a rival gang member and possessing a firearm as a felon. The trial court sentenced Mata to 86 years to life in prison, a sentence that included an enhancement for personally and intentionally discharging a firearm in committing the murder and an enhancement for having a prior serious felony conviction.
Mata argues his attorney provided ineffective assistance. We conclude otherwise and affirm his conviction, but we remand the case for the trial court to exercise its discretion under recent amendments to the Penal Code whether to strike the firearm enhancement and the prior serious felony conviction enhancement.

Joseph Stubbs was convicted of receiving stolen property. His sentence included nine one-year prior conviction enhancements pursuant to Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b). He appealed and, during the pendency of his appeal, he successfully petitioned under Proposition 47 (the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act) to have three of the prior convictions reduced to misdemeanors (§ 1170.18). He then petitioned for recall of sentence and resentencing, arguing that the three enhancements had to be stricken because the underlying convictions had been reduced to misdemeanors. The trial court denied his petition and we rejected his argument and affirmed the judgment. (People v. Stubbs (July 7, 2016, B255946) [nonpub. opn.] (Stubbs I).) The Supreme Court granted review and later transferred the matter to us with directions to vacate our opinion and to reconsider the cause in light of People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857 (Buycks). The People now concede that Buycks requires us to s

This case arises from the tragic death of fifteen year old Erica Gallardo, who ran away from a group home operated by respondent New Alternatives, Inc., and then died from an overdose of methamphetamine six days later. The man who sold the methamphetamine to Erica later pleaded guilty to manslaughter. Erica’s father, Anthony Gallardo, sued New Alternatives, alleging it was liable for Erica’s wrongful death because it had negligently allowed her to run away from its facility.

Defendant and appellant Nicholas Benjamin Ray was charged by information with committing a lewd act upon a child (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a), count 1), and possession or control of child pornography (§ 311.11, subd. (a), count 2). A jury convicted him of count 2, but acquitted him of count 1. A trial court denied defendant’s motion to reduce his conviction to a misdemeanor. It then sentenced him to the low term of two years in state prison.
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. We affirm the judgment.

Defendant and appellant, H.B. (Mother), is the mother of C.A., a boy born in May 2015. C.A. was taken into protective custody in July 2017 after Mother was found passed out behind the wheel of a car in a grocery store parking lot with C.A. in the back seat. Mother’s blood-alcohol content was .24, and she had a history of untreated mental illness and substance abuse. C.A. was placed with his maternal grandparents (MGP’s), who had previously adopted C.A.’s older sibling, A. Mother was denied services for C.A. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 361.5, subd. (b)(10), (11).)

A radiology business with an office in Palm Springs used an automated system to make phone calls and send text messages to its patients. In attempting to enter one patient’s phone number into the system, someone transposed two digits and entered the phone number of defendant Jerry Wayne Louis instead. Defendant therefore began receiving repeated “robocalls.”
On August 16, 2016, defendant called the Palm Springs office. Employee Brittany R. answered the phone. He told her, “If you keep calling me, . . . I’m going to shoot you and the Palm Springs office up.”
Brittany R. — who was crying — reported the call to her supervisor, in Indio. The supervisor called defendant back, “to try to calm the situation.” Defendant said, “Goddamn it, didn’t you hear what I said? I just told the other person . . . now I’m going to come down there and shoot the place up.” The supervisor “believe[d] th[e] threat.” She “felt frantic.” She called a higher-up, w

A jury convicted defendant and appellant Felipe Chavez Gonzalez of four charges, including kidnapping for robbery, robbery, assault with a firearm, and second degree burglary, all arising from the same incident, a robbery of a fast food restaurant. On appeal, defendant argues that the only evidence that connects him to the crimes is uncorroborated accomplice testimony, so his convictions must be reversed. We find the accomplice testimony to be adequately corroborated and therefore affirm the judgment.

Defendant and appellant Ralph Gordon appeals after the transfer of his probation from Los Angeles County to San Bernardino County. Upon the transfer, the San Bernardino County Probation Department recommended additional terms and conditions of probation “to ensure compliance of the offender and for Officer Safety.” Defendant objected to some of the new conditions, including the addition of an electronic device search condition. On appeal, defendant argues (1) the San Bernardino County Superior Court had no jurisdiction to add terms not previously imposed in Los Angeles County because no change in circumstances existed to justify the additional terms; (2) the condition requiring him to submit to search and seizure of any electronic device must be stricken because it is unreasonable under People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 (Lent), unconstitutionally overbroad, and significantly more invasive than necessary to serve any state interest in reformation and rehabilitation; and (3) the

Plaintiff and appellant Paulette Callender was crossing the street when a car driven by defendant and respondent Rick Loper struck her at a low speed. At trial, the jury found that Loper was negligent but that his negligence did not cause Callender’s injuries. The trial court then denied Callender’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) and motion for new trial. Because we find no evidence compelling a conclusion that Loper caused Callender’s injuries, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the JNOV. Because we also find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of the new trial motion, we affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted Nikko Jovar Quarles of second degree robbery (Pen. Code,
§ 211; count 1) and being a felon in possession of a firearm (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 2). It found true allegations that Quarles personally used a firearm in the commission of the count 1 robbery (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)). Quarles thereafter admitted he had suffered five prior prison terms (alleged as prior offenses 2 through 6; § 667.5, subd. (b)) and the trial court found true allegations he had suffered a sixth prior prison term (alleged as prior offense 7). The court sentenced Quarles to 18 years in state prison consisting of the lower term of two years, plus 10 years for the firearm enhancement, plus six years for the prior prison terms, and a two-year sentence on count 2, stayed under section 654.