CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Adrienne Patterson was convicted by a jury of vehicle theft (Veh. Code, 10851, subd. (a)), misdemeanor driving under the influence of alcohol (Veh. Code, 23152, subd. (a)), and misdemeanor driving with blood alcohol of .08 or higher (Veh. Code, 23152, subd. (b)); the jury acquitted her of receiving a stolen vehicle (Pen. Code, 496d), and receiving stolen property (Pen. Code, 496, subd. (a)). She was sentenced to prison for two years on the vehicle theft offense, and received concurrent 120-day sentences on the misdemeanor counts. She contends that the vehicle theft conviction was not supported by substantial evidence, that the court erred by giving the CALCRIM No. 362 (consciousness of guilt: false statements) jury instruction, and that her trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to this instruction. As we explain below, Court find these arguments untenable, and affirm the judgment.

B. G. (appellant), the alleged father of B. G. (the minor), born in 2003, appeals a juvenile court order denying his petition to change a court order. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 388.) He contends he did not receive proper notice of the detention hearing and reports by Alameda County Social Services Agency (respondent) and was therefore foreclosed from participating in the proceedings, establishing his status as a presumed father and obtaining reunification services. He also contends the court erred in denying his section 388 petition without a hearing. Court affirm.

James E. Griffin appeals following his conviction of battery with serious bodily injury (Pen. Code, 243, subd. (d); undesignated section references are to that code), assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury, involving infliction of such injury in domestic violence ( 245, subd. (a)(1), 12022.7, subd. (e)), attempting to dissuade a witness from reporting a crime ( 136.1, subd. (b)(1)), and cutting a utility line ( 591). Appellant was placed on formal probation for five years, with conditions including that he spend 365 days in county jail and undergo 52 weeks of domestic violence counseling.

Defendant Andre Rose appeals from a judgment after court trial, awarding the late Vera Carr $56,000 damages and $32,175 attorney fees, under Civil Code section 1695.7 (undesignated section references are to that code), which concerns purchases of residences in foreclosure. Appellant contends that (1) he was not subject to the statutory requirements of section 1695 et seq. because he acquired Carrs home for use as his personal residence ( 1695.1, subd. (a)), (2) the damages awarded constituted unjust enrichment, and (3) he was not subject to joint liability for them. Court find these contentions unmeritorious and affirm the judgment.

Defendant Anthony Tyrone Boyd appeals from the judgment entered following revocation of probation. He previously pled no contest to one count of kidnapping (Pen. Code, 207, subd. (a)); the court selected an eight year prison sentence, suspended execution of the sentence, and placed defendant on formal probation for three years. The terms of probation included that he serve 365 days in county jail (he was given credit for 230 days), obey all laws and orders of the court and probation department, and report to his probation officer as directed.

Milton Hasley appeals from the judgment entered following his conviction by jury of possession of marijuana for sale (Health and Saf. Code, 11359), following the denial of a suppression motion (Pen. Code, 1538.5). The court sentenced him to prison for two years. Appellant claims the trial court erred by denying the suppression motion. Court affirm the judgment.

Appellant claims ineffective assistance of counsel, because defense counsel did not call or interview a witness who had initially given potentially exonerating statements to the police, but later admitted having lied, and then entered a factual-basis plea, testifying adversely to appellant. Appellant also contends there was no substantial evidence to support a finding that his prior conviction was a serious felony requiring increased punishment as a second strike. Court reject both contentions and affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted defendant Lawrence A. Martin of committing a lewd act upon a child under the age of 14 ( 288, subd. (a)). In a bench trial, the court found that defendant had suffered a prior conviction within the meaning of the Three Strikes law. In sentencing defendant, the trial court selected the upper eight year term which it then doubled, imposing a 16 year sentence.
On appeal, defendant advances three separate contentions. The first is that the trial court abused its discretion in permitting the prosecution to offer evidence of a prior uncharged sex offense involving a minor. The second is that the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing argument. The third is that the trial court denied him the right to a jury trial in selecting the upper term for his sentence. Court are unpersuaded by these contentions and therefore affirm the judgment.

Jose G. and his five-year-old son, M. G., separately appeal from the jurisdiction and disposition orders of the juvenile court finding true that Jose sexually abused M. and that M.s parents had a violent confrontation in the childs presence. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 300, subd. (d).)[1]Both appellants contend that the court erred in relying on M.s out-of-court statements to sustain the petition and there was insufficient evidence to justify the removal of M. from Joses custody ( 361, subd. (c)). Guided by our Supreme Court in In re Cindy L. (1997) 17 Cal.4th 15 (Cindy L.) and In re Lucero L. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1227 (Lucero L.), Court affirm the orders.

After Sandra initiated the underlying marital dissolution, the family court awarded her exclusive possession of the family residence pending resolution of the action.[2]Subsequently, she filed a motion for an order to compel Vernon to produce documents regarding his business and financial affairs. At a contempt proceeding on April 29, 2004, the family court found that Vernon had repeatedly violated the order granting Sandra possession of the family residence and sentenced him to 24 days in the Los Angeles County Jail, but stayed 10 days of the sentence on the condition that he obey all orders. The next day, it issued an order directing Vernon to produce his financial and business records.
The judgment is affirmed.

Following the denial of his motion to suppress evidence (Pen. Code, 1538.5), Ivan Garcia entered a negotiated plea of no contest to possession for sale of cocaine (Health & Saf. Code, 11351, subd. (a)). He timely filed a notice of appeal challenging the denial of his motion to suppress evidence. Court examined the entire record, including the transcript of the in camera proceedings, and are satisfied Garcias attorney has fully complied with the responsibilities of counsel and no arguable issues exist. (Smith v. Robbins (2000) 528 U.S. 259, 277-284 [120 S.Ct. 746, 145 L.Ed.2d 756]; People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106; People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441.)
The judgment is affirmed.

At his preliminary hearing, appellant brought a motion to suppress all evidence seized during a warrantless search of his home. After the magistrate denied the motion, appellant renewed it in superior court, where it was again denied after the court found appellant had voluntarily consented to the search, and that his consent was sufficiently attenuated from any taint of an earlier illegal sweep of the residence. Appellant contends the court should have found from the totality of the circumstances that his consent was involuntary. Court find substantial evidence to support the trial courts finding, and affirm the judgment.

Mother appeals from the judgment terminating her parental rights. She contends that she was denied due process when she was not given notice of the continued Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing, after she had failed to appear at the properly noticed initial hearing. Court find the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and affirm the judgment.

A modification decision.