CA Unpub Decisions

After defendant Ian Clair MacDowell pleaded guilty to gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated (Pen. Code, § 191.5, subd. (a)), the trial court sentenced him to the low term of four years in state prison. On appeal, defendant contends that “denying [him] admittance to the Behavioral Health Court Program, because he lived in a neighboring county, violated his constitutional rights.” He further contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying him probation and sentencing him to state prison.

In exchange for a stipulated sentence, defendant David Moreno pleaded guilty to transporting a controlled substance for sale and admitted to violating probation. On appeal, he contends the trial court (1) violated the terms of his plea agreement by imposing a prison term instead of a jail term, (2) failed to award all custody credits to which he was entitled, and (3) imposed an unauthorized sentence by adding penalty assessments to a lab fee and a drug program fee. Part of defendant’s custody credit claim has merit. But because the trial court has already corrected the award of custody credits, we will affirm the judgment.

Defendant Jessica Hays pleaded no contest to unlawful sexual intercourse and furnishing marijuana to a minor. The trial court granted defendant probation for three years, ordered her to pay various fines and fees, and ordered her to register as a sex offender pursuant to Penal Code section 290.006.
On appeal, defendant contends the order to register should be reversed because the trial court failed to find she “posed a risk of re-offense” and failed “to state its reasons for such a conclusion on the record.” We conclude defendant forfeited her right to challenge the registration order on these grounds.
Defendant further contends the trial court erred in imposing penalty assessments on the mandatory laboratory fee. Based on a recent Supreme Court case, there was no error. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

In two separate incidents, police officers requested that defendant Calibra Alston produce identification. Both encounters deteriorated, culminating in defendant being charged with obstructing or resisting an officer, battery on a peace officer, and resisting, delaying, or obstructing a peace officer. (Pen. Code, §§ 69, 243, subd. (c)(2), 148, subd. (a)(1).) A jury found defendant guilty of misdemeanor resisting, delaying, and obstructing a peace officer in one incident, but failed to reach a verdict on the other counts in the second incident. The court ultimately sentenced defendant to 45 days and imposed fees and fines. Proceeding in pro. per., defendant appeals, arguing the trial court committed a plethora of errors. We shall affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted Romelio Espinoza of three counts of oral copulation or sexual penetration involving a child 10 years of age or younger (Pen. Code, § 287, subd. (b); counts 2, 3, & 6) and five counts of lewd or lascivious acts involving a child under the age of 14 (§ 288, subd. (a); counts 1, 4, 5, 7, & 8). The jury also found true allegations that Espinoza’s crimes were committed against more than one victim (§ 667.61, subds. (b), (c), & (e); counts 1, 4, 5, 7, & 8). The trial court sentenced him to the low term of three years on count four plus 105 years to life in state prison on the remaining counts. On appeal, he claims evidentiary and sentencing error. We affirm the conviction, vacate the sentence, and remand for resentencing.

This is defendant Steven Joseph Kaulick’s second appeal arising out of his petition for resentencing of his three strikes conviction (Pen. Code, § 1170.126, enacted as part of the Three Strikes Reform Act (Proposition 36)). (See People v. Kaulick (Jan. 4, 2017, B265040 [nonpub.]) (Kaulick I).) In Kaulick I, we reversed the trial court’s order denying Kaulick’s petition for resentencing after concluding the court erred in applying a “preponderance of the evidence,” as opposed to a “beyond a reasonable doubt,” standard of proof to find Kaulick intended to inflict great bodily injury during his third-strike offense, a finding that rendered him ineligible for resentencing under Proposition 36. We remanded the matter to allow the court to apply the correct standard of proof in determining whether Kaulick was eligible for resentencing.
On remand, the court found beyond a reasonable doubt that Kaulick intended to inflict great bodily injury on the victim of his third-strike

Alfredo Vargas Ramirez (plaintiff), who is self-represented , appeals from a judgment of dismissal after an order sustaining the demurrer of Arvest Central Mortgage fka Central Mortgage Company dba Central Mortgage Loan Servicing Company (defendant) to his second amended complaint (SAC) without leave to amend.
Plaintiff, a borrower on a real estate loan, alleged three causes of action in the SAC that are relevant to this appeal: violation of his right under Civil Code section 2937 (section 2937) to receive notice of transfers of the servicing of his

Plaintiff Claudia Schaefer, in propria persona, appeals from the trial court’s order granting defendant Dennis Block’s special motion to strike her complaint under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, the anti-SLAPP statute. Schaefer was the defendant in a prior unlawful detainer (UD) action filed by Block as the attorney for her landlord, James Clements. (Clements voluntarily dismissed that action.) Schaefer filed the instant action, including a claim for malicious prosecution against Clements and Block, alleging that Block filed the UD action despite knowing it lacked probable cause, and maliciously refused to dismiss it for several months. The trial court granted Block’s motion to strike, finding that Schaefer’s malicious prosecution claim arose out of protected activity and Schaefer failed to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on that claim against Block.
Schaefer does not dispute that her malicious prosecution claim arose out of protected activity under

J.S. (mother) appeals the juvenile court’s June 16, 2018 order terminating her parental rights over her ten-year-old son, Bobby S., contending the court erred in declining to apply the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to adoption. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) She also argues the ICWA notice given in the case was defective. We reject the former argument, but reverse and remand the juvenile court’s order for the limited purpose of curing the ICWA violation, which error the Solano County Health and Social Services Department (the “Department”) concedes.

Jennifer Y. (Mother), mother of 20-month-old Christopher Y., appeals from the juvenile court’s order declaring Christopher a dependent of the juvenile court, pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (j). Mother contends substantial evidence does not support the court’s jurisdictional findings that (1) there was a substantial risk that Christopher would suffer serious physical harm due to Mother’s substance abuse and mental health issues, and (2) a prior dependency case, in which Mother failed to reunify with Christopher’s older half sibling, further demonstrated a substantial risk of serious harm to Christopher in the present case. We shall affirm the juvenile court’s jurisdictional order.

This is an appeal from an order by the trial court to pay victim restitution in the amount of $567 to cover cash taken from the victim’s wallet. Defendant Elizabeth Anne Dockins, who pleaded no contest to the felony grand theft, contends this sum cannot, as a legal matter, be recovered by the victim because it was not alleged to have been stolen in the charging document. For reasons that follow, we affirm.

At all pertinent times, W.T., a dependent child within the jurisdiction of the Alameda County Family Court, was placed with Dawn H. These consolidated appeals present a single issue: while W.T. was a dependent child placed with Dawn H., was the Alameda County Social Services Agency (Agency) required to make monthly payments to Dawn H. for W.T.’s care? Thus, and unlike the overwhelming majority of dependency appeals, all that is in dispute here is money—who gets it, who must pay it, indeed whether it must be paid at all. These appeals are also noteworthy because they have been overtaken by events. In fact, the circumstances that have unfolded since entry of the orders the Agency wishes reviewed have rendered the controversy moot. And we thus dismiss the appeals.

This is an appeal from judgment in an employee class action lawsuit brought against defendants Recology, Inc. and Recology San Francisco, Inc. (hereinafter, Recology), a garbage and recycling collecting company with two facilities in San Francisco, one located at Pier 96 and the other at 501 Tunnel Avenue. The lawsuit accuses Recology of violating the privacy and other rights of certain employees engaged as “Classifiers” at the Pier 96 facility or “Material Handlers” at the 501 Tunnel Avenue facility in connection with Recology’s administration of a random drug testing program. The trial court dismissed all remaining causes of action and entered judgment for

Eric Ryan Hyde appeals from a judgment after a jury convicted him of weapons, ammunition, and forged document offenses. Hayde argues the following: the trial court erred by admitting statements he made at the preliminary hearing while representing himself; the court erred by admitting a business record; and there was cumulative error. As we explain below, we conclude Hayde was not prejudiced by any errors. We affirm the judgment.