CA Unpub Decisions

Defendants David Ross and his law firm, Ross, Rose & Hammill, LLP (RRH), and their attorney, Robert Gentino, appeal a discovery order dated March 10, 2006, deeming 21 requests for admissions (RFAs) admitted against David Ross and RRH (defendants) and imposing sanctions of $9,724 against defendants and Gentino (appellants). Appellants challenge the amount of sanctions on the ground the trial court failed to reduce the amount of sanctions based on defendants properly answering 18 out of 39 RFAs. Appellants also argue the trial court failed to deduct from the requested sanctions the full amount of travel charges, and the trial court wrongly concluded defendants responses to 21 RFAs were evasive and bad faith responses. Also, Gentino complains that there was no valid basis for sanctioning him for defendants discovery responses. Court conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing monetary sanctions against appellants for providing evasive, deficient discovery responses. The monetary sanctions order is thus affirmed.

Samuel A. Akintimoye (Akintimoye) appeals from the judgment denying a petition for a writ of administrative mandamus (Code Civ. Proc., 1094.5) directed at the California Public Employees Retirement System Board of Administration (the Board). On appeal, he raises the following issues: (1) Whether any action or failure to act by the Board regarding an alleged improper ex parte communication between California Public Employees Retirement Systems (CalPERS) counsel and the Administrative Law Judge Greer Knopf prior to the issuance of her decision in this case violated his due process rights; and (2) Whether the decision of the trial court is supported by substantial evidence.
The judgment is affirmed.

A jury found defendant guilty of second degree burglary (Pen. Code, 459), resisting a peace officer (Pen. Code, 148, subd. (a)(1)), and falsely identifying himself to a peace officer (Pen. Code, 148.9, subd. (a)). Defendant admitted two prior prison term enhancements. (Pen. Code, 667.5, subd. (b).) The court sentenced defendant to four years in state prison. Defendant contends the court abused its discretion by granting the Peoples motion to admit evidence of his prior offense of unlawfully driving or taking a vehicle. (Veh. Code, 10851, subd. (a).) Court affirm.

A jury found defendant and appellant Ronald Lloyd Carson guilty of misdemeanor receiving stolen property (Pen. Code, 496, subd. (a)) and being under the influence of a controlled substance. (Health & Saf. Code, 11550, subd. (a).) The trial court sentenced him to three years probation. On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence, and that the court erred in refusing to give a jury instruction saying that he was not guilty of receiving stolen property if he intended to give the stolen property to the police. Court affirm.

Yvette Carter sued Sharon Anderson, the successor in interest to Andersons adoptive parents, Thomas and Rita Orr, for title to real property and for breach of contract. Anderson appeals from a default judgment in favor of Carter. The primary issue on appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Andersons motion to set aside the default and default judgment. (Code Civ. Proc., 473, subd. (b); Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 981.) We conclude the trial court correctly determined defendant Anderson was validly served with the summons and complaint. Notwithstanding that finding, in view of the evidence of surprise and mistake and the errors in the default judgment proceeding, we hold it was abuse of discretion to deny defendants motion for relief from default and the default judgment. Court reverse.

Minor admitted vandalizing property valued over $400. (Pen. Code, 594, subd. (b)(1).) The court declared minor a ward of the court and granted him probation. Minor contends (1) the court abused its discretion by requiring him to attend drug and alcohol classes as a condition of his probation; and (2) the court erred by requiring minor to pay an administrative fee. Court affirm.

In this appeal, defendant and appellant Maria L. (mother) challenges the juvenile courts decision to terminate her parental rights to her four children under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Specifically, mother argues that the court erred when it found that the parental bond exception ( 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A)) to the presumption for adoption did not apply. As discussed below, we find that substantial evidence supports the juvenile courts finding, and so affirm the orders terminating parental rights and selecting adoption as the permanent plan. The juvenile courts orders terminating mothers parental rights and selecting adoption as the childrens permanent plan are affirmed.

Defendant Charles Ray Woodard challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for armed robbery and claims judicial error in the trial courts order denying his Marsden motion. Court find no error and affirm.

The juvenile court committed minor to the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) after minor repeatedly violated his wardship conditions at less secure facilities. Minor contends the court abused its discretion by committing him to DJJ. Court affirm.

Defendant and appellant Kellie C. (mother) is the natural mother of V.C., a dependent child of the juvenile court. On February 6, 2007, the juvenile court entered orders terminating mothers parental rights under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Mother appeals, raising the sole issue that notice under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) was improper because of an error in listing the fathers birth date in the notices given to the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) and a potential tribe. Court affirm.

Appellants C.C. (Mother) and D.W. (Father) are the parents of a girl (Daughter), born in March 2000, and a boy (Son), born in April 2005. The parents appeal the juvenile courts orders terminating parental rights and placing the children for adoption. (Welf & Inst. Code, 366.26.) Mother also appeals the courts denial of her petition to modify a previous order terminating her reunification services and limiting her visits with the children to once per month, supervised. ( 388.) Mother claims the juvenile court erred in summarily denying her section 388 petition, and that insufficient evidence supports the courts finding that the parental benefit exception to the adoption preference did not apply to her relationships with the children. ( 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A).) Mother also joins Fathers claims to the extent they may benefit her. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.200(a)(5).) Court disagree with Father, Mother, and the minors counsel that the matter must be remanded with directions to comply with the notice requirements of the ICWA. As we explain, it is not reasonably probable that any of the complained of deficiencies in the ICWA notices affected any tribes ability to determine whether the children were Indian children. We also find the parents other claims without merit, and affirm the orders.

Rita Hurst is the widow of Everett Hurst, who died on April 5, 2004, at the age of 95. The death certificate listed the cause of death as pneumonia and senile dementia. On April 5, 2005, plaintiff acting as her own attorney, filed a complaint for wrongful death, general negligence, and intentional tort against a host of defendants. Three sets of defendants attacked the complaint by filing a collection of demurrers, a motion to strike, and an anti-SLAPP motion. (Code Civ. Proc., 425.16.) Plaintiff did not file timely opposition to any of these proceedings.
In April 2006, the trial court ruled in favor of defendants on all their motions, except the motion to strike, which was rendered moot. On April 27, the court received, without filing, plaintiffs untimely affidavit. The court subsequently filed various orders dismissing the complaint as to these defendants.
Plaintiff appeals. Because the complaint lacks any merit and is incapable of amendment, Court affirm the trial courts rulings and judgment against plaintiff.

A jury convicted appellant Santos Rodriguez, Jr., of attempted voluntary manslaughter (Pen. Code, 192, subd. (a), 664)[1]and willfully endangering the health

of a child ( 273a). In a separate proceeding the court found true allegations that appellant had suffered two prior serious felony convictions ( 667, subd. (a)), one in 1998, for assault with a deadly weapon or by means of force likely to cause great bodily injury ( 245, subd. (a)), and the other in 1993, for gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated (hereafter gross vehicular manslaughter) ( 191.5, subd. (a) (hereafter 191.5(a)), and that both of those convictions qualified as strikes.[2] The court imposed a sentence of 35 years to life, with the determinate portion of the sentence consisting of 25 years on the attempted voluntary manslaughter conviction and 5 years on each of the two prior serious felony enhancements. The court awarded appellant 177 days of presentence credits, and, on the child endangerment conviction, the court imposed, and stayed pursuant to section 654, a term of 25 years to life.
In the instant appeal, appellant raises the claim set forth in the preceding paragraph. Respondent concedes the point. Court reverse the true findings on the prior conviction allegations in question, vacate the sentence, and remand for further proceedings.

A jury found Librado Salinas, Jr., guilty of transportation of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, 11379, subd. (a); count 1), possession of methamphetamine in jail (Pen. Code, 4573.6; count 2), and possession of methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, 11378; count 3). !(1 CT 73-77; 2 CT 439-441, 445; 3 RT 534-536)! At a bifurcated trial, the court found two strike prior allegations true. (Pen. Code, 211, 212.5, subd. (a), 245, subd. (a)(1), 667, subds. (c)-(j), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(e).) !(1 CT 73-77; 2 CT 445-446; 3 RT 533, 541-542)! At Salinass probation and sentencing hearing, the court struck one strike prior (Pen. Code, 1385), found no circumstance in mitigation true (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.423[1]), and found three circumstances in aggravation true that his prior convictions as an adult and sustained petitions in juvenile delinquency proceedings are numerous, that he served a prior prison term, and that his prior performance on probation and parole was unsatisfactory in that he violated terms and reoffended. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 4.421(b)(2), 4.421(b)(3), 4.421(b)(5)). !(2 CT 465; 3 RT 549, 553)! The judgment is affirmed.