CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant Michael Aaron Ricks pled no contest to second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211) and admitted a serious felony enhancement (§ 667, subd. (a)) and allegations that he had a prior conviction within the meaning of the “Three Strikes” law (§ 667, subds. (b)-(i)). On appeal, Ricks contends: (1) the court abused its discretion and violated his right to due process when it denied his Romero motion; and (2) the matter should be remanded to the trial court for it to exercise its discretion whether to impose or strike his serious felony enhancement. We find merit to this last contention and remand the matter for the trial court to exercise its discretion. In all other respects, we affirm.

A jury convicted appellant Joselito Meza of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated (Pen. Code, § 191.5, subd. (a)/count 1); driving under the influence of alcohol causing injury (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (a)/count 2); driving with a blood-alcohol content (BAC) of .08 percent or greater causing great bodily injury (§ 23153,
subd. (b)/count 3); and failing to stop at the scene of an accident resulting in serious injury or death (§ 20001, subd. (b)(2)/count 4). The jury also found true a flight enhancement (§ 20001, subd. (c)) in count 1 and a great bodily injury enhancement (Pen. Code § 12022.7) in counts 2 and 3.
On appeal, Meza contends: (1) his convictions in counts 2 and 3 must be vacated because the offenses charged in those counts are lesser included offenses of the gross vehicular manslaughter offense he was convicted of in count 1; and (2) he is entitled to additional presentence custody credit. We find merit to these contentions, modify the judgment accordi

Defendant and appellant, Aristea Hupp, appeals from an order granting in part and denying in part her July 2017 motion for a preliminary injunction (July 2017 PI motion). The trial court granted Aristea a preliminary injunction, enjoining plaintiff and respondent, Solera Oak Valley Greens Association (Solera) from restricting her access to Solera’s residential development through security entry gates (referred to herein as the “lock-out”). The trial court, however, denied Aristea’s request that the court enjoin Solera from enforcing Solera’s pit bull muzzle rule (muzzle rule), requiring any “pit bull” or “pit bull mix” dog to wear a muzzle while on the common areas of the Solera property.

Appellant Clemens Steiner (Husband) appeals from the dissolution of marriage from respondent Dina Marie Steiner (Wife) . Husband only disputes the adjudication of the real property located on Stonecreek Place in Chino Hills (Stonecreek Property). Husband, who is Austrian, and Wife were married on August 13, 2005. Prior to their marriage, Wife was the sole owner of the Stonecreek Property, which was encumbered by a loan from Washington Mutual bank. Wife gifted one-half interest in the Stonecreek Property to Husband (transfer deed) before they were married based on her reliance on a promise by Husband that he would grant to her a one-half interest in all of his assets. After they were married, Husband insisted that they obtain a loan in Austria to pay off the Washington Mutual loan. Husband obtained a loan from the Raiffeisenlandesbank Oberosterreich Bank (RLB) by forging Wife’s signature and paid off the mortgage for the Stonecreek Property. Wife was aware that the loan was pai

Following a jury trial, Dunn was convicted of carjacking (Pen. Code, § 215, subd. (a), count one), robbery (§ 211, count two), and possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1), count three). As to counts one and two, the jury found true the allegation that Dunn personally used a firearm within the meaning of sections 12022.5, subdivision (a) and 12022.53, subdivision (b). Dunn admitted to a prior serious felony conviction (§§ 667, subd. (a)(1), 668, 1192.7, subd. (c)) that also constituted a strike (§§ 667, subd. (b)-(i), 1170.12, 668). Dunn was subsequently sentenced to prison for 20 years, four months.

E.A. (father) appeals from the juvenile court’s dispositional order denying him reunification services as to minor K.A. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 355/358.) Father, who is incarcerated, contends the court failed to consider the required statutory factors under section 361.5, subdivision (e)(1) (hereafter “§ 361.5(e)(1)”) before determining that providing him services would be detrimental to the minor, and that even if the court considered those factors, its ruling was an abuse of discretion. We affirm.

Defendant Eduardo Ramirez pleaded no contest to four counts of attempted murder and admitted that he personally inflicted great bodily injury on one of the victims. In accordance with defendant’s plea agreement, the trial court imposed a 19-year prison term.
On appeal, defendant’s counsel filed an opening brief in which no issues are raised and asked this court to independently review the record under People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. We sent a letter to defendant notifying him of his right to submit a written argument on his own behalf on appeal. He has not done so.
Finding no arguable appellate issue, we affirm. We will provide “a brief description of the facts and procedural history of the case, the crimes of which the defendant was convicted, and the punishment imposed,” as required by People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 110. We will further include information about aspects of the trial court proceedings that might become relevant in future proceedings. (I

A.B. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional order removing her children, S.M. (daughter, born 2010) and R.M. (son, born 2013) from her custody and care. She argues substantial evidence does not support the court’s jurisdictional findings, because there is insufficient evidence her mental health issues and substance abuse problems placed her children at risk of physical harm. She also argues there is insufficient evidence of domestic violence in the home. Although we agree with mother the record does not contain substantial, credible evidence of domestic violence, we conclude there is sufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings. Mother’s mental health issues, which were tied to her substance abuse, were recurrent, and there was evidence her issues may increase in severity absent proper treatment. We affirm the order.

Petitioner F.G. was 16 years old when he allegedly perpetrated a gang murder on April 16, 2016. In January 2017, the district attorney filed a juvenile petition alleging that F.G. committed murder (Pen. Code, § 187); that he committed the offense for the benefit of a criminal street gang (id., § 186.22, subd. (b)(5)); and that a principal in the offense intentionally and personally discharged a firearm, causing the victim’s death (id., § 12022.53, subds. (d), (e)(1)). In conjunction with the petition, the district attorney moved pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 707 to transfer F.G. to a court of criminal jurisdiction.

C.G. (mother) and T.G. (father) are the parents of six-year-old I.G. (born November 2011). In case No. H045169, this court affirmed the dispositional order removing I.G. from the home. Following a 60-day review hearing, the trial court continued I.G. in out-of- home placement. On appeal, father challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support this order. We affirm.

A jury convicted defendant Jose Omar Ramirez of a number of crimes, including two counts of attempted first degree burglary with another person present (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 459, 667.5, subd. (c)(21)); resisting an executive officer in the performance of his duties under Penal Code section 69 (hereafter section 69); and resisting a peace officer under Penal Code section 148, subdivision (a) (hereafter section 148(a)). Ramirez contends on appeal that we must reverse his conviction of section 69 because of insufficient evidence; the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that section 148(a) is a lesser offense of section 69; and, if we uphold the section 69 conviction, we must strike the section 148(a) conviction because he cannot be convicted of both offenses. Ramirez also argues—and the People concede—that the enhancements under Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (c)(21) do not apply to the crime of attempted burglary and must be stricken.

In 2016, Veena Ramachandran sued her former employer alleging she was wrongfully terminated in 2001. The trial court entered a judgment of dismissal against Ramachandran after sustaining a demurrer on statute of limitations grounds without leave to amend. On appeal, Ramachandran argues she sufficiently alleged that the limitations period was equitably tolled for more than 14 years while her administrative action was pending before the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (DLSE) and during an ensuing enforcement action brought by the Labor Commissioner against the employer. We disagree and affirm.

A jury convicted defendant Jose Carlos Romero of first degree murder (Pen. Code § 187, subd. (a)), unlawful possession of a firearm (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)), and unlawful possession of ammunition (§ 30305, subd. (a)(1)). The jury also found true the allegation that defendant personally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury and/or death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). In a separate proceeding, the trial court found that defendant had served a prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The trial court sentenced defendant to 25 years to life for murder, a consecutive term of 25 years to life for the firearm enhancement, and a consecutive one-year term for the prior prison term enhancement.

In 2016, the Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) took the children of Kim K. (mother) and Gary G. (father) into protective custody. After providing reunification services for over two years, the juvenile court found that the return of custody to the parents would present a substantial risk of detriment to the children’s safety, protection, and well-being. The court terminated reunification services and set a future hearing regarding parental rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26.)
Mother has filed a petition for an extraordinary writ of mandate/prohibition in this court seeking to vacate the juvenile court’s orders. She argues that substantial evidence does not support the court’s factual finding of detriment. We disagree and deny the mother’s petition for extraordinary writ relief.