CA Unpub Decisions

Joseph Codinha, Jr., appeals from a judgment convicting him of indecent exposure with a prior conviction for lewd act on a child. (Pen. Code, 314, 288, subd. (a).) He contends the trial court (1) erred in admitting uncharged sexual offense evidence, and (2) violated his jury trial rights under Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 490 (Apprendi) by imposing an upper term sentence. Court reject his arguments and affirm the judgment.

Jonathan Loucks and Jeremiah Loucks appeal the granting of a summary judgment in favor of Eric Jacobs on their lawsuit for malicious prosecution. They contend the court erred in finding they had not raised triable issues of fact as to whether Eric conspired or aided and abetted his father, Harvey Barry Jacobs (Barry), in filing the underlying prior malicious prosecution suit against the Louckses. Court affirm the judgment.

Scott Griffin Sewell appeals, contending he was erroneously deprived of custody credits in his probation revocation case for the time he spent in custody after being arrested for a new offense.
On April 25, 2001, Scott Griffin Sewell pled guilty to burglary (Pen. Code, 459) and admitted he had served a prior prison term within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b) in case No. SCD 157908. The trial court sentenced Sewell to four years in prison, suspended execution of the sentence and placed Sewell on three years of felony probation.matter is remanded to the trial court with directions to order the preparation and filling of a supplemental probation report and to hold a new hearing on the issue of credits.

In 1995 Berhu Fekadu pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity to two counts of forcible lewd acts on a child (Pen. Code,[1] 288, subd. (b)) and three counts of assault with a deadly weapon and by means of force likely to cause great bodily injury ( 245, subd. (a)(1)). The court ordered him committed to the California Department of Mental Health ( 1026). In July 2006 the People filed a petition for extension of commitment ( 1026.5). In December the court found that by reason of a mental disorder, Fekadu represented a substantial danger of physical harm to others. It granted the petition and extended Fekadu's commitment for two years. Fekadu appeals. Court affirm.

An information charged defendants Arturo Ocegueda (Defendant O.) and Alfredo Moreno (Defendant M.) with murder (Pen. Code, 187, subd. (a))[1]and alleged the special circumstance of lying in wait ( 190.2, subd. (a)(15)). Following a jury trial, Defendant O. was convicted of first degree murder, and the special circumstance of lying in wait was found to be true. Defendant M. was found guilty of second degree murder, but the special circumstance was not found to be true. Defendant O. was sentenced to state prison for life without the possibility of parole. Defendant M. was sentenced to state prison for a term of 15 years to life.
The judgment is affirmed.

Defendant Valerie Juarez (aka Flaca) was convicted of the murder of Azalia Sandoval. (Pen. Code, 187, subd. (a).)[1]The jury also found true the enhancement allegation that she personally used and intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury or death. ( 12022.53, subd. (d).) She pled guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. ( 12021, subd. (a)(1).) She admitted two prison priors and one prior strike conviction. Defendant was sentenced to a total of six years plus 75 years to life.
On appeal defendant contends the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense to murder. She further argues that the trial court erroneously allowed into evidence three statements made by defendant allegedly obtained in violation of Miranda. Court affirm the judgment.

Plaintiff Arlene A. McDonald appeals from a judgment entered after the trial court sustained without leave to amend the demurrer of defendant to McDonalds third amended complaint for wrongful termination. Our independent review confirms McDonald failed to state a cause of action. Court affirm the judgment.

Defendant and appellant Luis Antonio Jaimes appeals from the order extending his commitment to the Department of Mental Health, after a jury found that he continued to be a mentally disordered offender (MDO). (Pen. Code, 2970, et seq.) Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it allowed the Peoples experts to testify as to what would happen to him if he were released from the MDO program. Court affirm.

Defendant and appellant Louis Biscotti and his counsel, Nicholas C. Rowley, appeal from an order directing them to pay attorney fees to Plaintiff and Respondent Brandon Foss after Biscotti brought an unsuccessful motion to set aside deemed admissions. Biscotti contends the trial court lacked authority to impose attorney fees as a sanction.

Pursuant to a negotiated settlement resolving two cases, defendant pleaded no contest to making a criminal threat (Pen. Code, 422),[1]to deterring an executive officer in the performance of his or her duties ( 69), and admitted a prior strike conviction ( 667, subds. (b)-(i)). Defendants pleas and admission were given in exchange for the dismissal of other counts and a promise of no more than four years in state prison. Court find no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant.

We have previously published two opinions in this case. In Vasquez v. State of California (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 849, 851, 856-857(Vasquez I), we held as a matter of first impression that the State of California (the State) has a duty under Proposition 139, the voter-approved Prison Inmate Labor Initiative of 1990, to enforce a private business's duty to pay wages to inmate employees that are comparable to wages paid in the private sector, given the State's right to a percentage of their wages to defray expenses of incarceration. Court reversed a judgment entered for the State after the sustaining of a demurrer to Cristina Vasquez's taxpayer waste cause of action.

Ennis E. White entered a negotiated guilty plea to second degree burglary. (Pen. Code, 459.) The court sentenced him to a stipulated two-year middle term in prison. The record does not include a certificate of probable cause. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.304(b).) The judgment is affirmed.

Thomas E. Cartwright entered a guilty plea to one count of transportation of cocaine base (Health & Saf. Code, 11352, subd. (a)), and one count of possession of cocaine base for sale ( 11351.5). Cartwright also admitted that he had twice been convicted of predicate drug offenses within the meaning of section 11370.2, subdivision (a), giving rise to sentencing enhancements for both of those prior convictions, and that he had suffered two prior serious or violent felonies constituting strike priors (Pen. Code, 667, subds. (b) (i), 1170.12, subds. (a) (d) (the Three Strikes law)).
At sentencing, the trial court exercised its discretion (1) to strike one of Cartwright's strike priors, and (2) to strike both of the enhancement allegations made pursuant to section 11370.2, subdivision (a). The trial court sentenced Cartwright to prison for eight years.
Cartwright contends that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to strike both of his strike priors. Court conclude that Cartwright's argument is without merit. Accordingly, Court affirm.

Jose Guillen, as Jury Commissioner for the Superior Court of Imperial County (Guillen), filed a petition for writ of mandate challenging the trial court's order enforcing the subpoena duces tecum served on Guillen by defendant Reggie D. Cole requiring Guillen to disclose certain State of California Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) information in his (Guillen's) possession in connection with Cole's investigation into whether the jury selection process managed by Guillen complies with constitutional standards. Guillen contends the trial court erred because: (1) Code of Civil Procedure section 197[1]precludes his disclosure of that DMV information to anyone; (2) Cole does not have a constitutional right to pretrial discovery of the requested DMV information; and (3) Cole did not make the requisite showing for disclosure of that DMV information. Court conclude Cole has not shown the DMV information is relevant under the applicable standard for disclosure of information necessary to his investigation of his reasonable belief that underrepresentation of cognizable groups may be the result of improper jury selection practices. Court therefore grant the petition.