CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant Austin Stephen Hess subleased a room from Derek Morgan. He was bitten by Morgan's dog. He alleges that respondents Abel and Celia Mosqueda (the Mosquedas), the property owners and Morgan's lessors, are liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
Hess's complaint for negligence and strict liability against the Mosquedas was resolved by summary judgment in their favor on the grounds that the Mosquedas had no agency or employment relationship with the dog owner and had no vicarious liability for Hess's injuries.
Court conclude that summary judgment was properly granted because, as we shall explain, simply permitting a lessee to sublease does not thereby make the lessee the agent of the lessor. Accordingly, Court affirm.

Augustine Alejo appeals a judgment of conviction entered after he expressly waived his constitutional rights and pleaded nolo contendere to second degree robbery, and admitted allegations of prior serious felony strike convictions and service of prior prison terms. (Pen. Code, 211, 667, subd. (a), 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d), & 667.5, subd. (b).)[1] Alejo received a negotiated sentence of 16 years, consisting of a 5-year upper term for second degree robbery (doubled), a 5-year enhancement pursuant to section 667, subdivision (a), and a one-year enhancement pursuant to section 667.5, subdivision (b). The trial court awarded Alejo presentence custody credits of 282 days. It also imposed a $200 restitution fine and a $200 stayed parole revocation restitution fine. ( 1202.4, subd. (b) & 1202.45.) The trial court dismissed a remaining count of grand theft from a person, strike allegations, and prior prison term allegations charged in the information.
Court have reviewed the entire record and are satisfied that Alejo's attorney has fully complied with his responsibilities and that no arguable issue exists. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441.) The judgment is affirmed.

Joshua Ty Cobb appeals from an order revoking probation and sentencing him to two years state prison. In 2003 appellant pleaded guilty to unlawful intercourse with a minor (Pen. Code, 261.5, subd. (d)). The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and granted five years probation. Appellant admitted violating probation in 2005. The trial court reinstated probation and ordered appellant to serve 30 days county jail.
Court have reviewed the entire record and are satisfied that appellant's attorney has fully complied with his responsibilities and that no arguable issues exist. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441.) The judgment is affirmed.

A jury convicted defendant Jaquay Odell Liggion of willful discharge of a firearm at an inhabited dwelling (Pen. Code, 246[1]--count one) and assault with a firearm ( 245, subd. (a)(2)--count two). He was sentenced to state prison for the upper term of seven years on count one. Count two was stayed pursuant to section 654.
Defendant appealed to this court, contending the trial court erred by (1) denying his Wheeler-Batson[2]motion, and (2) imposing the upper term based on facts not found by the jury. In January 2006, this court affirmed the judgment, and the California Supreme Court denied review. (Review den. Apr. 19, 2006, S141792.) The judgment is affirmed.

Because Gonzalo Vergara defaulted on his mortgage payments, his lender, Heritage Community Credit Union, had an attorney, Steven Melmet, act as its trustee in order to conduct a nonjudicial foreclosure sale. After Vergara sued Heritage and Melmet on various theories, the trial court sustained their demurrers without leave to amend. Vergara, formerly a California attorney who proceeds in this court in propria persona, timely filed his notice of appeal from the judgment and proceeds in this court in propria persona. Court affirm.

Defendant appeals his conviction by jury trial of second degree robbery with personal firearm use (Pen. Code, 212.5, subd. (c), 12022.53, subd. (b)) (count 1), possession of a firearm by a felon ( 12021, subd. (a)(1)) (count 2), burglary of a vehicle ( 460, subd. (b)) (count 3) and possession of stolen property ( 496, subd. (a)) (count 4). In a bifurcated proceeding, the court found true a prior conviction allegation. ( 1203, subd. (e)(4).) Wilson was sentenced to 15 years eight months in state prison. Codefendant Jeffrey Burtley[2]appeals his conviction of second degree burglary while armed with a firearm ( 212.5, subd. (c), 12022, subd. (a)(1)) (count 1), burglary of a vehicle (count 3), and receiving stolen property (count 4). The court found true a prior serious felony conviction. ( 667, subd. (a).) Burtley was sentenced to 16 years four months in state prison.
Defendants both contend the court erroneously denied their joint Batson Wheeler motion, and erroneously admitted a witnesss opinion testimony. In addition, Burtley contends the court erroneously denied his pretrial severance motion, there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction of possession of stolen property, and the court committed Blakely error (Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296) in imposing the upper term and consecutive sentences in violation of his right to jury trial. Court reject the contentions and affirm.

Demetrius Chafford appeals from a judgment entered after a jury convicted him of first degree murder. (Pen. Code, 187, 189.) He contends his conviction must be reversed because (1) the trial court erred when it admitted evidence of his prior misconduct, (2) the court erred when it allowed a witness to testify about the meaning of certain words that were used in recorded telephone calls, and (3) the prosecutor committed misconduct during final argument. Court reject these arguments and affirm.

Defendant appeals from a seven-year sentence imposed by the trial court following a jury trial, contending that imposition of the upper term violated his federal constitutional right to a jury trial. In light of the California Supreme Courts recent decision in People v. Black (2007) 41 Cal.4th 799 (Black II ), Court affirm the judgment.

Plaintiff Robert Roe appeals from denial of his petition for writ of mandate seeking de novo review of his termination by the Department of Justice. Court hold that the State Personnel Board did not violate the Government Code section 18671.1 time limit for issuing a decision, that Roes due process claims are without merit, and that there is no ongoing wrongful deprivation entitling him to a further backpay award. Court affirm the trial court.

Appellant Mark Anthony Lozada was placed on felony probation after he was tried before a jury and convicted of assault by means of force likely to cause great bodily injury. (Pen. Code, 245, subd. (a)(1).)[1]He contends the judgment must be reversed because (1) the testimony of the victim and the only other eyewitness was tainted by an unduly suggestive pretrial identification procedure; (2) the court committed prejudicial error when it gave a flight instruction over his objection and declined to give an absence of flight instruction at his request; and (3) his motion for a new trial on the grounds of suggestive identification procedures and insufficient evidence should have been granted. Court affirm.

Defendant appeals from a judgment entered on his plea. His counsel has asked this court for an independent review of the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.)
After denial of his motion to suppress below, defendant pleaded no contest to possession of cocaine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, 11351), possession of heroin for sale (Health & Saf. Code, 11351), possession of methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, 11378), and receiving stolen property (Pen. Code, 496, subd. (a)); he also admitted two prior prison convictions and four prior drug convictions. Defendant was sentenced to 16 years in state prison. There are no meritorious issues to be argued on appeal. The judgment is affirmed.

The People, having invoked their right to a speedy trial (Cal. Const., art. I, 29), seek a writ of mandate commanding respondent superior court to proceed with the [underlying] criminal case without further delay, other than that reasonably necessary for the parties to obtain the attendance of their witnesses. (Pen. Code, 1511.) Real party in interest Qi Xin Kuang was charged with various crimes including attempted murder in November 2005. The preliminary hearing was held in October 2006. According to the People, trial was originally set for January 12, 2007. The issuance of a peremptory writ of mandate in the first instance is appropriate as there is no dispute over the law or the facts in this case (see Lewis v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1259-1260), and section 1511 provides for immediate relief under the circumstances of this case.
A peremptory writ of mandate issue commanding respondent superior court to proceed with the criminal case without further delay, other than that reasonably necessary for the parties to obtain the attendance of their witnesses. This decision is final immediately as to this court (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.264(b)(3).

Sukhdev Rye appeals in propria persona from the judgment of dissolution of marriage entered on the petition of Rajvir Uppal.[1] He contends that the trial court erred in denying his request for a continuance; in denying his request after the court took the matter under submission for a statement of decision; in computing interest on community funds at the legal rate rather than the actual return; in calculating the credit to the community for community funds he had expended on legal fees; and in imputing an earning capacity to him. Court reverse the judgment and remand to the trial court for a determination of limited issues. Given the nature of his arguments, Court do not need to relate many of the facts to which the parties testified. Court therefore not include a separate summary of the facts, and instead incorporate the pertinent details in the Discussion where relevant.
The portion of the appeal from the order denying the request for a statement of decision is dismissed.

Petitioner Diane Gail Stretton appeals probate court orders: (1) granting the motion for terminating discovery sanctions against her filed by contestant Donna Tobey and joined by contestant Sharon Freeburn; (2) denying Stretton's motions for sanctions against the contestants, for special accommodations, and for change of venue; and (3) denying her motion for reconsideration of these orders. Stretton contends the trial court abused its discretion by granting the motion for terminating sanctions for her failure to comply with the court's order compelling her deposition and production of documents because: (1) substantial evidence does not support the court's factual findings; (2) the terminating sanction was punitive rather than remedial; and (3) a lesser sanction would have been sufficient.