CA Unpub Decisions

Cheryl McElwain filed suit against Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (Hospitals) and Southern California Permanente Medical Group (Medical Group) (collectively Defendants) after she was terminated from her position as a nurse. McElwain alleged disability discrimination premised upon the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) claims. (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.) The jury found for McElwain on two causes of action, with the jury awarding her $187,762 in economic damages, $100,000 in non-economic damages, and $20,000 in punitive damages, for a total recovery of $307,762.

Cheryl McElwain filed suit against Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (Hospitals) and Southern California Permanente Medical Group (Medical Group) (collectively Defendants) after she was terminated from her position as a nurse. McElwain alleged disability discrimination premised upon the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) claims. (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.) The jury found for McElwain on two causes of action, with the jury awarding her $187,762 in economic damages, $100,000 in non-economic damages, and $20,000 in punitive damages, for a total recovery of $307,762.

On May 29, 2018, petitions were filed on behalf of Matthew M. (age 11) and Isabella M. (age 9) pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 by Tuolumne County Child Welfare Services (child welfare services) alleging the children were at risk of harm due to S.T.’s (mother) addiction to methamphetamine. The children were detained. At the jurisdiction hearing on August 15, 2018, the juvenile court found true allegations that both children suffered substantial risk of physical harm due to their mother’s addiction to methamphetamine. At the conclusion of a disposition hearing on October 12, 2018, the juvenile court found the bypass provisions of section 361.5, subdivision (b)(13) applicable, denied mother reunification services, and set the matter for a permanency planning hearing on February 5, 2019.

Appellant, Hutton Frank Miller, a California state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a civil action in Fresno County Superior Court against the medical staff of Valley State Prison alleging inadequate medical care in failing to provide treatment for nerve pain in his feet. Although appellant filed the complaint, he did not effectuate service on the defendants nor did he appear at the scheduled case management conference.
On February 23, 2017, the trial court held an order to show cause hearing, but appellant failed to appear. Based on his failure to appear, the court, by way of an unsigned minute order, dismissed the action without prejudice. No further activity appears on the docket prior to appellant’s filing of a notice of appeal on April 20, 2017. We find that an unsigned minute order is not an appealable order, and therefore we lack jurisdiction and must dismiss the appeal.

Appellant Mario Anthony McGill was charged in count 1 with the premeditated murder of Raul Valera (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 189, subd. (a)), with the special circumstance allegations that the murder was committed by lying in wait (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(15)); by an active gang member (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(22); that he personally used a deadly weapon in the commission of the murder (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)); and that the murder was committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). Appellant was also charged in count 2 with active participation in a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (a)) and, as to each count, it was alleged appellant had served four prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).

Appellant Justin Anthony Banks shot a man to death, was convicted of murder, and received an aggregate prison sentence of 83 years to life. He now argues that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial because, in response to concerns about disorderly behavior or potential disorderly behavior among spectators, the court began mid-trial to require spectators to show identification to the bailiff and place their names on a sign-in sheet before entering the courtroom.

In 2008, as part of a plea agreement, appellant Gurmit Singh pleaded no contest to charges of arranging a meeting with a minor for the purpose of engaging in lewd or lascivious behavior and attempted lewd act upon a child. Seven years later, after he fulfilled his sentence and probationary period and was subject to deportation, Singh moved to vacate the judgment and withdraw his plea, pursuant to Penal Code sections 1016.5, 1018, and 1203.4, arguing that at the time of the plea hearing he did not understand the trial court’s advisement of the plea’s possible immigration consequences. The motion was denied, and Singh timely appealed. We affirm.

In this matter, we have reviewed the petition and its exhibits, real party in interest’s (real party) opposition, and petitioner’s reply. We have determined that resolution of the matter involves the application of settled principles of law, and that the equities favor petitioner. We conclude that issuance of a peremptory writ in the first instance is therefore appropriate. (Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 178.)

Appellant, T.B., a minor, age 14, appeals from the judgment entered after the dependency court ordered reunification services for defendant and respondent, V.B. (Father). At the jurisdictional and dispositional hearing, the court found that Father had physically abused T.B., and found true the allegations of risk of serious physical harm under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b). T.B. argues that the court failed to apply the correct standard of review in denying his request to bypass reunification services. Additionally, T.B. argues that the court abused its discretion by relying on only one factor to order reunification services for Father. We find that T.B. forfeited his argument to the court using the incorrect standard of review regarding bypass and reunification services by not raising it in the lower court. We further conclude that even reaching the merits of T.B.’s claim, the court did not abuse its discretion. We therefore affirm the judg

This action involves a dispute between the members of Apex Fuels LLC (AFLLC). Plaintiff and respondent Chemoil Corporation (Chemoil) sued defendants and appellants AFLLC, Cunningham Holdings, Inc. (CHI), Gregory S. Cunningham (Cunningham), and Apex Energy Ventures LLC (AEV) to recover amounts owed to Chemoil as a secured creditor. On March 17, 2017, while the action was pending, the trial court granted Chemoil’s request for a preliminary injunction and ordered defendants to pay into the court the sum of $224,500 and any other direct or indirect proceeds from the sale of an AEV asset (mandatory portion). The court further enjoined defendants from taking any action that would dispose of any assets of AEV (prohibitory portion).

This case is about a residential asbestos abatement gone awry. Michele Holloway owns a house in Norco, California. In 2011, she filed a claim for water damage with her insurance carrier, Travelers Commercial Insurance Company (Travelers), reporting that water from her toilets had leaked and flooded the house. After inspecting the property, Luba, Inc. (Luba) recommended testing the vinyl tile covering her foundation for asbestos. The test came back positive, and Holloway hired Alliance Environmental Group, Inc. (Alliance) to remove the tile and asbestos from her foundation.After the abatement, Holloway complained of a strong chemical odor and claimed she could not reenter her home. About a year later, she sued Alliance and Luba for negligence, breach of contract, fraud, and deceptive practices against a disabled person. She claimed Luba had fraudulently induced her to agree to an unnecessary abatement and Alliance improperly performed the work.

Casey Jones, Jr., appeals an order denying his petition to designate his conviction for burglary (Pen. Code, § 459, unlabeled statutory citations refer to this code) as misdemeanor shoplifting (§ 459.5) under section 1170.18, which California voters enacted as part of The Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act (Proposition 47). Jones also appeals the order denying his motion to strike the one-year prison prior enhancement (§ 667.5, subd. (b)) imposed on the burglary count, which was based on a conviction the trial court had previously redesignated a misdemeanor under Proposition 47. Jones contends the trial court erred by inadvertently denying his petition to designate the burglary conviction a misdemeanor and by denying his motion to strike the enhancement because the redesignated misdemeanor conviction could not have supported an enhancement had Proposition 47 been in effect at the time of his offenses.

A jury convicted Jaimi Teresa Roberts of (1) involuntary manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (b), count 1) as a lesser included offense of murder, and (2) child abuse homicide (§ 273ab, subd. (a), count 2). The court sentenced Roberts to prison for 25 years to life on count 2, and a concurrent four-year term for involuntary manslaughter, which the court stayed under section 654.
On appeal, Roberts makes two instructional error arguments with respect to her conviction for child abuse homicide. First, she contends the court erred in failing to instruct on the defense of accident. If we determine the court had no sua sponte duty to so instruct, and to avoid forfeiture of the issue on appeal, Roberts contends her attorney's failure to request that instruction constituted ineffective assistance. Second, Roberts contends the court erred by failing to instruct that involuntary manslaughter is a lesser included offense of child abuse homicide. We reject both contentions and aff

This action involves a dispute between two factions for control of the Alta Del Mar Coastal Collection Community Association (the Association), a homeowner's association governing 10 homes. The trial court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) that essentially barred Girish Prasad, a co-manager of plaintiffs LNSU #1, LLC (LNSU#1) and LNSU #2, LLC (LNSU#2) (together plaintiffs or the LLCs), from acting as a director on the Association's board of directors (the board). The ultimate question presented is whether Prasad is eligible to be a board member. The trial court also issued a preliminary injunction that barred plaintiffs from: (1) preventing other Association members from holding a special election to fill two vacancies on the board and (2) conducting any Association business other than ordinary day-to-day property maintenance or election preparations.