CA Unpub Decisions

Indrasain Ramsundar and Khaimwatee Ramsundar (collectively, Ramsundar) appeal from a judgment for First American Title Insurance Company (First American) in this action for breach of the covenant against encumbrances implied in a grant deed. Ramsundar argues it was error to grant two motions in limine that excluded evidence of his defenses to the action. Court disagree and therefore affirm.

Defendant Timothy McKnight appeals from a judgment that extended his civil commitment under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA), Welfare and Institutions Code section 6600 et seq. Because the term of defendants recommitment has expired, Court dismiss the appeal as moot.

A mother, Robin S., appeals from jurisdictional and dispositional orders concerning her child. Court affirm.

Defendant and appellant Jason O. appeals the juvenile courts dispositional order committing him to the Orin Allen Youth Rehabilitation Facility (OAYRF) for a period of six months. Appellant contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by sending him to the OAYRF rather than returning him to the home of his mother. He also contends the juvenile courts decision amounts to a violation of his constitutional rights to due process. For reasons explained in more detail below, Court discern neither abuse of discretion nor any violation of appellants constitutional rights. Consequently, Court affirm.

Defendant Kevin M. Anthony appeals a judgment based on pleas of no contest in two separate cases. The opening brief filed by his appellate counsel raises no issues and asks this court for an independent review pursuant to the decision in People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. Counsel advised defendant of his right to file a supplementary brief and none was filed. After reviewing the record, Court find no meritorious issues to be briefed or argued.

Marcela Fuentes appeals from summary judgment in favor of her employer, AutoZone, Inc. (defendant, sometimes referred to as AutoZone) on her complaint for sexual harassment, intentional infliction of emotional distress and slander. Plaintiff argues that she presented evidence that her individual harassers were supervisors and therefore defendant is strictly liable. Defendant argues that since the undisputed facts demonstrate that the harassers were coworkers, it is liable only if it failed to take immediate and appropriate corrective action once it knew of the harassment. The parties also contest whether the harassment was severe or pervasive. Court find triable issues of material fact precluding summary judgment as to whether the individual harassers were supervisors and as to whether the harassment was severe. Plaintiff also appeals from the denial of her motions for new trial and for relief pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473. Court need not and do not reach these further arguments in light of our reversal of the summary judgment as to the first cause of action for sexual harassment. The judgment in favor of defendant is reversed.

Appellants, Johnathan T. Bolden and Tavares Stefin, appeal from their convictions of multiple murders, robbery and burglary. They contend the trial court erred in finding their respective statements to the police were voluntary and thus admissible. They also contend the trial court committed prejudicial error in admitting evidence of uncharged crimes. They further argue the gang findings are not supported by the evidence. Stefin argues the trial court erred in excluding evidence to support his duress defense and further erred in refusing instructions on the defense of duress. Finally, they assert their sentences should be corrected to reflect the jurys verdict, the courts oral pronouncement of judgment and applicable law. Court find their allegations of sentencing error have merit and accordingly will modify the judgments. As so modified, Court affirm.

Lincoln Santa Monica Limited Partnership, LP (Lincoln) appeals from a judgment entered upon a jury verdict in favor of respondent, HNTB Design/Build, Inc. (HNTB) in litigation arising out of the construction of a multi-million dollar apartment complex. Lincoln claims the trial court erred in awarding HNTB breach of contract damages, statutory penalties pursuant to sections 3260 and 3260.1 of the Civil Code and attorney fees. Specifically, it claims: (1) the jury did not make the necessary factual findings in its special verdict to support an award for breach of contract damages, statutory penalties or attorney fees; and (2) the jury instructions concerning the statutory penalties were legally erroneous. As we shall explain, none of these contentions warrants a reversal of the judgment. Consequently, Court affirm.

After the sale did not close, buyer brought an action for specific performance of the sale contract; seller and agent filed cross-complaints. Seller appeals from the judgment granting specific performance of the contract to sell the property to buyer. The trial court also ruled against seller and in favor of buyer, buyers partner (Julian Rosales), agent, and Escalante on sellers cross-complaint, which had sought rescission of the sale contract and agents listing agreement. Agent also appeals from the judgment in favor of seller on agents cross-complaint for its brokers commission.
The judgment is affirmed as to the complaint and cross-complaint filed by appellant Ignacio Morales. The appeal by appellant Management Systems Corporation is dismissed.

This is a construction defect litigation case involving an eight-unit condominium complex in Toluca Lake. The homeowners association, plaintiff Landale-Cameron Court, Inc. (hereinafter, the HOA), discovered various water leaks during rains and sued the builder-developers Arnold and Helen Kaufman (hereinafter, Kaufman) and defendant Petri Ahonen dba Riteway Decking and Flooring (hereinafter, Riteway), alleging, inter alia, negligence and contract causes of action. The HOA appeals following summary judgment against it and in favor of Riteway based on the statute of limitations. Riteway cross-appeals, contending it was entitled to attorney fees from the HOA because it was the prevailing party on the third party beneficiary contract claim, and the contract between Riteway and Kaufman provided for attorney fees.We reverse as to the negligence cause of action because the statute of limitations was tolled by a signed agreement between the HOA and Kaufman. As provided for by the statutory scheme addressing common interest developments such as condominiums (Civ. Code, 1350 et seq.), notice to the builder of defects tolls all statutes of limitations against all parties who may be responsible for the defects claimed, whether named in the notice [of defects] or not . . . for a period of 150 days or a longer period agreed to in writing by the association and the builder. (Former 1375, subd. (b)(3)(A), italics added.) However, the HOAs cause of action for breach of a third party beneficiary contract is substantively without merit because the HOA, which was not even in existence at the time of the contract, was not a third party beneficiary. Finally, because the judgment must be reversed and the matter proceed to trial or other resolution, Riteways claim for attorney fees as the prevailing party is obviously unavailing.

Maria Solorio appeals from her conviction of one count of grand theft of personal property (Pen. Code, 487, subd. (a); all further statutory references are to the Penal Code). She argues the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction, the special enhancement was barred by the statute of limitations, and the victim restitution order is improper. Court find sufficient evidence to support the conviction. On this record, a preponderance of the evidence establishes that the enhancement is not barred by the statute of limitations because the prosecution was commenced within four years of discovery of appellants crime. Court find no abuse of discretion in the amount of restitution ordered.

Four young cousins brought suit against respondent Heidi Ludwick to assert claims primarily for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The cousins complaint, in essence, alleged Ludwick had wrongfully secreted and harbored the person who had been convicted of molesting them years before. The cousins claimed they suffered emotional distress because Ludwicks actions prevented the molester from being incarcerated for his crimes. The trial court sustained Ludwicks demurrer to the cousins first amended complaint without leave to amend and dismissed the action. The trial court found the allegations of the cousins first amended complaint contradicted the allegations of the original complaint in an attempt to state a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. For this reason, the trial court concluded the first amended complaint was a sham pleading. The trial court also found the cousins had not, and could not, allege Ludwick owed them a duty and thus the cousins could not state a cause of action for negligence. court affirm.

A jury convicted appellant Marcos Ordonez of having a concealed firearm (Pen. Code, 12025, subd. (a)(2))[1](count 2) and exhibiting a concealable firearm (brandishing) ( 417, subd. (a)(2)) (count 3).[2] The trial court sentenced appellant to one year for each offense, to be served consecutively, for a total of two years in county jail.
Appellant appeals on the grounds that: (1) the trial court erred prejudicially by failing to instruct the jury on self defense, and (2) appellants term of one year in county jail for brandishing a firearm is an unauthorized sentence because the jury did not find that the offense occurred in a public place.
The judgment is modified to reduce the one year term imposed on count 3 to a six month term, and appellants total sentence is reduced to one year and six months. As modified, the judgment is affirmed.

Plaintiff Susana de la Pea, Ph.D., was hired by defendant Rio Hondo Community College District (the District) to teach English. However, after unsatisfactory performance ratings as a probationary employee, de la Peas employment contract was not renewed. De la Pea challenged the decision by way of arbitration, pursuant to the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. She also sued the District, her supervisors, and other District personnel,[1]alleging causes of action in a fourth amended complaint for wrongful termination based on national origin discrimination and retaliation, defamation, false imprisonment, and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Court find the trial court properly (1) denied the motion to confirm the arbitration decision, which was in de la Peas favor but was merely advisory and was not adopted by the District, and (2) denied the petition for a writ of administrative mandamus because substantial evidence supported the finding by the District that there were no procedural irregularities in the process used to evaluate de la Peas grievance. Additionally, the trial court properly (1) sustained the demurrer to the cause of action alleging wrongful termination in violation of public policy in the first amended complaint, and (2) granted summary judgment as to the remaining causes of action.