CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant Shawn Carter was convicted, following a jury trial, of one count of second degree murder in violation of Penal Code section 187. Appellant admitted that he had suffered a prior serious felony conviction within the meaning of sections 667, subdivision (a) and subdivisions (b) through (i) and 1170.12. The trial court sentenced appellant to a total term of 35 years to life in state prison. Appellant appeals from the judgment of conviction, contending that the trial court erred in instructing the jury with CALCRIM Nos. 220 and 222 concerning reasonable doubt. Court affirm the judgment of conviction.

In August 2005, police officers responded to a call about a fight to find 16-year-old Jonathan M. and some other young men near the corner of Hollywood Boulevard and Highland Avenue. Witnesses (including Jonathans 15-year-old girlfriend, Angela W.) told the officers about the fight. Jonathan was arrested, and Angela was taken to the police station, where the police found more than 30 individually wrapped pieces of rock cocaine in her pockets. Jonathan waived his rights and told the officers that he was a member of the Harlem 30 Crips gang, that he had gone to Hollywood to sell rocks and that, when he became involved in the fight, he dropped them. Angela picked them up. Court have independently reviewed the record and are satisfied that Jonathans lawyer has fulfilled her duty and that no arguable issues exist. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436; People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106.) The judgment is affirmed.

Plaintiff and appellant William Leader (Leader) filed a legal malpractice action against, inter alia, defendant and respondent Russell Iungerish (Attorney Iungerish) stemming from Leaders conviction in an underlying criminal proceeding during which Attorney Iungerish represented Leader. Although the trial court initially stayed the malpractice action pursuant to the parties stipulation, it thereafter lifted the stay, sustained Attorney Iungerishs demurrer, and dismissed the action (first dismissal order). Leaders appeal from the first dismissal order was assigned to this court, and Court reversed that order and directed the trial court to stay Leaders malpractice action during the period in which . . . Leader timely and diligently is pursuing his postconviction remedies.
Leader now appeals from the second dismissal order, arguing that the order is premature, unfair, and harsh, and that monetary sanctions or an order to show cause would have been more appropriate remedies for his failure to appear at the status conference. Because the trial court failed to give Leader notice of its intent to dismiss the malpractice action and denied him the opportunity to be heard on the issue, Court vacate the dismissal order.

Crystal B. (mother), mother of M. B. and Cleveland T., petitions for extraordinary relief pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.452. She seeks review of an order terminating her reunification services and setting a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Mother contends the juvenile court erred in finding the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) provided her with adequate reunification services. Court deny the petition.

Convicted of a number of residential burglaries (Pen. Code, 459), forgery of a check (Pen. Code, 470, subd. (d)), possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, 11377, subd. (a)), and misdemeanor elder theft (Pen. Code, 368, subd. (d)),[1]defendant Johanna Ceniceros appeals her convictions and the sentence imposed. She contends the trial court erred in declaring a witness unavailable because of infirmity or illness and raises various claims of sentencing error. On February 20, 2007, the United States Supreme Court, having granted a petition for writ of certiorari, vacated the judgment of this court and remanded the case to us for further consideration in light of Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. [166 L.Ed.2d 856] (Cunningham). Court directed the parties to submit supplemental letter briefs, discussing Cunningham issues only. Having further considered the case in light of Cunningham, the convictions are affirmed but the matter is remanded to the trial court for correction of sentencing errors.

When the parties 20-year marriage was dissolved in 1987, the court awarded no spousal support but reserved jurisdiction on the issue of support.
Nineteen years later, the court granted Yolandas request for support and entered an order that Ramon pay her $150 per month. Ramon appeals. Court affirm the judgment.

Appellant T.L.S., the mother of D.S. and J.S. (the minors), appeals from an order of the juvenile court denying a petition for modification (Welf. & Inst. Code, 388, 395), which sought to change the placement of the minors from nonrelative foster care to the home of T.Q., the minors paternal aunt. Appellant contends generally that in denying the petition for modification, the juvenile court abused its discretion. For the reasons that follow, Court affirm the order.

A jury found defendant Robert Lindsey Conley guilty of 36 counts charging various sex offenses involving his daughter H. and stepdaughter K. (Pen. Code, 261, subd. (a)(2); 261.5, subds. (c) & (d); 288, subd. (a); 288a, subds. (b)(2), (c)(2); 288.5; unspecified statutory references that follow are to the Penal Code.) The jury also found true charged special allegations. ( 667.61, subd. (b); 1203.065, subd. (a); 1203.066, subd. (a)(7).)
Defendant appeals, contending that imposition of the upper term on count 24 violates the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution under Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. [166 L.Ed.2d 856] (Cunningham). Court disagree and affirm the judgment.

About 9:00 a.m. on July 20, 2003, defendant Zachary James Ragan drove a stolen car at 91 miles per hour on Interstate 5. When a highway patrol officer tried to stop defendant, defendant increased his speed to 110 miles per hour, passed cars on the shoulder and center divider and eventually crashed. He ran from the crash scene but was found in the Shasta River. His eyes were bloodshot and glazed. The car was severely damaged. Having undertaken an examination of the entire record, Court find no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant. The judgment is affirmed.

After he kicked in a hotel room door and beat an acquaintance of his fiance, defendant Donald Gene Weaver entered a negotiated guilty plea to charges he committed first degree burglary and felony assault (Pen. Code, 459/460, subd. (a), 245, subd. (a)(1); additional statutory references are to the Penal Code).
His sole contention on appeal is that the trial court erred in failing to recite in detail the statutory basis for the restitution fine and probation revocation fines it imposed. Court disagree.

A modification decision.

After a nonjury trial, the trial court convicted Robert Bass of forgery (Pen. Code,[1] 476), burglary ( 459), six counts of grand theft of personal property ( 487, subd. (a)), two counts of attempted grand theft of personal property ( 664/487, subd. (a)), unlawful taking and driving of a vehicle (Veh. Code, 10851, subd. (a)), and receiving stolen property ( 496.) The court sentenced Bass to an aggregate term of four years four months in prison.
We conclude that Bass is correct with respect to this last challenge the trial court should have rendered a verdict on only one count of grand theft based on Bass's single criminal scheme. We consequently remand the case for the trial court to vacate the erroneous convictions, and resentence Bass accordingly. As Bass will receive a new sentencing hearing on remand, we need not consider Bass's other challenge to his sentencing procedure that the trial court erred by not granting him a continuance prior to sentencing. Court reject the balance of Bass's contentions.

Arlesia Graham appeals a judgment denying her petition for writ of administrative mandate against San Diego County Civil Service Commission (CSC). The petition challenged the CSC's decision affirming an order of the San Diego County Sheriff's Department (Sheriff) terminating her employment with Sheriff. On appeal, Graham contends: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court's finding that she violated the Sheriff's policy prohibiting its employees from associating with convicted felons or felons serving time in custody; and (2) the level of discipline imposed by the Sheriff (i.e., termination of her employment) was excessive punishment as a matter of law.

Shelley H. appeals the findings and orders entered at the jurisdictional and dispositional hearing held pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code sections 360, subdivision (d) and 361, subdivision (c). Citing In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, she asks this court to exercise its discretion to review the record for error. The appeal is dismissed.