CA Unpub Decisions

Simon D. appeals the findings and orders entered at the jurisdictional and dispositional hearing held pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code sections 360, subdivision (d) and 361, subdivision (c). Citing In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, he asks this court to exercise its discretion to review the record for error.
Simon D.'s counsel also requests leave for him to file a supplemental brief in propria persona. The request is denied. The appeal is dismissed.

After a court trial, the trial court found that defendants Jimmy Johnson and Deborah Johnson committed fraud and breached fiduciary duties in connection with a purchase of real property. The trial court reformed the deed to the property to remove the Johnsons from title, and to confirm plaintiffs Neil Cairns and Verla Cairns as the sole owners of the property. The trial court also found that the Johnsons conduct was outrageous and maliciously oppressive. It therefore awarded plaintiffs general damages for emotional distress of $50,000 and punitive damages of $50,000.
The Johnsons appeal, contending the emotional distress damages are unsupported by substantial evidence. They also argue that the punitive damages award should be reversed because there was no evidence of their financial condition.
The award of punitive damages is reversed for insufficiency of the evidence. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

On January 19, 2007, pursuant to Penal Code section 1192.5, defendant, represented by counsel, pled guilty to a violation of Health and Safety Code section 25189.6, subdivision (a), (count one) and admitted the special allegations filed pursuant to Penal Code sections 667(e)(1) and 1170.12(c)(1).
In accordance with the negotiated disposition, defendant was committed to state prison for four years less custody credits and the remaining counts and special allegations and case No. INFO51032 were dismissed and stricken on motion of the district attorney. (Pen. Code, 1385.)
The judgment is affirmed.

Lisa F. (the mother) appeals from an order terminating parental rights to her infant son, Isaac L.[1] Her sole appellate contention is that her right to due process was violated because the Department of Public Social Services (the Department) was recommending a continuance, and hence she did not have adequate notice that the termination hearing would actually proceed. Court hold that she forfeited this contention by failing to raise it below and that, even if not waived, it lacks merit.

Jose Luis Barragan was sentenced to three consecutive 15-year-to-life prison terms in counts one through three, and four consecutive eight-year prison terms in the remaining counts, after a jury found him guilty of three counts of aggravated sexual assault of P.C., a child (Pen. Code, 269, subd. (a)(1)[1]; counts one through three), two counts of forcible oral copulation of P.C. ( 288a, subd. (c)(2); counts four and six), and two counts of forcible rape of P.C. ( 261, subd. (a)(2); counts five and seven). On appeal, he sought relief on the grounds that the trial court (1) failed to hold a Marsden[2]hearing while criminal proceedings were suspended to determine his competency, (2) erred when it struck his once in jeopardy plea to counts one through four, (3) erred when it admitted his voluntary confession because he was not given a sufficient Miranda[3]warning, (4) erred when it instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 2.70, which defines confession and admission, (5) erred when it failed to instruct the jury, sua sponte, on unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor ( 261.5, subd. (d)) and nonforcible oral copulation ( 288a, subd. (a)(1)) as lesser included offenses, and (6) erred in imposing aggravated terms on counts four through seven. We affirmed the judgment. (People v. Barragan (Feb. 10, 2006, F046353) [nonpub. opn.].)The following pages set out, first, the facts and the discussion of all issues but the sentencing issue (verbatim from our original opinion) and, second, the discussion of the sentencing issue after remand from the United States Supreme Court. The judgment is affirmed.

The trial court convicted defendant Shahpor Ghobadi of eight counts of aggravated sexual assault upon a child. (Pen. Code, 269.)[1] On appeal, defendant contends that (1) no substantial evidence supports the convictions for counts 2, and 5 through 8, (2) the trial court erred by sustaining the Peoples objection to certain evidence, and (3) he received ineffective assistance of counsel as a result of several omissions. Court disagree and affirm the judgment.

Appellant Andrew Li was convicted, after a jury trial, of possession of cocaine. (Health & Saf. Code, 11350, subd. (a).) Appellant was granted probation. He contends his conviction must be reversed, because his rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda) were violated. Courtfind no Miranda violation, and affirm.

Appellant Kimberly C. committed misdemeanor vehicular manslaughter without gross negligence (Pen. Code, 192, subd. (c)(2) [section 192(c)(2)]), as a result of a collision which killed the driver of a motorcycle and seriously injured his passenger. The passenger incurred substantial medical expenses. Appellant and her parents appeal from restitution orders of the juvenile court which direct appellant to pay over $700,000, and her parents $5,000, in restitution to the passenger and two members of her family. The primary contention on appeal is that the motorcycle passenger was not a victim of the crime of misdemeanor vehicular manslaughter, and thus is not the proper subject of a restitution order. Court affirmed the adjudication of wardship in a prior appeal.

Vince Williams appeals from a judgment entered after a jury convicted him on three counts of second degree burglary, (Pen. Code, 459)[1]eight counts of receiving stolen property, ( 496, subd. (a)) one count of unlawfully taking or driving a vehicle, (Veh. Code, 10851, subd. (a)) and three counts of providing false information to a pawnbroker. ( 484.1, subd. (a).) He contends (1) the trial court erred when it revoked his right to represent himself at trial, (2) several of the counts are not supported by substantial evidence, and (3) the court erred when sentencing him. Court agree the court committed a minor sentencing error and order the appropriate modification. In all other respects, Court affirm.

Following a jury trial, appellant Tamarcus Williams was convicted of voluntary manslaughter (Pen. Code,[1] 192, subd. (a)) with a sentence enhancement for the use of a firearm during commission of the offense ( 12022.5, subd. (a)(1)). On appeal, he contends the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury he had the right to use deadly force in self-defense to protect against being maimed. He also argues that, under Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. [127 S.Ct. 856] (Cunningham), the trial court erred by imposing the upper terms on his conviction and the associated firearm use sentence enhancement. Court affirm.

Appellant Jontae L. Bailey was convicted by a jury of possession of cocaine base for sale, a felony, and resisting arrest, the latter offense charged as a misdemeanor, for which he was sentenced to state prison for five years. His court appointed attorney has filed a brief raising no legal issues and asking this court to conduct an independent review pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. Court affirm the judgment.

Appellants Donna Simpson (Simpson) and Arthur Winkley (Winkley)appeal from an order denying class certification. Appellants Carol Lopez (Lopez), Gloria Ross (Ross), Phyllis L. Williams (Williams), and Artelious Warren (Warren) appeal from an order denying their motion to intervene. Court affirm.

The minor, Devon F., appeals from an order of the juvenile court denying his motion, pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 779, to modify the courts prior disposition committing him to the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ). Court affirm.

The juvenile court sustained allegations of robbery and assault upon a transit operator against appellant Mario R. after he attempted to board a bus without paying the fare and, upon being prevented from riding, severely beat the bus driver. Appellant does not challenge the assault finding, but he contends that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that he committed robbery by tearing a bus transfer from the stack maintained by the bus driver. Court affirm.