CA Unpub Decisions

Darrell Presswood (defendant) argues that his plea to a drug charge is invalid because the trial court did not establish a factual basis for his plea. A factual basis is required only when a defendant enters a conditional plea. (Pen. Code, § 1192.5 ; People v. Holmes (2004) 32 Cal.4th 432, 438 (Holmes).) Because defendant has not established that his plea was “conditional,” we affirm.

The juvenile court terminated a father’s and mother’s parental rights over their now-four-year-old daughter. In this appeal, the parents do not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence underlying the court’s finding that their daughter was adoptable or that the beneficial parent-child exception was inapplicable. Instead, they argue that they were wrongly deprived of their right to establish that exception because (1) the court denied them a contested hearing, and (2) their daughter’s refusal to attend several visitation sessions in the last few months prior to the termination of their rights deprived them of the right to establish the exception. We conclude that the parents’ arguments lack merit and affirm.

Daniel Eric Engel, in propria persona, filed a first amended complaint (the operative complaint) against numerous defendants who own apartment buildings near his residence. The trial court sustained without leave to amend defendants’ demurrers and dismissed the action with prejudice. We affirm.

The juvenile court exerted dependency jurisdiction over a one-year-old child, removed the child from her parents, and ordered the Los Angeles Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) to provide family reunification services to the parents. The mother argues that the Department did not make “good faith” efforts to provide two of the services ordered by the court—namely, parenting classes and housing assistance. The juvenile court found that the Department had made good faith efforts, and its findings are supported by substantial evidence. We accordingly affirm.

The juvenile court removed an infant from her father’s custody. The father challenges that removal. Because the court’s order is supported by substantial evidence, we affirm.

J.M. (Father) appeals the juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings and disposition order concerning his two daughters, N.C.M. and N.S.M. The juvenile court asserted jurisdiction over the girls based on both parents’ drug use and the parents’ history of domestic violence. We consider Father’s claim that reversal is required because no substantial evidence supports the jurisdictional allegations sustained against him.

Jose Carlos Flores fatally stabbed Pedro Gaspar outside an Oxnard cantina. The jury convicted him of involuntary manslaughter. (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (b).) It acquitted him of second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter. The jury found true an allegation that Flores personally used a knife. (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1).) The trial court sentenced Flores to four years in state prison, deemed the sentence served, and released him.
Flores contends that the trial court should have granted his motion for acquittal of murder (§ 187, subd. (a)) at the close of the prosecution’s evidence. He also contends that there is insufficient evidence to support the conviction because he acted in self-defense. We affirm.

Kathy P., the mother of now-eight-year-old Aaron D. and three-year-old Kylie T., and Sherman T., the father of Kylie, appeal the juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings and disposition order declaring the children dependents of the juvenile court and removing them from parental custody after sustaining the allegation that Kathy and Sherman had failed to maintain a clean, sanitary and hazard-free home (§ 300, subd. (b)). Kathy and Sherman contend the court’s jurisdiction findings and disposition order are not supported by substantial evidence. We affirm.

Edward Macias petitioned for recall of sentence under Proposition 36, the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (Pen. Code, § 1170.126). The superior court denied the petition, finding Macias was ineligible for relief because his current sentence had been imposed for an offense committed with the intent to cause great bodily injury to another person. On appeal Macias contends the court erred in applying a preponderance-of-the-evidence, rather than the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt, standard of proof. The People concede the court erred in using a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard but argue the error was harmless because it is not reasonably probable that the court, employing the proper standard of proof, would not have ruled that Macias intended to cause great bodily injury when committing the underlying crime. We reverse and remand for a new eligibility hearing utilizing the proper standard of proof.

Defendant Thomas Mallo appeals from a judgment in favor of plaintiff Skull Base Medical Group, Inc. (Skull Base) on its complaint for breach of contract and common counts. The trial court awarded Skull Base $157,441.27, consisting of $72,660.70 in damages, based on money owed for Skull Base’s provision of medical services, $37,743.75 in prejudgment interest, $45,616.20 in attorney fees, and $1,420.62 in costs.
Mallo challenges the award of damages, contending there was no basis for the award on either a breach of contract or common counts theory, and damages could not be awarded under both theories. He also challenges the awards of prejudgment interest, attorney fees, and costs. We reverse.

Defendant Trayvon R. Thomas was convicted of several sex offenses and of dissuading a victim from reporting a crime. On appeal, defendant argues his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses was violated because the trial court permitted the victim to testify while wearing dark glasses. Defendant also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction for dissuading a victim from testifying.
We conclude that allowing the victim to wear dark glasses was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We reject defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence for his conviction of dissuading a victim from reporting a crime. We thus affirm the judgment of conviction.

Katherine Breeden appeals from a judgment entered against her after the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Joseph Farzam Law Firm and attorney Joseph Farzam (collectively, Farzam) in this action for legal malpractice. We affirm.

Plaintiff Lauren Cazden appeals from the trial court’s order denying in part her motion to tax costs sought by defendant Josue Cisneros Espinoza, doing business as 7-Point Construction, following entry of judgment in favor of Espinoza after a jury trial. We affirm the order.

A jury convicted defendant and appellant Johnny Isidro Rojas (defendant) of second degree vehicle burglary and receiving stolen property. Defendant testified at trial and claimed the burgled car’s window was open and he never entered the vehicle. The car’s owner testified the windows were rolled up and the doors locked, the owner’s son (an eyewitness) testified he saw defendant’s head and shoulders inside the car, and a subsequent inspection of the car revealed items in the glove compartment and center console had been rifled through. We consider whether reversal is warranted because the trial court should have instructed on vehicle tampering as a lesser included offense of vehicle burglary.