CA Unpub Decisions

A jury found defendant Ralph Lujan, Jr., guilty of unlawful taking or driving of a vehicle and sustained four strike allegations. The trial court sentenced defendant to 25 years to life.
On appeal, defendant contends: (1) the trial court abused its discretion in denying his severance motion; (2) the unlawful taking or driving of a vehicle count should be reduced to a misdemeanor; (3) his sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment; and (4) the court miscalculated his prejudgment custody credits. Court award an additional 193 days of credit and otherwise affirm the judgment.

Appellant Carlos A. Cevallos appeals from a judgment entered after a jury convicted him of grand theft by embezzlement (Pen. Code, 487, subd. (a); counts 1, 3, 5, 9, 16, 18, 20, 22, 24, 28, 30, 32, 34, 36, 38, 40, 56, 59, 61, 63, 65)and found true that in the commission of the offense, a principal was armed with a handgun. ( 12022, subd. (a)(1).) With respect to counts 1, 3, 5, 24, 30, 40, 56, 61, 63 and 65, the jury found true that appellant took property exceeding $50,000. ( 12022.6, subd. (a).) The jury also convicted appellant of second-degree commercial burglary. ( 459; counts 2, 4, 6-8, 10-15, 17, 19, 21, 23, 25-27, 29, 31, 33, 35, 37, 39, 41-55, 57-58, 60, 62, 64 & 66-69.) As to those charges (with the exception of count 48, for which the allegation was not charged) the jury found true the allegation that a principal was armed with a handgun. ( 12022, subd. (a)(1).) With respect to counts 2, 4, 7, 27, 31, 41, 58, and 64, the jury found true the allegation that appellant took property exceeding $50,000. ( 12022.6, subd. (a).)
Appellant was sentenced to 43 years and four months in state prison. Court affirm the judgment with modifications and remand the matter to the trial court with directions to exercise its discretion with respect to the principal armed enhancements.

A jury convicted Alejandro Benitez of the attempted kidnappings of Marta Ramirez and Lesbia Hernandez and assaults with a firearm against the same two victims. He challenges his convictions and his sentence. Court affirm.

Jorge Zaragoza appeals from a judgment entered after a jury convicted him of unlawfully driving or taking a vehicle and grand theft of personal property. He contends the trial court erred by imposing multiple punishments in violation of Penal Codesection 654. Court agree and modify his sentence accordingly.

The juvenile court sustained a petition alleging that appellant Shawn S. unlawfully drove or took a vehicle in violation of Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a). The court found that appellant was a person described by Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, adjudged appellant to be a ward of the court, and placed him in Camp Community Placement Program for a minimum of six months and a maximum of four years and four months. Appellant appeals from the orders sustaining the petition and adjudging him to be a ward of the court, contending that there is insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court's finding that he unlawfully took or drove a vehicle. He also contends that this matter must be remanded to the trial court for the court to declare the offense to be a felony or misdemeanor. Court remand for the declaration but otherwise affirm the trial court's orders.

Appellant James J. Jeknavorian (Jeknavorian) appeals from a trial court order denying his motion pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473.5[1]to set aside the default judgment entered against him and in favor of respondent SCME Mortgage Bankers, Inc. (SCME). He also challenges the judgment on the grounds that (1) it is based upon a dismissed cause of action, and (2) the damage award exceeds the damages sought in the complaint. Court conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Jeknavorians motion. Accordingly, we affirm the entry of judgment against Jeknavorian. However, because the amount of damages awarded against him does exceed those sought in the complaint, the judgment must be reduced from $535,291.88 to $400,000.

In a jury trial, Christian Gallegos (appellant) was convicted of attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder (Pen. Code, 664/182, subd. (a)),[1]with findings that a principal personally and intentionally discharged a firearm in the commission of the offense proximately causing great bodily injury ( 12022, subd. (a)(1), 12022.53, subds. (c), (e)(1), (d) & (e)(1)), and that the offense was committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang ( 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). On appeal from the judgment, appellant contends that (1) the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the codefendants recorded postarrest statement, (2) the trial court improperly admitted expert gang testimony, (3) the trial court improperly admitted unduly prejudicial gang evidence, (4) trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective, and (5) enhancing the term for attempted murder for the discharge of a firearm violates the principles of double jeopardy, collateral estoppel, due process, double punishment, Apprendi v. New Jersey(2000) 530 U.S. 466 (Apprendi), and the merger doctrine in People v. Ireland (1969) 70 Cal.2d 522 (Ireland).
Court affirm the judgment.

In this case involving specific performance of a contract to sell a radio station, the sellers (defendants Royce International Broadcasting Corporation, Royce International Broadcasting Company, and Edward R. Stolz II) appeal from a judgment entered in favor of the buyer (plaintiff Entercom Communications Corporation), awarding compensation incidental to specific performance. Defendants contend the trial court erred in the measure of the compensation.
Plaintiff cross appeals, contending the trial court abused its discretion in denying plaintiff compensation for lost profits for a ramp up period after transfer of the radio station to plaintiff. Court affirm the judgment.

Defendant Robert Santos, Jr. was found guilty by a jury of driving under the influence of alcohol (Veh. Code, 23152, subd. (a))[1]and driving with a .08 percent or higher blood-alcohol concentration. ( 23152, subd. (b).) In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found that defendant committed these violations within 10 years of a prior violation of section 23152 that was punished as a felony ( 23550.5, subd. (a)(1)), that he had a prior strike conviction (Pen. Code, 667, subds. (b)-(i)) and that he had served three prior prison terms. (Pen. Code, 667.5, subd. (b).) The court denied probation and sentenced defendant to nine years in state prison, consisting of six years for the underlying offense (an upper term of three years doubled based on the prior strike conviction) and one year consecutive for each prior prison term. Court have undertaken an independent examination of the entire record and have found no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant. The judgment is affirmed.

International Fidelity Insurance Company (Fidelity), the surety on a bail bond, appeals from an order denying its Penal Code section 1305.4[1]motion to extend the 180 day exoneration period and from the summary judgment entered on the bail forfeiture. Fidelity contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying its motion as it demonstrated good cause for the extension. Court affirm.

A jury found James Rodriguez willfully failed to comply with statutory registration obligations applicable to sex offenders. (Pen. Code, 290, subd. (g)(2).)[1] The jury also found Rodriguez committed arson and vandalism when he destroyed a GPS system that law enforcement officers had put on his vehicle. The jury could not reach a verdict on firearm possession counts, and these counts were dismissed. The court imposed a sentence of two years and eight months.
On appeal, Rodriguez contends: (1) former section 290 was unconstitutionally vague with respect to his obligation to register at a second address; (2) the court erred in failing to instruct on a five day residency requirement; and (3) the court erred in failing to permit him to rely on an affirmative defense requiring the registering agency to provide him written notice of his increased reporting obligations. Court reject these contentions and affirm.

Eddie W. appeals a judgment of the juvenile court terminating his parental rights to his minor daughter Amana W. under Welfare and Institutions Code[1]section 366.26. Eddie contends: (1) the court erred by summarily denying his section 388 modification petition; and (2) the court and the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) did not comply with the notice provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.) requiring reversal and remand for proper notice.
The Agency agrees with the notice contention. We conclude the court did not err by summarily denying the section 388 petition. However, we further conclude the record does not contain sufficient evidence that proper notice was given under the ICWA. Accordingly, Court affirm the order and reverse the judgment for the limited purpose of ensuring compliance with the ICWA.

A jury convicted Rachee Willis of residential burglary (Pen. Code, 459, 460) and unlawful taking and driving a vehicle (Veh. Code, 10851, subd. (a)). The trial court sentenced Willis to two years and eight months in prison. Willis appeals. Court affirm.

Nicole O. seeks review of juvenile court orders terminating her reunification services for her child, Nicolas O., and setting the matter for a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing. She contends she was not provided with reasonable reunification services. Court deny the petition.