CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Michael Patrick Jones was convicted of various crimes related to defrauding his employer, the California Highway Patrol (CHP), and the State Compensation Insurance Fund out of monetary benefits by filing false and fraudulent claims that he was physically unable to work due to work related back injuries. On appeal, he contends the prosecutor committed misconduct by commenting on the defenses failure to call a particular witness. Court affirm the judgment.

Appellant, Michelle Denise Fox, pled no contest to felony trespassing with a threat (Pen. Code., 601) and misdemeanor brandishing a weapon (Pen. Code, 417).[1] On August 10, 2006, the court denied Foxs motion to withdraw her plea and placed her on felony probation on condition that she serve 270 days local time. On appeal, Fox contends the court abused its discretion when it denied her motion to withdraw her plea. Court affirm.

Consortium Information Services, Inc. (Consortium), asserted causes of action against Experian Information Solutions, Inc. (Experian), for (1) intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, (2) trade libel, (3) common law unfair competition, (4) unfair competition in violation of the California unfair competition law, Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq. (UCL), and (5) violation of the Cartwright Act, section 16700 et seq. The trial court sustained without leave to amend Experians demurrer to Consortiums third amended complaint on the grounds that each cause of action was time-barred and that Consortium failed to allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Consortium appealed from the resulting judgment of dismissal (Consortium does not challenge dismissal of the third cause of action, for common law unfair competition).
Court are concluding only that the complaint alleges facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and are not commenting on the merit of Consortiums claims. The judgment is reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings.

The People appeal from an order of the superior court ending Ernest Smiths parole on the ground that he had completed his parole requirements. The People argue that the procedure by which the superior court issued its order was defective, and, substantively, that Smith must remain on parole because he has not satisfied the time requirements of his parole term. Court affirm the order.

In March 2006, after defendant Andres Rubalcaba pled no contest to two counts of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor at least three years younger than he, misdemeanor inflicting corporal injury on a cohabitant, misdemeanor violating a protective order, and three counts of furnishing a minor at least four years younger than he with a controlled substance in exchange for a maximum of four years, eight months in state prison, as part of the sentence, the trial court imposed a $3,200 restitution fine. On January 12, 2007, we affirmed the judgment on appeal. Now, after deciding People v. Crandell (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1301 (Crandell), the California Supreme Court transferred Rubalcabas case to this court with directions to vacate the decision and to reconsider the cause in light of Crandell.
The decision in this case filed on January 12, 2007, is ordered vacated. After reconsideration in light of Crandell, supra, 40 Cal.4th 1301, as ordered by the California Supreme Court, the judgment is affirmed.

Salvador Quiroz appeals a conviction, following a jury trial, of unlawfully driving or taking a vehicle (Veh. Code, 10851, subd. (a)) (count 1), receiving a stolen vehicle (Pen. Code, 496d) (count 2), and driving with a suspended license (Veh. Code, 14601.1) (count 3). The court also found the enhancements true as charged: appellant had a prior conviction for unlawfully driving or taking a vehicle (Pen. Code, 666.5), and he committed the offenses while released on bail (Pen. Code, 12022.1). Appellant was sentenced to a two-year mitigated term on count 1, a concurrent mitigated two-year term on count 2, and a 30 day term on count 3 (with credit for 30 days time served). On appeal, appellant contends that pervasive prosecutorial misconduct deprived him of his right to due process and that he was improperly convicted of receiving a stolen vehicle and stealing that same vehicle. Court disagree and affirm.

Appellant was convicted after a court trial on three felony counts: possession of a machinegun (Pen. Code, 12220) (count one); conspiracy to possess a machinegun (Pen. Code, 182, subd. (a)(1)) (count two); and possession of concentrated cannabis (Health & Saf. Code, 11357, subd. (a)) (count three). The court suspended imposition of sentence, and placed appellant on probation.
Appellant contends: (1) the trial court should have granted his motion to suppress the evidence of illegal drugs and the machinegun that the police seized from appellants truck after a traffic stop; (2) his convictions for possession of a machinegun and conspiracy to possess a machinegun must be reversed, because these convictions are not supported by sufficient evidence showing that appellant knew the machinegun in question was an illegal weapon; (3) the conviction for possession of concentrated cannabis must be reversed, because there was no proof by means of expert testimony that a ball of hashish seized from appellants truck contained concentrated cannabis; and (4) the abstract of judgment must be corrected in order to properly list the offenses as to which appellant was convicted, without regard to certain other allegations that were dismissed prior to trial.
Court reject appellants first three contentions, but Court agree with his last contention, and will order a remand to correct the record as to the offenses of which appellant was convicted.

Jimmy Kamnoi appeals the judgment entered after a jury convicted him of first degree murder (Pen. Code[1], 187, subd. (a), 189) and three counts of attempted murder ( 664/187, subd. (a)). The jury also found true allegations that the murder was committed by discharging a firearm from a vehicle ( 190.2, subd. (a)(21)), that the attempted murders were committed willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation ( 664, subd. (a)), and that a principal was armed in the commission of all of the offenses ( 12022, subd. (a)(1)). He was sentenced to life in state prison without the possibility of parole on the murder count, an additional three life sentences with the possibility of parole on the attempted murder counts, plus an additional two years for the section 12022, subdivision (a)(1) enhancements. He was also ordered to pay a $10,000 restitution fine ( 1202.4, subd. (b)), and a $10,000 parole revocation fine ( 1202.45) was imposed and suspended. He contends the trial court violated its sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on implied malice murder, second degree murder, and assault with a firearm. He also contends that the parole revocation fine should not have been imposed. Court modify the judgment by striking the parole revocation fine. Otherwise, Court affirm.

This is an appeal from a modified judgment of the juvenile court committing a minor to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Justice, formerly known as the Youth Authority. We had earlier remanded with directions that the court exercise its discretion in setting appellant's maximum term of confinement, pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 731, subdivision (b).[1] (In re Ramon D. (Sept. 20, 2005, B177881) [nonpub. opn.].)
Court therefore direct the juvenile court to amend the judgment to reduce the minor's commitment to the Youth Authority to three years six months. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

Shortly before midnight on July 15, 2005, appellant and two accomplices robbed at gunpoint Michael Cisneros and Arah Parker when Cisneros and Parker were parked on Mount Baldy road in the San Gabriel Mountains. During the robbery, appellant used a gun. A few weeks later, police arrested appellant and his accomplices.
Appellant Cordero Ramos appeals from the trial courts denial of his motion to vacate a judgment of conviction and set aside his plea bargain. Court affirm.

Gloria Portillo appeals from the judgment after a jury convicted her of sale of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, 11379) and possession for sale of a controlled substance (id., 11378). As to count 1, the court suspended imposition of sentence and placed Portillo on formal probation for 36 months with terms and conditions that include 365 days in county jail. She received the same sentence on count 2, to run concurrently with the sentence on count 1, but the court stayed that sentence pursuant to Penal Code section 654. (People v. Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436, 441.) The judgment is affirmed.

David Lee Johnson appeals from a judgment entered following his guilty plea to second degree burglary, with admissions that he suffered a prior felony strike conviction and served three prior prison terms. (Pen. Code, 459, 667, subds. (c) & (e), 1170.12, subds. (a) & (c), 667.5, subd. (b).)[1] The prosecution charged appellant with burglary, petty theft and providing a false name to a police officer, and alleged one prior "strike" and three other convictions as prison term enhancements. ( 459, 666, 148.9, subd. (a), 667, subds. (c) & (e), 1170.12, subds. (a) & (c), 667.5, subd. (b).)
Court have examined the entire record and are satisfied that appellant's attorney has fully complied with his responsibilities and that no arguable issues exist. (People v. Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436, 441.) The judgment is affirmed.

Tina R. seeks extraordinary writ review of a juvenile court order terminating family reunification services and setting a permanent plan hearing. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.26.) She asserts she is entitled to an additional two and one half months of reunification services because she was incarcerated for that amount of time and was unable to comply with her case plan. Court deny the petition for extraordinary writ.

Defendant Michael Bradley Prindle was convicted by a jury of two counts of assault with a deadly weapon in violation of Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(1) (hereafter section 245(a)(1)).[1] Following a court trial, the trial court found true allegations that defendant had a prior strike conviction from 1992 ( 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12) and had served a prior prison term for a 1999 conviction. ( 667.5, subd. (b).) The trial court sentenced defendant to 11 years in state prison computed as follows: on count one - the middle term of three years doubled to six years pursuant to the three strikes law; on count two - one-third of the middle term doubled pursuant to the three strikes law to run consecutively;[2]plus a consecutive five year enhancement pursuant to section 667, subdivision (a), and a concurrent one year enhancement pursuant to section 667.5, subdivision (b).
On appeal, defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial courts finding he had a prior serious felony conviction in 1992. Court direct the correction of a minor clerical error in the abstract of judgment and otherwise affirm the judgment.