CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant Santiago E. Roldan-Lopez appeals from the lower courts June 12, 2006 child support order. He contends the court abused its discretion in failing to deviate from the guideline amount pursuant to the extraordinarily high income exception set forth in subdivision (b)(3) of Family Code section 4057, or, in the alternative, by failing to apply equitable principles to reduce the child support payments. Court find no abuse of discretion and affirm the child support order.

Plaintiff Jon Renee Johnson filed this action for personal injuries resulting from a collision between his motorcycle and an automobile driven by defendant Corey Scott Jamieson and owned by defendant Gene Jamieson. When plaintiff failed to serve a verified response to defendants requests for admissions, the court ordered the requests for admissions deemed admitted. The court denied plaintiffs motion for reconsideration or relief and later granted summary judgment in favor of defendants based on the admissions.
Court reject these contentions and affirm the judgment.

On June 29, 2005, defendant was seen working on a 1986 Volkswagen Cabriolet that bore the license plate of a 1999 Toyota Corolla. Both the Volkswagen and the license plate had been stolen. A glass pipe was inside the Volkswagen. Defendant, who was under the influence of methamphetamine, told the police that he was on probation. He also told the police that he had used the pipe to smoke methamphetamine with a friend. Defendant said he thought the Volkswagen had been abandoned. Pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, Court have reviewed the entire record and have concluded that there are no arguable issues on appeal. The judgment is affirmed.

Defendant Eduardo Cabrera appeals from the judgment below, arguing that the gang enhancement findings against him should be reversed and the case remanded for resentencing. Court affirm the judgment.

Angelo Escalante appeals his conviction of second degree murder. (Pen. Code, 187.)[1] The jury also found true an enhancement allegation pursuant to section 12022, subdivision (b)(1). The court sentenced defendant to a term of 15 years to life for second degree murder, and a term of one year for the personal use of a knife.
Defendants sole contention on appeal is that the court erred by failing sua sponte to give CALCRIM No. 334, a standard instruction that informs the jury an accomplices testimony should be viewed with caution and must be corroborated. Court hold that any error was harmless and affirm the judgment.

Andrew Donnell Gaines was convicted by a jury of attempted second degree robbery (Pen. Code, 211, 664)[1] and was sentenced to two years in prison for that offense, plus one year for service of a prior prison term ( 667.5, subd. (b)). Defendant submits that the one-year enhancement must be reversed because it was neither admitted nor found to be true. Court hold that defendant effectively admitted the enhancement, and thus affirm the judgment.

Michael Wayne Hamburg (Hamburg) appeals from a judgment of conviction and sentence entered after he pled no contest to unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor more than three years his younger. (Pen. Code, 261.5, subd. (c).)[1] He seeks to set aside his no contest plea on the ground that it was induced by the misrepresentation that he could appeal the denial of his motion to suppress statements he made to the police. Respondent agrees that the case should be remanded to provide Hamburg the opportunity to withdraw his plea. Court reverse the judgment and remand the matter for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Objector and appellant Abdul N. (appellant), father of Omar N., appeals a dispositional order of the juvenile court which continued drug testing as to father at the discretion of the Alameda County Social Services Agencys (Agency) Child Welfare Worker (CWW). The sole issue on appeal is whether the juvenile court abused its discretion by giving the Agencys CWW unfettered discretion to determine whether drug testing should continue following the dispositional hearing. Court conclude there was no abuse of discretion.

Appellant, Mark Wayne Rathbun, was convicted by jury of 14 counts of residential burglary (Pen. Code, 459, undesignated section references are to that code) and 45 counts of forcible sex offenses, predominantly rape ( 261, subd. (a)(2)) and oral copulation ( 288a, subd. (c)(2)), involving 14 victims. With respect to 40 counts, the jury made one-strike findings under section 667.61, subdivisions (a), (b), (d)(4), and (e)(5). The court found appellant had a prior strike conviction ( 667, 1170.12), and two prior serious felony convictions ( 667, subd. (a)(1)).

Appellant was sentenced to terms of 540 years plus 500 years to life. On appeal, he contends that the court erred in (1) declining to admit expert testimony about false confessions; (2) refusing to order discovery of DNA evidence from uncharged offenses; (3) admitting DNA evidence that did not qualify under People v. Kelly (1976) 17 Cal.3d 24 (Kelly); (4) admitting DNA evidence that was irrelevant and prejudicial; and (5) refusing to treat appellants apprehension as a cold hit. In addition, appellant contends with respect to his sentence that; (6) the sentence violates the separation of powers; and (7) the sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment; and (8) the sentence must be modified in light of Cunningham v. California (2007) U.S. [127 S.Ct. 856] (Cunningham) and its antecedents. Court find appellants contentions unmeritorious, except that under Cunningham the sentence on one count must be vacated and remanded for resentencing, as provided for by People v. Sandoval (July 19, 2007, S148917) Cal.4th [2007 WL 2050897] (Sandoval). Court order and otherwise affirm the judgment.

Diane Vrcic petitioned for dissolution of her marriage to Vedran Vrcic. Vedran thereafter deeded his interest in several pieces of real property to his mother, Kristina Vrcic, and his brother, Wilson Vrcic, who were then joined as claimants in the dissolution action. In these consolidated appeals, Vedran, Kristina, and Wilson (hereafter appellants) challenge various decisions of the trial court concerning property characterization, the imposition of a real property lien, and the award of attorneys fees and sanctions. Court affirm.

Appellant Ezekiel Harris sued the County of Los Angeles (County) and two deputy sheriffs resulting from the deputies conduct that caused him serious injury.[1] Part of the case was based on whether appellant, a mentally challenged individual, initiated a confrontation with the deputies, justifying their use of force. Following a 10-2 defense verdict, appellant challenges the trial courts denial of his motion for new trial. The motion was based on the alleged undisclosed bias of a juror against mentally challenged individuals, specifically that such individuals are violent. Appellant also seeks review of the trial courts denial of his request for an evidentiary hearing where the challenged juror would be called to testify. Concluding there was no error, Court affirm the judgment.

Charles P. Littlejohn appeals an order declaring him to be a vexatious litigant under Code of Civil Procedure section 391, subdivision (b)(3). Because Littlejohn was represented by counsel, Court reverse.

Defendants Long Beach, California Area Local, American Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO (the local), and its president in 2004, Jesse Scroggins, appeal from an order denying their motion to strike as a SLAPP suit plaintiff Deborah Mastrens action for slander and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). (Code Civ. Proc., 425.16; undesignated section references are to that code.) We agree with the trial court that plaintiffs case was not grounded on statements respecting a public issue. Moreover, plaintiff in any event showed a likelihood of prevailing on her principal claim of slander. Court therefore affirm the order denying the motion to strike.

In this postdissolution case, the wifes attorney challenges two separate sanction orders, one imposing $1,000 in a discovery dispute, the other imposing $3,500 for alleged bad faith conduct involving ex parte applications.
Court conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the $1,000 sanction because the attorney made baseless objections to discovery. But, in awarding the $3,500, the trial court relied on a statute that has never gone into effect, and the order did not describe any misconduct or explain the courts reasoning. Accordingly, Court affirm the first order and reverse the second.