CA Unpub Decisions

On March 2, 2006, while he was on parole, Bryon Hood pleaded guilty to the felony offense of possession of cocaine base for sale. The imposition of sentence was suspended, and the court placed Hood on three years formal probation, with the understanding that Hood was to comply with both probation and parole obligations. About seven months later, on October 18, 2006, the district attorney filed a motion to revoke probation on the grounds of a new arrest for transporting or selling narcotics and obstructing and resisting arrest. After a contested hearing, the court revoked probation and imposed the upper term of five years on the possession offense.

Craig L., the father of Elizabeth L. and the presumed father of Morgan C., appeals from orders terminating his parental rights. He contends the juvenile court failed to secure compliance with the notice requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.) (ICWA). He further argues that, to the extent ICWA applies, the juvenile court failed to comply with ICWAs substantive requirements, including the requirement that an order terminating parental rights with respect to an Indian child must be supported by the testimony of a qualified expert witness. Court reverse and remand for the limited purpose of securing compliance with ICWAs notice requirements.

Tammy R. Thayer appeals from a final judgment of conviction following a jury trial. Her court appointed counsel has filed a brief raising no issues and asking this court to conduct an independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.
The court also imposed a two year middle term on count II and a one year sentence to county jail on count III, but ordered the sentences on those two counts stayed pursuant to section 654. Appellant thereafter filed timely notice of this appeal. The judgment and sentence imposed are affirmed.

Defendant E.M. timely appeals from the juvenile courts March 13, 2007 order declaring him a ward of the court, sentencing him to an out-of-home placement, and setting the maximum term of confinement at six years. Defendants appointed appellate counsel has filed a brief under People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, and has identified an issue in the record that might arguably support the appeal. (Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738, 744.) Counsel describes the issue as follows: Did the juvenile court err by denying [defendants] suppression motion because the only facts supporting probable cause to arrest [defendant] were the statements of his co-participants who were themselves the focus of pending criminal charges or investigations [and thus their statements are] inherently suspect? (People v. Duarte (2001) 24 Cal.4th 603, 617 . . . ; see also People v. Schulle (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 809, 814, 815; People v. Kurland (1980) 28 Cal.3d 376, 393.) Or, under the circumstances, did the co-participants statements provide sufficient probable cause because they corroborated each other? (People v. Green (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 199, 205 . . . [[C]orroboration of an unreliable informants statements may be met by those of another, if they were interviewed independently, at a different time and place.]; see also People v. Fein (1971) 4 Cal.3d 747, 753, disapproved on other grounds by People v. Palaschak (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1236, 1241.) After reviewing the entire record, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying defendants motion to suppress and that there is no issue warranting further briefing. The March 13, 2007 order is affirmed.

Defendant and appellant David Hicks appeals from the judgment entered following a jury trial that resulted in his convictions for carjacking and unlawfully driving or taking a vehicle. Hicks was sentenced to 10 years in prison. In our original nonpublished opinion, filed November 3, 2005, we affirmed Hickss convictions and ordered his sentence modified to impose a 10-year Penal Code section 12022.53, subdivision (b) firearm enhancement. (People v. Hicks (Nov. 3, 2005, B178886, [nonpub. opn.].)
On February 20, 2007, the United States Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded to us for further consideration in light of Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. [166 L.Ed.2d 856, 127 S.Ct. 856].) Court requested and received further briefing from the parties on the effect of Cunningham on Hickss sentence. Court now affirm Hickss convictions, but order the sentence vacated in light of Cunningham. Accordingly, Court remand to the trial court for resentencing.

The sentence is vacated and the matter is remanded for resentencing. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

Appellant Bianca Harris appeals from a judgment entered after a jury convicted her of second degree murder (Pen. Code, 187, subd. (a); count 1); assault on a child causing death ( 273ab; count 2); and child abuse ( 273a, subd. (a); count 3). The jury found true that appellant committed the offense under circumstances likely to produce great bodily injury or death. ( 12022.95.)
Appellant contends that: (1) she was denied her right to confront witnesses by the admission of statements made by her four year old son Christian Hines (Christian) to school employees; and (2) the trial court improperly allowed the People to cross examine a defense expert. The judgment is affirmed.

Appellant Century Surety Company appeals from a final judgment entered after a court trial on respondent Zurich Specialties London Limiteds claim for declaratory relief, equitable contribution, and subrogation arising from several construction defect actions against two entities for which both appellant and respondent provided commercial general liability coverage. Appellant also appeals from a postjudgment order denying a motion to tax costs. Court affirm the judgment, but reverse the order denying appellants motion to tax costs.

Contemporary Services Corporation (CSC) and Staff Pro Security Inc. (Staff Pro) both provide security and event staffing services to arenas, stadiums, and similar venues in which concerts, athletic events and trade shows are held. In 2001, CSC filed suit against Staff Pro. CSCs first amended complaint alleged causes of action for below-cost pricing (Bus. & Prof. Code, 17043) and unfair competition (Bus. & Prof. Code, 17200). This appeal challenges three separate orders made by the trial court directing CSC and its counsel (Philipson & Simon) to pay attorney fees and costs to Staff Pro. For purposes of clarity, Court separately discuss each order. Court reverse one order because it was unauthorized by statute. Court affirm the two other orders.

Cornell Smith appeals his conviction on one count of bringing a deadly weapon into jail, in violation of Penal Code section 4574, subdivision (a).[1] He claims the court erred in permitting him to represent himself because he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel. In a related claim, he argues the court should have revoked his in propria persona status and appointed stand by counsel to represent him when it became evident that he did not understand the nature of the charges against him or the penalties he was facing. He also asserts the court improperly directed his defense. Court find no error and affirm the judgment.

Defendant Eddie Delacruz (defendant) appeals his conviction, following a jury trial, of one count of kidnapping for carjacking (Pen. Code, 209.5, subd. (a));[1] one count of second degree robbery ( 211); one count of evading an officer (Veh. Code, 2800.2); and one count of misdemeanor hit and run driving (Veh. Code, 20002, subd. (a).) Defendant contends his conviction must be reversed because the trial court committed prejudicial error by denying a Pitchess[2] motion for discovery of personnel records of the officers involved in defendants arrest, by excluding evidence concerning the victims prior misdemeanor conviction for soliciting prostitution, and by denying defendants motion for a mistrial predicated on an unsolicited statement by the victim after his testimony had concluded. Court affirm the judgment.

Stewart Humberto Romero (Romero) appeals from the judgment entered following a jury trial which resulted in his conviction of two counts of assault with a firearm (Pen. Code, 245, subd. (a)(2)),[1]during each of which he personally used a firearm ( 12022.5) and during one of which he was released on bail
( 12022.1), and his admission he had previously suffered a felony juvenile adjudication within the meaning of the Three Strikes law ( 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)). The trial court sentenced Romero to 21 years, four months in prison. Romeros contentions, that there is insufficient evidence to support the finding he committed one of the assaults, that his trial counsel was ineffective and that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to strike or dismiss his Three Strikes prior juvenile adjudication in furtherance of justice are without merit. Also without merit is his assertion the trial court violated the mandates of Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. [127 S.Ct. 856] (Cunningham) when it imposed the upper term of 10 years in prison for his personal use of a firearm during an assault. Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.

Daniel Becker appeals from a judgment against him in his personal injury action, and the trial courts orders denying his motions for a new trial and judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Court affirm.

Appellant contends that: (1) the trial court erred when it failed to instruct the jury as to the lesser included offenses of possession for sale and simple possession of a controlled substance; and (2) the trial court failed to properly advise appellant before taking his admission of the prior conviction. The judgment is affirmed.

Plaintiff, Natalia Reagan, appeals from summary judgments entered in favor of defendants, Keller Williams Realty, Inc. (Keller Williams) and its franchisee, Rafeh Corporation, doing business as Keller Williams Realty (Rafeh Corporation). Plaintiff sustained injuries as a result of a vehicle accident caused by defendant, Victoria Szuch, who worked as a real estate sales agent. The trial court granted summary judgment on the ground Keller Williams and Rafeh Corporation were not vicariously liable for plaintiffs injuries. Keller Williams and Rafeh Corporation contended Ms. Szuch was an independent contractor or, alternatively, was not acting in the scope of her employment at the time she was involved in the accident. The trial court also granted summary judgment in favor of Keller Williams on the ground it was neither the employer, principal, or joint venturer of Ms. Szuch. Court reverse.