CA Unpub Decisions

Respondents Bo Wei and Broadtron Technology (hereafter jointly Plaintiffs) sued appellants Great Wall Technology Company, Ltd., ExcelStor Technology Group, ExcelStor Technology, Inc.,[1] InchStor Technology, Inc., Eddie Lui, and Samuel Leung (hereafter jointly Defendants) for breach of contract, misappropriation of trade secrets, and promissory fraud arising out of an agreement to invest in Plaintiffs company. The jury found in favor of Plaintiffs on their breach of contract causes of action, but denied their fraud claims. The court granted Defendants motion for nonsuit on the misappropriation of trade secrets cause of action, but denied Defendants motion for attorney fees pursuant to Civil Code section 3426.4 on that cause of action.
On appeal, Defendants contend Wei cannot recover for wrongful termination as a matter of law, Weis damages were speculative, the court abused its discretion when it allowed Weis damages experts to testify, the special verdict form improperly allowed Wei to recover twice for breach of contract, and the court erred in denying Defendants motion for attorney fees on the misappropriation of trade secrets cause of action. Court find no error and affirm the judgment.

The mother of Justice W. (Mother), appeals from a final judgment terminating her parental rights and setting adoption as the permanent plan for Justice under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Mother contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion by failing to find that Justice comes within the beneficial parent child relationship exception to adoption. Court find no abuse of discretion, and affirm the judgment.

After defendants motion to suppress was denied, he was found guilty by a jury of four counts of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, 212.5 subd. (c)), with associated enhancements for use of a weapon (Pen. Code, 12022, subd. (b)(1)) and infliction of great bodily injury on one of the robbery victims (Pen. Code, 12022.7, subd. (a)). In this appeal he renews his challenge to the warrantless search that resulted in the immediate seizure of a piece of concrete from his jacket pocket and the ultimate ascertainment of his identity. Court find that defendants encounter with off duty police officers was consensual, with the exception of a pat search that was based upon adequate cause. Court therefore affirm the judgment.

Defendant and appellant Nicolas David Andreas appeals from the judgment entered following a jury trial that resulted in his convictions for three counts of committing a lewd act upon a child. Andreas was sentenced to a prison term of 30 years. In our original nonpublished opinion, filed November 30, 2005, Court affirmed Andreass convictions and sentence. Court also concurrently considered and denied Andreass petition for a writ of habeas corpus. (People v. Andreas (Nov. 30, 2005, B171847 [nonpub. opn.].)
On February 20, 2007, the United States Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded to us for further consideration in light of Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. [166 L.Ed.2d 856, 127 S.Ct. 856].) Court requested and received further briefing from the parties on the effect of Cunningham on Andreass sentence. Court again affirm the judgment and deny the writ.

In this eminent domain proceeding, following trial, a jury awarded defendant and appellant San Miguel Meat Distributors, Inc. (San Miguel), damages in the amount of $333,000 against plaintiff and respondent Los Angeles Unified School District (the District), to compensate San Miguel for loss of goodwill for the Districts taking of property which San Miguel leased for its chicken processing business. San Miguel relocated its business to a new location. In a second trial, the trial court determined that the taking caused San Miguels relocation and loss of goodwill. Court reverse and remand for entry of judgment in favor of San Miguel consistent with this opinion. San Miguel presented substantial evidence showing that the taking caused the alleged loss in goodwill.

Plaintiff and appellant Quenton Trenal (Trenal) filed the present lawsuit against defendant and respondent Wanda M. Schumacher (Schumacher) to cancel a real estate grant deed to Schumacher and to quiet title in residential real property. Following a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Schumacher. The trial court found that Trenal did not carry his burden of proof to show that he did not intend to transfer ownership of the real property to Schumacher at the time he executed the grant deed. Alternatively, the trial court found that Trenal was estopped from asserting ownership of the real property. Because substantial evidence supports the judgment, Court affirm.

A jury found that appellant Hernan Orozco is a sexually violent predator within the meaning of the Sexually Violent Predator Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, 6600, the SVPA). On appeal, he makes the following contentions: First, there is insufficient evidence he has a mental disorder that falls under the SVPA. Second, the trial court erred when it admitted hearsay evidence. Third, the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the Static-99, a tool used to predict the likelihood of reoffending. Fourth, CALJIC 4.19, with which the jury was instructed, violates substantive due process. Finally, the SVPA violates constitutional proscriptions against ex post facto laws and violates the federal equal protection clause. Court reject each contention, and Court therefore affirm the judgment.

William Penrock, appointed special administrator of the Estate of Michael Prevost, appeals an order denying his Probate Code section 850[1] petition seeking transfer of title to real property (the Crockett property) from its purchaser, Lugo Land Corporation (Lugo), to the Prevost Estate. Prevosts joint venture contract with Lugo gave Prevost only a possible expectation of a portion of future profits when the contract was completed and the Crockett property was sold. Therefore Prevost could not bring a section 850 petition because he did not have a claim to real property, title to or possession of which was held by another, and the trial court properly denied Prevosts petition. We reject Penrocks claim that by its orders denying Lugos two motions to expunge Penrocks lis pendens on the Crockett property, the trial court recognized Prevosts claim to the Crockett property. Court conclude that no error arose from the trial courts interpretation of the relief requested by Penrocks petition or from the trial courts refusal to grant equitable relief. Although Penrock claims that a constructive trust or a resulting trust should be imposed on Lugos ownership of the Crockett property, Penrock has not established the requirements for imposing either of these trusts. Finally, Court reject Lugos claim that this court should impose sanctions on Penrock for bringing an appeal that was frivolous because it was moot. Court affirm the order denying the section 850 petition.

Defendants Aaron Arnold Klein and Tina Doreen Klein, as trustees of the Klein Family Revocable Trust, appeal from the judgment ordering them to pay more than $60,000 to plaintiff Lark Ellen Condominium Homeowners, Inc., for breaching a fiduciary duty to disclose the need to perform certain repairs to portions of the common area at a condominium project the trust once owned. Because defendants owed no such duty to the individual condominium buyers, and because the alleged breach of any such supposed duty could not have caused plaintiff to incur damages, Court reverse. Plaintiff cross-appeals from the order granting the Kleinss motion for judgment on three other causes of action. Because the trial court correctly determined that plaintiff had not sued the right party, Court affirm.

Government Code section 854.8 provides immunity to public entities for injuries to inpatients of mental institutions. Government Code section 855 creates an exception to this liability for injuries proximately caused by the failure of the public entity to provide adequate or sufficient equipment, personnel or facilities required by any statute or any regulation of the State Department of Health Services, Social Services, Developmental Services, or Mental Health prescribing minimum standards for equipment, personnel or facilities . . . . In this case, we consider which statutes and regulations are sufficient to trigger liability under Government Code section 855. Specifically, we conclude that only statutes and regulations promulgated by the described departments are sufficient; County regulations, federal Medicare regulations, and Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organization (JCAHO) standards are insufficient bases for liability under Government Code section 855. Moreover, we conclude that only statutes and regulations which prescrib[e] minimum standards for equipment, personnel or facilities can create liability; regulations that simply require sufficient equipment, personnel or facilities are too broad to fit within the narrow immunity exception of Government Code section 855.
Court conclude plaintiffs complaint is barred by statutory immunity, and therefore affirm.

Plaintiff Steven Guilford is a software architect. In October 1999, he brought suit against Adam Singer, M.D. (Dr. Singer) and Dr. Singers companies, In-Patient Consultants, Inc. (IPC) and In Patient Consultants Management, Inc.[2](IPCM) (collectively defendants) for breach of an oral contract. Guilford had developed a software program for defendants and contended they had failed to fully pay him for his work.
Upon retrial, the jury awarded Guilford $2,972,394. Defendants appeal, arguing that, on retrial, Guilford impermissibly claimed to have created a much larger computer program for defendants than he claimed at the first trial. Defendants also argue there was no reasonable basis in the record for the sizeable award of damages. Court disagree and affirm.

Defendant and appellant John Garcia appeals from the judgment entered following a jury trial that resulted in his conviction for second degree murder. Garcia was sentenced to 36 years to life in prison. Garcia contends: (1) the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter; (2) his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by acquiescing in the trial courts purported instructional error; and (3) the trial court erred by admitting evidence of his prior conviction and uncharged misconduct. Court affirm.

Isaiah Mark Walker (Walker) appeals from the judgment entered following a jury trial which resulted in his conviction of attempted willful, deliberate, premeditated murder (Pen. Code, 664/187, subd. (a)),[1]during the commission of which he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm, proximately causing great bodily injury ( 12022.53, subds. (b), (c) & (d)), and the finding he committed the offense for the benefit of a criminal street gang ( 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)). The trial court sentenced Walker to 40 years to life in prison. Walker contends he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel because his counsel failed to make a timely objection to a photographic lineup and failed to call as a witness an expert on eyewitness identifications. court affirm the judgment.

Appellant Michael Bernard Lee was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon and related charges. He was sentenced to 20 years in state prison. On appeal, he raises these sentencing issues: (1) The same prior conviction cannot be used both for a prior prison enhancement under Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b) ( 667.5(b)) and a prior serious felony enhancement under Penal Code section 667, subdivision (a)(1) ( 667(a)(1)). (2) Imposition of the upper term violated his federal constitutional rights to a jury trial and to due process of law (U.S. Const., 6th & 14th Amends.), under Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296 (Blakely) and Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. [127 S.Ct. 856](Cunningham). (3) When the trial court imposed the upper term on the ground that appellants record justifie[d] the high term, it improperly used appellants four prior convictions both for separate sentence enhancements and for imposition of the upper term.
Respondent concedes the first sentencing issue, which requires a sentencing modification. Court reject the other issues, and otherwise affirm.