CA Unpub Decisions

On August 10, 2004, defendant, represented by counsel, pled guilty to a violation of Penal Code section 487(c), grand theft person, and admitted the special allegation filed pursuant to that count. Thereafter, defendant was placed on a formal grant of probation on condition he spend 365 days in the local jail. In accordance with the negotiated disposition, the remaining counts and special allegations were dismissed and stricken on motion of the People and in the interests of justice pursuant to Penal Code section 1385. Court have now concluded it's independent review of the record and find no arguable issues. The judgment is affirmed.

Appellant and defendant T.L. (minor) admitted as true the allegation that he committed the crime of attempted residential burglary. (Pen. Code, 664/459.) The juvenile court declared minor a ward of the court, placed him in the custody of his grandmother on probation under certain terms and conditions. On appeal, minor contends that the court abused its discretion in imposing gang related probation conditions. Court affirm.

The County of San Bernardino sued defendant Antonia Bivings for code violations and obtained a preliminary injunction in May 2006, prohibiting her from conducting a commercial trucking business and from allowing commercial parking on her residential real property in Bloomington. We have already addressed the issues related to the preliminary injunction in a previous appeal, County of San Bernardino v. Bivings (Apr. 10, 2007, E040677) [nonpub. opn.] (Bivings I). This appeal challenges the trial courts denial of defendants anti SLAPP motion. ( 425.16.) Court affirm the judgment. The County as prevailing party recovers its costs on appeal.

Despras demurred to the Aloha complaint which the trial court granted without leave to amend. We find a substantial factual question regarding the effect of the addendum upon the request of Aloha for the second five year option, and reverse the judgment. A trial of the claim of Aloha could find that Desprass denial of the application of Aloha to extend the five year term violated the terms of the first addendum, entitling Aloha to compensatory damages for the refusal. Court reverse the case. The case is reversed.

Appellant Kentry Shawn Walker was convicted after a jury trial of three felony counts of vandalism (Pen. Code,[1] 594, subd. (b)(1), counts two, three, and five; two misdemeanor counts of vandalism ( 594, subd. (b)(2)(A), counts one and six); and one misdemeanor count of contributing to the delinquency of a minor ( 272, count seven). In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found true the allegations that Walker had suffered two prior strike convictions within the meaning of section 667, subdivisions (c)-(j) and section 1170.12, subdivisions (a)-(e), a juvenile robbery and carjacking.
Walker next contends that the trial court erred when instructing the jury. He claims that 1) the court was required to instruct sua sponte that the jury must find that Walker had the specific intent to aid and abet the male juvenile, and 2) the court erred when it gave instructions on how to evaluate lay and expert opinion testimony because there was no opinion testimony to be considered. Court reject both contentions. The judgment of conviction is affirmed.

Sukhwinder Singh (hereafter plaintiff) agreed to lease to Randeep Singh (hereafter defendant) a 1997 Utility truck trailer for use in defendants trucking business. After defendant stopped making monthly payments, plaintiff canceled the lease and sought the return of his trailer. When that did not occur, plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit and was successful in recovering the trailer by means of a writ of possession. Repossession of the trailer, however, did not end the parties dispute because plaintiffs complaint also sought recovery of damages for unpaid rent and other losses. At the trial of the damage claims, defendant asserted that it was plaintiff who breached or repudiated the agreement by failing to make certain repairs. The trial court disagreed, found that defendant had breached the agreement, and awarded plaintiff the sum of $17,067. Defendant appeals, claiming reversible error on two grounds: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support the trial courts determination that defendant breached the agreement, and (2) damages were improperly calculated. Court conclude the first ground fails because there is no adequate record on appeal to support the defendants challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, and the judgment is presumed to be correct. In regard to measure of damages, we agree based on error disclosed on the face of the record that the trial court improperly awarded rental damages for the period of time after possession of the trailer was recovered. Accordingly, Court remand the case to the trial court to recalculate the damage award, but in all other respects the judgment affirmed.

Respondent Anna Lee Deuel (Anna) filed a petition for dissolution of her marriage to Brian Wade Deuel (Brian), and sought legal and physical custody of their child (the child).[1] Brian was in state prison, and his mother, appellant Cynthia Wade (Cynthia), filed a motion for joinder and for visitation with her paternal grandchild. The court granted the motion for joinder and provided for Cynthia to have visitation. Brian was released from prison and sought to regain his custodial and visitation rights, with Cynthia to provide supervision, but Brian appeared at a court hearing while apparently under the influence of a controlled substance, failed to comply with the courts order to submit a drug test, and then disappeared.
The court granted custody to Anna, with specific visitation to Cynthia, but ordered Cynthia and Anna to attend counseling, for Cynthia to pay counseling and babysitting expenses, and not to make disparaging remarks about Anna in the childs presence. The trial courts order that appellant (Cynthia) pay for respondents (Annas) counseling expenses is stricken. In all other respects the judgment is affirmed.

Appellant, Sandra Marie Torres, was found guilty after a jury trial on June 1, 2006, of first degree burglary (Pen. Code, 459).[1] In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found true allegations that Torres had a qualifying prior prison term within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b), a prior serious felony conviction within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (a), and a prior serious felony conviction within the meaning of the three strikes law ( 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)).
Torres responded with a letter challenging the authentication of property stolen during the burglary. She questions whether any witness saw her come out the front door of the victims residence. Torres asks us to review whether there was animosity between her family and the victims family. Torres also requests that Court review her mental health and whether she was taking medications for a mental illness. The judgment is affirmed.

Appellant Emily M., the mother of Austin O., a dependent of the juvenile court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code[1]section 300, subdivisions (b) and (j), appeals from a post-permanent plan order of the juvenile court suspending her right to make educational decisions for Austin and appointing Clovis Unified School District (Clovis Unified) as the entity responsible for those decisions. Dependency jurisdiction initially was invoked in November 2001 after the juvenile court found true the allegations that Emily had failed to protect Austin from physical abuse by Emilys live-in boyfriend. Austin was in the third grade. The permanent plan ultimately adopted for Austin by the juvenile court was long term foster care. Over the course of dependency, Austin has had several placements. Currently, he is in a foster home and attending an intermediate school. Although the court ordered monthly visits between Austin and Emily, Emily no longer has any contact with Austin. The trial court granted the section 388 petition and suspended Emilys parental right to make educational decisions on behalf of Austin, appointing Clovis Unified as the entity responsible for those decisions.The order of the juvenile court is affirmed.

This is an appeal from summary judgment in favor of defendant and respondent Del Monte Foods Company. Plaintiffs and appellants William and Joyce Souza contend the evidence does not support the grant of summary judgment under the relevant standards. In particular, appellants contend facts found true by the court were not established by the evidence before it and, even if supported by evidence, the courts findings did not negate appellants three theories of liability. Court affirm the judgment.

Karen R. appeals from an order terminating her parental rights (Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.26) to her three-year-old son, Joseph.[1] Prior to the termination hearing, appellant petitioned to modify ( 388) an order denying her reunification services; the court had denied her services due to her extensive and chronic history of drug abuse ( 361.5, subd. (b)(13)). In the midst of the evidentiary hearing on both appellants petition and the recommendation to terminate her parental rights, her attorney requested a continuance, which the court denied for lack of good cause. Appellant, who was testifying on direct examination when the court called a noon recess, had failed to return to court. Thereafter, the court denied appellants modification petition, rejected her argument that termination would be detrimental to Joseph, and, having found the child adoptable, terminated parental rights.
She contends on appeal that the superior court erred by denying each of her requests. Respondent Fresno County Department of Child and Family Services (the department) responds the disentitlement doctrine (see MacPherson v. MacPherson (1939) 13 Cal.2d 271) should prevent her from raising these arguments. On review, we have assumed without discussion that the disentitlement doctrine is inapplicable here. Having evaluated the merits of appellants complaints, Court affirm.

After a jury trial, appellant was convicted of assaulting two police officers; attempting to murder one of them; and possessing methamphetamine for sale. He contends that the trial court erred in: (1) admitting expert testimony regarding gunshot sounds; (2) admitting evidence of appellants prior assault on a different police officer; (3) denying a motion for mistrial; (4) refusing to instruct on accident or misfortune; (5) failing to inquire adequately into alleged juror misconduct; (6) denying a pretrial motion for release of exhibits for testing; (7) permitting the prosecution to amend the information, after the discharge of the jury, regarding the details of prior conviction allegations being tried to the court; and (8) treating one of appellants prior convictions as a strike. court reject all of these contentions, and affirm.

Acting in propria persona, appellants Konstantin Shabanov, Regina Kasvan and Diana Shabanov (collectively the Shabanovs) appeal from a judgment dismissing their complaint against respondent San Francisco Housing Authority (the Housing Authority) following the sustaining of the Housing Authoritys demurrer without leave to amend. The complaint appears to be a wrongful death action alleging that Yuri Shabanov, the Shabanovs elderly father, died as a result of the Housing Authoritys failure to take reasonable means to prevent his fall from his Housing Authority apartment window. Because the Shabanovs have failed to meet their burden, as the appellants, to present an adequate record for review, Court affirm.

This is the third appeal by K.H. (mother), following the removal of two of her sons, J.A. and D.A., from her custody. This case originated when the Alameda County Social Services Agency (agency) filed a petition pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b) of the Welfare and Institutions Code[1]on behalf of J.A. and D.A. Following a jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the juvenile court found the allegations in the amended petition true and removed both boys from the custody of mother. Mother appealed that ruling, and Court affirmed in our nonpublished decision filed January 18, 2007, In re J.A., A114066 (J.A. I.).