CA Unpub Decisions

The Orange County juvenile court entered a true finding that Jessica A. solicited an act of prostitution, a misdemeanor (Pen. Code, 647, subd. (b); statutory references are to the Penal Code). The case was transferred to San Diego County, where Jessica lived. The San Diego County juvenile court adjudged her a ward, placed her in the custody of the probation officer and committed her to the Short Term Offender Program for 90 days, after which she was authorized to live with her grandmother. Jessica appeals, contending the true finding is unsupported by substantial evidence that she committed an act in furtherance of an agreement to engage in prostitution. Court affirm.

Allwin B. Hall and Edmon Keller Stanley were lifelong friends. In 1998, Allwin[1]and his wife, Marguerite, purchased residential real property in Palm Desert. Stanley made all the payments on the property and either resided there intermittently or rented it out from the date of purchase forward. After a court trial on the issue of quiet title by adverse possession, the court gave judgment in favor of Stanley.
Patricia Anne Doolette, the trustee of the Hall trust and the executor of Marguerites estate, appeals. Court affirm the judgment because substantial evidence establishes the elements of adverse possession.

This appeal originally concerned the issue of whether the fee shifting provision of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (Song Beverly Act), California Civil Code section 179, subdivision (d),[1]permits the use of a multiplier under the lodestar adjustment method for determining attorneys fees. While this appeal was pending, this court resolved that issue in the affirmative. (See Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of California, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 785, review den. Feb. 7, 2007, S148905 (Robertson).) Thus, the issue on appeal is whether the appellants are precluded from relitigating this issue under the doctrine of collateral estoppel. For the following reasons, we conclude that one of the appellants is not precluded from relitigating this issue by Robertson. However, Robertson is controlling, and appellants have not challenged the reasonableness of the fee award outside of the issue of the use of a multiplier. Thus, Court affirm the trial courts order granting the attorneys fees.

Appellant Emma H. (mother) appeals from an order implementing a permanent plan of guardianship over her daughter, Elizabeth W. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.26.[1]) Mother raises two contentions on appeal: (1) the court and respondent Kern County Department of Human Services (Department) failed to comply with the notice requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.) requiring remand with directions for the juvenile court to comply with ICWA; and (2) the juvenile courts visitation order must be reversed because it gives her daughter sole discretion over whether visitation occurs. Court affirm.

In an information filed March 24, 2006, appellant was charged with willful infliction of corporal injury on a spouse or cohabitant (Pen. Code, 273.5; count 1), assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury ( 245, subd. (a)(1); count 2), making a criminal threat ( 422; count 3), possession of a controlled substance, viz., amphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, 11377, subd. (a); count 4), possession of more than 28.5 grams of marijuana (Health & Saf. Code, 11357, subd. (c); count 5), and assault with a deadly weapon ( 245, subd. (a)(1); count 6). It was also alleged that appellant had served two separate prison terms for prior felony convictions ( 667.5, subd. (b)), suffered a strike[2]and personally inflicted great bodily injury under circumstances involving domestic violence in committing the count 1 offense ( 12022.7, subd. (e)).
Pursuant to a plea agreement, on November 16, 2006, appellant pled no contest on count 1 and admitted the great bodily injury enhancement and strike allegations. On December 18, 2006, the court imposed a prison term of nine years, consisting of the three-year midterm on the substantive offense, doubled pursuant the three strikes for a total of six years, and the three-year lower term on the accompanying enhancement.
Appellant did not request, and the court did not issue, a certificate of probable cause ( 1237.5).Following independent review of the record, we have concluded that no reasonably arguable legal or factual issues exist. The judgment is affirmed.

This is the third appeal brought by Tara Hosseini (Hosseini or, where context fits better, the mother) arising out of her marriage to her ex-husband, attorney William Steiner (Steiner or, where context fits better, the father). The first appeal concerned an order requiring monitored visitation between the mother and the couples younger son. Court affirmed the order requiring monitored visitation. Court reasoned that the trial court acted reasonably in the light of the substantial evidence that the mother had poisoned the relationship between the father and his older son and it was important that the cycle not be repeated with the younger son. (In re Marriage of Steiner (June 30, 2003) G029404 [nonpub. opn.].)

Defendant Oscar Tlatelpa appeals after his conviction on two counts related to the attempted theft of an automobile. He argues there was insufficient evidence that the victim owned the car, and errors in jury instructions and the admissibility of a statement he made shortly after his arrest. He also argues sentencing error. Court find that none of these contentions have merit and affirm.

Roberto Sarabia appeals from a judgment after a jury convicted him of two counts of first degree murder. Sarabia argues the trial court erroneously refused to allow a lay witness to testify Sarabia wasnt okay in the head in the days before the killings. Court find no error and affirm the judgment as modified to accurately reflect Sarabias presentence custody credit.

In June 2005 a jury found Norman Lionel Fullbright guilty of first degree murder (Pen. Code,[1] 187, subd. (a); count 1), possession of forged items ( 475, subd. (a); count 2), resisting a peace officer ( 148, subd. (a)(1); count 3), and three counts of battery on a peace officer ( 243, subd. (b); counts 4-6). On the count 1 murder charge the jury also found that Fullbright personally and intentionally discharged a shotgun within the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivision (d). The court sentenced Fullbright to a prison term of 50 years to life, plus three years, consisting of a term of 25 years to life on count 1, a consecutive 25 year-to-life term for the personal use of a shotgun allegation, and an upper term of three years on count 2.
On appeal Fullbright asserts that (1) the court erred under Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 (Crawford) by admitting an affidavit the victim gave to police describing a previous domestic violence assault Fullbright committed against the victim as it violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses; (2) the court erred in instructing the jury under CALJIC No. 4.51; (3) the court erred by refusing to sever the resisting arrest and battery upon a peace officer counts; (4) the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct by speculating as to what the victim would have said if she had testified; and (5) under Cunningham v. California (2007) U.S. [127 S.Ct. 856] (Cunningham), he was entitled to a jury trial on the factors used by the court to impose the upper term on count 2.

Cindy T., mother of the minors, appeals from orders terminating her parental rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.26, 395 [further unspecified section references are to this code].) Appellant contends reversal is required because she was not given proper notice of the hearing and the hearing was conducted without her personal presence or a waiver of her presence.
This court granted appellant permission to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus, case No. C056147, which further explored the question of inadequate notice as well as ineffective assistance of counsel. Court issued an order to show cause returnable in the trial court.
Court affirm the orders of the juvenile court.

Defendant Douglas Elsworth Drake pled guilty to felony driving under the influence (DUI). Defendant also admitted three prior convictions for the same offense pursuant to an agreement under which he would receive the middle term of two years. The court sentenced him to two years in state prison with time credits.
On appeal defendant contends the trial court erred in refusing to strike a Nevada prior conviction for DUI, asserting: 1) the Nevada prior was invalid because the record does not show that he knowingly and voluntarily waived his constitutional rights in pleading to the Nevada charge; and 2) the record does not establish that the conduct underlying the Nevada prior would qualify as a prior DUI conviction had it occurred in California. The People essentially contend that these two issues are not reviewable because defendants motion to strike the Nevada conviction was denied before defendant made his guilty plea, and the issues were not preserved for appeal as a part of the plea agreement. Court agree with the Peoples argument and therefore affirm the judgment.

Defendant Joseph Terrence Barling appeals following his conviction of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, 211), with personal use of a firearm ( 12022.53, subd. (b)), while released from custody on another offense ( 12022.1). Defendant contends (1) his assertion of rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [16 L.Ed.2d 694] was improperly used against him at trial; (2) an involuntary admission was improperly used at trial; (3) an emergency room doctor was improperly allowed to testify on forensic issues upon which he did not qualify as an expert; and (4) the prosecutor committed misconduct. Court affirm the judgment.

In her disability discrimination action under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (Gov. Code, 12940 et seq. (FEHA)), plaintiff Melanie Ann Siegel appeals from the judgment of the trial court entered after it granted the motion for summary judgment brought by defendants Newspapers First, Inc. (defendant) and Janet Hokama (Hokama). We conclude plaintiff has not raised triable issues of material fact with the result as a matter of law, summary judgment was proper. Accordingly, Court affirm the judgment.

Defendant Billy Joe Rutherford was arrested in his motel room after police responded to a telephone call from the motel manager who smelled marijuana coming from inside the room.[1] The police found defendant in the room with his companions, his one-year-old son, more than 97 grams of methamphetamine, and $1,500 in cash. Weapons, pay-owe sheets and scales were seized in defendants room and in his truck.
Facing multiple charges and enhancements, defendant entered a guilty plea to transportation of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, 11379, subd. (a)), and admitted two prior prison term enhancements (Pen. Code, 667.5, subd. (b)), as well as an allegation that he was presumptively ineligible for probation. The judgment is affirmed.