CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant Jonathan N. appeals from the order declaring him a ward of the juvenile court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602. The juvenile court sustained a petition alleging that Jonathan N. committed two counts of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, 245, subd. (a)(1)), two counts of assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, 245, subd. (a)(1)), and vandalism (Pen. Code, 594, subd. (a)). Jonathan N. was ordered into the camp community placement program for a period of three months. His maximum period of confinement was fixed at five years.
This court has conducted an independent review of the record. There are no arguable appellate issues. The judgment is therefore affirmed. (Smith v. Robbins (2000) 528 U.S. 259; People v. Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 443.)

Gerardo Luna appeals from a judgment entered following his no contest plea to assault with a firearm, count 2 (Pen. Code, 245, subd. (a)(2)), his admission that the offense was committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang within the meaning of Penal Code section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(C), that during the commission of the offense he personally used a handgun within the meaning of Penal Code section 12022.5, subdivision (a) and personally inflicted great bodily injury within the meaning of Penal Code section 12022.7, subdivision (a).[1] He was sentenced to prison for a total of 18 years, consisting of the upper term of four years for the base term, plus a consecutive middle term of four years for the gun use enhancement, plus a consecutive term of 10 years for the gang enhancement. For purposes of sentencing, the great bodily injury enhancement was stricken. Appellants notice of appeal states his appeal is based on the sentence or other matters occurring after the plea and that his appeal challenges the validity of the plea or admission. He requested but was denied a certificate of probable cause.
After review of the record, appellants court-appointed counsel filed an opening brief requesting this court to independently review the record pursuant to the holding of People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441. The judgment is affirmed.

A jury found defendant and appellant Manuel Alfredo Escamilla (defendant) not guilty of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, 245, subd. (a)(1)[1]), but guilty of the lesser included offense of simple assault ( 240). The jury also found defendant not guilty of vandalism. ( 594, subd. (a).)[2] The trial court placed defendant on probation for three years under various terms and conditions including the condition that defendant serve 60 days in county jail, with 20 days of presentence credit consisting of 14 days of actual custody credit and 6 days of conduct credit. The trial court imposed a $20 court security assessment ( 1465.8, subd. (a)(1)), and a $200 restitution fine ( 1202.4, subd. (b)), and a suspended $200 probation revocation restitution fine ( 1202.44).
On appeal, defendants appointed counsel filed an opening brief in accordance with People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 requesting this court to conduct an independent review of the record to determine if there are any arguable issues on appeal. Court have reviewed the record and affirm the judgment.

Nick Marquez appeals from a judgment entered following his no contest plea to carjacking, count 1 (Pen. Code, 215, subd. (a)), assault with a semi-automatic firearm, count 7 (Pen. Code, 245, subd. (b)), his admission that he suffered a prior conviction of a serious or violent felony within the meaning of the Three Strikes law (Pen. Code, 1170.12, subds. (a) (d) and 667, subds. (b)- (i)) and his admission that he used a firearm within the meaning of Penal Code sections 12022.53, subdivision (b) and 12022.5, subdivision (a). He was sentenced to prison for a total of 28 years composed of the upper term of nine years for count 1, doubled pursuant to the Three Strikes law plus 10 years for the gun use enhancement pursuant to Penal Code section 12022.53, subdivision (b). For count 7, he was sentenced to a concurrent term. He requested but was denied a certificate of probable cause. The judgment is affirmed.

While appellant Michael K. Riley (Riley) was living with respondent Karen M. Blochland (Blochland), an incident occurred between them during which Blochland fell to the floor, cutting her lip and sustaining other physical injuries. Riley was arrested, but not subsequently charged with any crime. Blochland petitioned for and, after an evidentiary hearing, obtained a civil restraining order against Riley.
Riley appeals from the restraining order, arguing that the trial court improperly refused to allow an impeachment witness to testify on Rileys behalf. Riley also contends there is insufficient evidence to support the issuance of the restraining order.
Court hold that Riley forfeited on appeal the issue concerning his impeachment witness and that because there was substantial evidence to support the trial courts finding that Riley committed an act of domestic violence against Blochland, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the restraining order against Riley. Court therefore affirm that order.

Following an automobile accident on May 5, 2003, plaintiff Tami K. Alan commenced a lawsuit for personal injury and property damage against defendant Charles S. Stephens. Alan was represented by her husband, Attorney Keith Alan. Stephens was served by substituted service, but failed to answer or otherwise respond within the required deadline. On Alans request, the clerk entered Stephenss default. Approximately 14 months later, judgment was entered against Stephens in the amount of $577,461.25 after a default prove-up hearing. The trial court denied Stephenss subsequent motion to vacate the default judgment. Stephens appealed that ruling, contending the court abused its discretion in denying his requested relief. He also contends the default judgment was excessive as a matter of law.
Court reject both contentions and affirm. As to the denial of Stephenss motion to vacate the default judgment, we find the record supported the trial courts finding of Stephenss inexcusable neglect. With regard to Stephenss challenge to the judgment itself, Court find Stephenss failure to timely appeal from the default judgment constitutes a jurisdictional bar to appellate review.

Joseph Stuber appeals an order determining him to be a mentally disordered offender (MDO), and recommitting him to the Department of Mental Health for treatment. (Pen. Code, 2962 et seq.). Court affirm.

Karen and Ted Aliado sued the Archdiocese of Los Angeles Education and Welfare Corporation (the Archdiocese) for negligence and for violation of their constitutional right to privacy, as a result of the Archdioceses disclosure of confidential information in response to a subpoena. The complaint was dismissed after demurrers were sustained without leave to amend.
Court conclude that the Aliados privacy claim is barred by the litigation privilege (Civ. Code, 47) because the information that the Archdiocese divulged was in a communication connected to a judicial proceeding. The Aliados have abandoned their negligence claim with respect to the release of confidential information. Finally, the Aliados new claim relating to schoolyard bullying is not cognizable because they failed to obtain leave from the trial court to assert it. Accordingly, Court affirm the judgment in favor of the Archdiocese.

Karen and Ted Aliado sued the Archdiocese of Los Angeles Education and Welfare Corporation (the Archdiocese) for negligence and for violation of their constitutional right to privacy, as a result of the Archdioceses disclosure of confidential information in response to a subpoena. The complaint was dismissed after demurrers were sustained without leave to amend.
Court conclude that the Aliados privacy claim is barred by the litigation privilege (Civ. Code, 47) because the information that the Archdiocese divulged was in a communication connected to a judicial proceeding. The Aliados have abandoned their negligence claim with respect to the release of confidential information. Finally, the Aliados new claim relating to schoolyard bullying is not cognizable because they failed to obtain leave from the trial court to assert it. Accordingly, Court affirm the judgment in favor of the Archdiocese.

Nathan Lee appeals from the judgment entered following a jury trial in which he was convicted of continuous sexual abuse of a child and child abuse. The convictions were based on evidence that defendant sexually abused his stepdaughter over a period of several years starting when she was five, and physically abused an eight year old male foster child who was living in the home. No evidence was presented in defense.
Defendant was sentenced to an upper term of 16 years in state prison for continuous sexual abuse based on the aggravating factors that the crime involved a high degree of cruelty in that the abuse lasted for seven or eight years, the victim was particularly vulnerable, defendant took advantage of a position of trust, and defendant used threats to intimidate the victim into silence. A concurrent sentence was imposed for child abuse. The judgment is affirmed.

Wylie Phillips and Eddie Nash appeal from the judgments entered following a joint jury trial in which each was convicted of robbery and assault, with further findings of firearm use as to Phillips (during the assault) and principal armed as to Nash (based on Phillipss firearm use during the assault). Nash was also convicted of driving a vehicle without the owners consent. (Phillips, Nash, and codefendant Ryan Gandy, who is not a party to this appeal, were acquitted of several additional charges.)[1] In bifurcated bench proceedings, Phillips and Nash were each found to have suffered a prior felony conviction within the meaning of the Three Strikes law. Phillips and Nash contend they were denied a fair trial based on the trial courts comment during voir dire regarding the privilege against self-incrimination and that they were improperly sentenced to upper terms in violation of Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296 [124 S.Ct. 2531]. Court affirm.

Nathan Lee appeals from the judgment entered following a jury trial in which he was convicted of continuous sexual abuse of a child and child abuse. The convictions were based on evidence that defendant sexually abused his stepdaughter over a period of several years starting when she was five, and physically abused an eight-year-old male foster child who was living in the home. No evidence was presented in defense.
Defendant was sentenced to an upper term of 16 years in state prison for continuous sexual abuse based on the aggravating factors that the crime involved a high degree of cruelty in that the abuse lasted for seven or eight years, the victim was particularly vulnerable, defendant took advantage of a position of trust, and defendant used threats to intimidate the victim into silence. A concurrent sentence was imposed for child abuse.The judgment is affirmed.

Wylie Phillips and Eddie Nash appeal from the judgments entered following a joint jury trial in which each was convicted of robbery and assault, with further findings of firearm use as to Phillips (during the assault) and principal armed as to Nash (based on Phillipss firearm use during the assault). Nash was also convicted of driving a vehicle without the owners consent. (Phillips, Nash, and codefendant Ryan Gandy, who is not a party to this appeal, were acquitted of several additional charges.)[1] In bifurcated bench proceedings, Phillips and Nash were each found to have suffered a prior felony conviction within the meaning of the Three Strikes law. Phillips and Nash contend they were denied a fair trial based on the trial courts comment during voir dire regarding the privilege against self-incrimination and that they were improperly sentenced to upper terms in violation of Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296 [124 S.Ct. 2531]. Court affirm.

Defendant and appellant Steven Alan Thoreson appeals from a judgment entered after a guilty plea and an admitted violation of probation. He contends the judgment should be reversed because (1) his July 8, 2004, prospective waiver of custody credits was not knowing, voluntary and intelligent; (2) the prospective waiver of custody credits on July 8, 2004, was imposed by the court as a matter of routine in violation of People v. Penoli (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 298 (Penoli); and (3) his April 20, 2005, waiver of custody credits did not apply to credits he received while in the Pate House residential treatment program. Court affirm the judgment.