CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant James Randolph Ruiz was convicted after a jury trial of possession and transportation of methamphetamine. (Health & Saf. Code, 11377, subd. (a), 11379, subd. (a)) and misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia (Health & Saf. Code, 11364). The jury acquitted defendant of possession of methamphetamine for sale. After a bench trial, the trial court found defendant had two prior drug convictions (Health & Saf. Code, 11370.2, subd. (c)) and that defendant had served a prior prison term (Pen. Code, 667.5, subd. (b)).[1] The trial court found defendant ineligible for Proposition 36 probation ( 1210.1) and sentenced him to an aggregate term of 10 years in state prison.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial courts denial of Proposition 36 probation violated the principles enunciated in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 [147 L.Ed.2d 435] (Apprendi) and Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296 [159 L.Ed.2d 403] (Blakely), because the court relied upon facts not submitted to the jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. court affirm.

Following a contested jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile court sustained a subsequent petition alleging the 17 year old minor David T. was within the provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 602. The petition contained allegations he had committed a forcible lewd act against a child under the age of 14, forcible rape, attempted penetration with a foreign object, assault with intent to commit rape, petty theft, false imprisonment by force or menace, and forcible rape in concert. The court committed the minor to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Facilities, for a maximum confinement period of nine years, not to exceed the age of 25.
On appeal, the minor contends: (1) statements were admitted against him in violation of Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [16 L.Ed.2d 694]; (2) assault with intent to commit rape, forcible rape, and false imprisonment are lesser included offenses of rape in concert; and (3) the commitment order incorrectly states the maximum confinement period.
Court reverse the findings sustaining assault with intent to commit rape and forcible rape, order the juvenile court to correct the commitment order, and otherwise affirm the judgment.

Defendant was convicted by a jury of forcible rape (Pen. Code, 261, subd. (a)(2); further undesignated section references are to the Penal Code), forcible sexual penetration with a foreign object ( 289, subd. (a)(1)), assault with a deadly weapon ( 245, subd. (a)(1)), battery causing serious bodily injury ( 243, subd. (d)), and torture ( 206), all arising from a single incident in which defendant beat and sexually assaulted his one-time girlfriend over a period of eight hours. He was acquitted of aggravated kidnapping for the purpose of committing a sex offense ( 209, subd. (b)(1)), but convicted of the lesser included offense of simple kidnapping ( 207). The jury also found various enhancements and one-strike allegations true. Defendant thereafter admitted a prior serious felony conviction within the meaning of the three strikes law ( 667 and 1170.12) and another conviction for which he served a prison term ( 667.5). Sentenced to an aggregate, unstayed term in state prison of 83 years to life, defendant appeals contending he was denied his constitutional right to present a defense by virtue of several evidentiary rulings by the trial court and he was denied the right to a jury trial on factors used to determine the aggregate sentence imposed. court find no error and affirm the judgment.

Following a contested jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile court found that Randell B., a minor, committed first degree burglary (Pen. Code, 459, 460). On October 21, 2005, the juvenile court declared the minor a ward of the court and committed him to the Sacramento County Boys Ranch (SCBR) for 90 days, but stayed the commitment to January 9, 2006, at which time the minor was to be present before the court to determine whether it should continue the stay.
On November 4, 2005, the minor filed a notice of appeal. Court reject the minors first contention, but agree with him as to the second. Consequently, Court remand for a new disposition hearing, at which time the court can address the minors third and fourth claims if necessary.

Appellant Cass E., mother of the minors, appeals from the dispositional orders of the juvenile court entered on February 8, 2006. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 360, subd. (d), 395; undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.) She contends that, prior to disposition, the juvenile court improperly issued a temporary restraining order against her which required she move out of the family home. She also contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by not ordering she be provided reunification services. Court affirm.

In August 2005, a Chico police officer responded to an anonymous tip that defendant Kareem Shamar Brown was selling controlled substances from a motel room. Police records showed that defendant was on parole.
Chico police arrived at defendants room and made several attempts at knock and notice. Eventually defendant opened the door and was detained. Upon the first knock, an officer saw someone throw an object out of the bathroom window. The officer retrieved a can of hairspray, determined that its bottom could be unscrewed, and found a sock containing 10 baggies with a total of 0.44 grams of rock cocaine.
Having undertaken an examination of the entire record, Court find no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant. The judgment is affirmed.

Defendant Buck Edward Boswell appeals following his conviction for drug offenses. Defendant contends (1) a search warrant was invalid; (2) he was convicted on uncorroborated accomplice statements; (3) the trial court should have instructed the jury that two persons were accomplices as a matter of law; (4) the prosecutor committed misconduct; and (5) there was sentencing error. Court affirm the judgment.

Mary Harvey appeals on the ground the trial court denied her the right to a jury trial in her action to recover a one half interest in the home in which she and Bobby Joe Neeley had lived as unmarried cohabitants. An advisory jury was empanelled to hear the case, but after it rendered its special verdicts, the trial court found Harvey had not proved her claims and entered judgment for Neeley. Court agree with the trial court that Harveys action was essentially equitable, and that she had no right to a jury trial. Court affirm the judgment.

Defendant William Mikel Blankenship pleaded guilty to failing to register as a sex offender within five working days of his birthday (count 1) (Pen. Code, 290, subd. (a)(1)(D))[1]and failing to reregister within five working days of moving (count 2) ( 290, subd. (a)(1)(A)) and admitted serving a prior prison term ( 667.5, subd. (b)) in exchange for a sentencing lid of four years eight months. Sentenced to four years eight months in state prison, defendant appeals, contending his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance at sentencing. Court disagree and affirm the judgment.

Defendant Joseph Stanley pled no contest to selling cocaine base (Health & Saf. Code, 11352, subd. (a))[1]less than a month after a mistrial on the same charge. The trial court sentenced defendant to a stipulatedlow term of three years, and the prior drug conviction ( 11370.2, subd. (a)) was dismissed.
Having obtained a certificate of probable cause, defendant appeals, contending that his plea was taken without a proper advisement and waiver of his rights. Court affirm.

Defendant Christopher James Shay filed this appeal after pleading no contest to one count of assault by means of force likely to cause great bodily injury (Pen. Code, 245, subd. (a)(1)) and one count of mayhem ( 203). He raises two issues: (1) the trial court should have dismissed the other three counts charged in the information as provided in his plea bargain, and (2) the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him to consecutive terms.
Court conclude that the judgment should be modified to dismiss the remaining counts of the information pursuant to the plea agreement. Court also conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant to consecutive terms.

In October 2000, defendant Robert Martinez partially inserted his penis into 13 year old Rebecca F.s vagina. He molested her again sometime during the three months that followed. Defendant also fondled 11 year old Jessica F.s vagina sometime between October 2000 and October 2001. Defendant entered a negotiated plea of guilty to two counts of lewd and lascivious conduct upon a child under the age of 14 years (Pen. Code, 288, subd. (a); counts one, two) and one count of sexual battery (as reasonably related to that charged) (Pen. Code, 243.4; count four) in exchange for dismissal of the remaining count, a stipulated state prison sentence of six years, that is, the low term of three years on count one, a consecutive one third the midterm or two years on count two, a consecutive one third the midterm or one year on count four, and concurrent sentencing on two other cases. The court sentenced defendant accordingly. The trial court is directed to remove the current abstract of judgment from the record and to prepare a new abstract of judgment reflecting the minors first names and last initial only. The trial court is directed to redact the last names of the minor victims from the minute order and replace with the last initial. The trial court is directed to forward a certified copy of the new abstract of judgment to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. The judgment is affirmed.

A modification decision.

Defendant pleaded no contest to inflicting corporal injury on a cohabitant (Pen. Code, 273.5, subd. (a); further section references are to the Penal Code), stemming from an incident in which he punched his girlfriends face and head, grabbed her by the hair and kicked her after she had fallen to the floor. Defendant was placed on probation for three years with terms and conditions including a requirement that he serve 120 days in jail. Less than a month later, defendants probation was revoked based on a probation officers declaration alleging that defendant failed to report for his jail sentence and falsely identified himself to a peace officer. ( 148.9.) A subsequent amended declaration contained several additional allegations concerning defendants failure to comply with conditions of probation.
Defendant was arrested in another county on a bench warrant for the violations of probation. He posted bail but failed to appear in court in the matter. Consequently, defendant was charged with failing to appear on a felony ( 1320.5) and an enhancement for committing the offense while out on bail on another charge. ( 12022.1.)
Court have undertaken an independent examination of the entire record in this case and have found no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant. The judgment is affirmed.