CA Unpub Decisions

In August 2000, plaintiff was declared a dependent of the juvenile court and placed in the care and custody of the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS). She was 12 years old at the time. Over the next four years, DCFS placed her in several different foster homes and agencies, but plaintiff repeatedly ran away and eventually became involved in unlawful drug and sexual involvement.The judgment of dismissal is affirmed.

Annette E. (mother), mother of Alyssa P. and Ariana P., petitions for extraordinary relief pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.452. She seeks review of an order terminating her reunification services and setting a permanent plan hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Mother asserts the trial court erred in failing to grant her an additional 22 days of reunification services. Court deny the petition.

Appellant Michael Anthony Villarreal and three codefendants were charged with first degree murder of Antonio Castillo, with an enhancement for committing the offense for the benefit of a criminal street gang. Appellant and the codefendants entered into a negotiated disposition whereby they pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter, admitted the gang enhancement, waived their appellate rights, and would receive a sentence of 21 years. Appellant then sought to withdraw his plea and admission. The court denied the motion and imposed the aggregate term of 21 years. Appellant has filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. Court dismiss the appeal.

Appellant C.Y. was charged with unlawfully taking or driving a car and receiving stolen property. He was found eligible to receive deferred entry of judgment (DEJ) and admitted the allegations. However, the court determined he was not suitable for DEJ and permitted him to withdraw his admissions. Thereafter, appellant admitted the vehicle offense and he was adjudged a ward of the court, ordered to perform community service, and placed on an electronic monitoring program.
On appeal, appellant argues the court abused its discretion when it found he was not suitable for DEJ, failed to make sufficient findings to support its decision, and failed to clarify whether the vehicle offense was a felony or misdemeanor. Respondent argues that appellant failed to object to the courts findings that he was not suitable for DEJ and thus waived appellate review. Respondent also argues the court inferentially found the vehicle offense was a felony. The judgment is affirmed.

A jury convicted appellant Shannon Ruffin of driving while under the influence of alcohol (Veh. Code, 23152, subd. (a);[1]count 1), driving while his driving privilege was suspended or revoked ( 14601.1, subd. (a); count 2) and willful obstruction of a peace officer in the performance of official duties (Pen. Code, 148, subd. (a)(1); count 3) and appellant admitted that within the previous 10 years he had suffered a conviction of violating section 23152, subdivision (a), thereby making the count 1 offense a felony under section 23505.5. In a separate proceeding, appellant admitted allegations that he had served four separate prison terms for prior felony convictions (Pen. Code, 667.5, subd. (b)).
The court imposed a prison term of six years, consisting of the two-year midterm on count 1 and one year on each of the four prior prison term enhancements. The court imposed concurrent 180 day county jail terms on each of counts 2 and 3.
Appellants appointed appellate counsel has filed an opening brief which summarizes the pertinent facts, with citations to the record, raises no issues, and asks that this court independently review the record. (Peoplev.Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d. 436.) Appellant has not responded to this courts invitation to submit additional briefing.
Court have independently reviewed the record and based on that review we have concluded that no reasonably arguable legal or factual issues exist. The judgment is affirmed.

At approximately 1:24 p.m. on September 29, 2005, during a parole search appellant David Jacobson became combative and was eventually arrested by Bakersfield police officers at his residence. While putting handcuffs on Jacobson the officers found a glass smoking pipe in his hand and a baggie containing .34 grams of cocaine on the bed next to him. On March 22, 2006, a jury convicted Jacobson of possession of cocaine (Health & Saf. Code, 11350, subd. (a)) and possession of narcotics paraphernalia ( 11364). Three prior prison term enhancements (Pen. Code, 667.5, subd. (b)) were also were also found true. The trial court is directed to issue an amended abstract of judgment that correctly indicates that Jacobson was convicted of violating section 11350, subdivision (a), not section 11377, subdivision (a), and to forward a certified copy to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

An injured worker petitions for a writ of review (Lab. Code, 5950; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.494) contending the 104-week statutory maximum entitlement to temporary disability indemnity payments enacted as part of the 2004 workers compensation reforms is unconstitutional because he did not become permanent and stationary within two years. Court conclude the reduction of potential temporary disability benefits is within the Legislatures constitutional authority to prescribe a complete system of workers compensation and deny the petition.

A modification decision.

A jury convicted defendant of committing lewd or lascivious acts on a child under age 14 by force (Pen. Code, 288, subd. (b)(1))[1](count 1), aggravated sexual assault of a child under age 14 and 10 or more years younger than defendant (former 269; Stats. 1994, 1st Ex. Sess. 1993-1994, ch. 48, 1, p. 8761) by penetration with a foreign object (id., subd. (a)(5); see 289, subd. (a)(1)) (count 2), and threats to commit a crime resulting in death or great bodily injury ( 422) (count 3). The trial court sentenced defendant to 23 years to life in prison, consisting of a principal term of two years for the threats conviction, a full consecutive term of six years for the lewd acts conviction, and a term of 15 years to life imprisonment for the aggravated sexual assault to run consecutively to the other two terms.
On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred in excluding proffered evidence that the victim was not home on the day of his alleged first sexual assault against her and abused its discretion in denying his motion for a mistrial following the victims outburst in the courtroom, that there was cumulative error, that his sentence is unconstitutional under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and that his sentence constitutes cruel and/or unusual punishment in violation of the United States and California Constitutions. Court affirm the judgment.

Defendant entered a negotiated plea of no contest to 15 sex offenses perpetrated against three victims. He agreed to a maximum sentence of eight years. The trial court ordered defendant to register as a sex offender under the mandatory requirement set forth in Penal Code section 290, subdivision (a)(1)(A), and sentenced him to five years and eight months. It calculated the sentence as follows: three years for unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor under age 16 (count 2, victim K. Doe); eight months consecutive for oral copulation with a minor (count 4, victim K. Doe); eight months consecutive for unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor more than three years younger (count 9, victim E. Doe); eight months consecutive for unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor more than three years younger (count 11, victim M. Doe); eight months consecutive for recording confidential communications (count 15, victim M. Doe).[2] It imposed concurrent sentences on the remaining counts. On appeal, defendant contends that (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to object to the trial courts reason for imposing the consecutive sentence for count 15, (2) the sentences for counts 7 and 14 (using a minor to model in sexual conduct, victims K. Doe & M. Doe) and 15 constitute improper multiple punishment ( 654), and (3) the mandatory aspect of the order to register denied him equal protection of the law (People v. Hofsheier (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1185 (Hofsheier)). Court affirm the judgment.

Defendant and appellant Leobardo Palma appeals his prison commitment after revocation of his probation. He argues that the court hearing the revocation of probation proceedings violated due process in the conduct of the hearing. He also contends that there were errors in the imposition of sentence. Court affirm.

Quintin Salmond and Brenda Salmond were both injured in an airplane crash and jointly settled their claims with American Airlines for the total amount of $17,500,000. Shortly afterwards, they separated and Brenda initiated divorce proceedings. Brenda appeals, claiming that, based on her interpretation of Family Code section 2603, the trial court erred by not assigning to her one half of the American Airlines settlement. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in assigning to each party the amount they previously agreed should be allocated to each of them as part of the settlement. (In re Marriage of Devlin (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 804, 807-808 (Devlin).) Court also reject Brendas other assignments of error and affirm the judgment.

Defendant and appellant Gregory Alverez Deville (hereafter defendant) is serving a nine year sentence after a jury convicted him of felony possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, 11350, subd. (a))(count 1); misdemeanor use and being under the influence of a controlled substance ( 11550, subd. (a)) (count 2); misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia ( 11364) (count 3); and misdemeanor false self-identification to a peace officer (Pen. Code, 148.9, subd. (a)) (count 4). In this appeal, defendant argues: 1) the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on voluntary intoxication as a defense to several of the charges; and 2) the sentences for misdemeanor use/being under the influence and possession of drug paraphernalia should be stayed because they were part of the same course of conduct and incident to the same intent as the felony possession charge pursuant to Penal Code section 654. For the reasons discussed below, Court modify the judgment to stay the sentence imposed for count 2. The remainder of the judgment is affirmed.

This decision is the result of a transfer from the Supreme Court after it issued an order granting the Attorney Generals petition for review of our original decision and deferred briefing pending resolution of People v. Modiri (2006) 39 Cal.4th 481 (Modiri). The pertinent procedural details are that a jury found defendants and appellants Eileen M. Merchant (hereafter defendant Merchant) and Michael C. Gramaje (hereafter defendant Gramaje) (collectively defendants) guilty of numerous charges including felony child endangerment, torture, and assault with a deadly weapon (the latter two as to defendant Merchant only). In their consolidated appeal, Court held that the various claims of error raised by defendant Gramaje were meritless, but Court agreed with defendant Merchants claim that the evidence was insufficient to support the jurys true findings on two allegations under Penal Code section 12022.7, subdivision (d) that in committing the felony child endangerment and the assault with a deadly weapon, defendant Merchant personally inflicted great bodily injury on K., the six-month old victim of all the crimes. Accordingly, Court affirmed as to defendant Gramaje and struck the two section 12022.7, subdivision (d) enhancements as to defendant Merchant and affirmed as modified.