CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Juan Antonio Ramos was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm, misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia, providing false identifying information to a peace officer, and being a felon in possession of ammunition. Defendant pled no contest to being a felon in possession of a firearm in exchange for dismissal of all other counts and a grant of probation with 180 days in county jail.
At the sentencing hearing, the court suspended sentence and placed defendant on formal probation for five years. The probation terms included, inter alia, that defendant not associate with known gang members and not go to places frequented by known gang members.
On appeal, defendant contends that the courts gang restriction conditions: (1) are not reasonably related to the purposes of his probation, nor are they related to his future criminality; (2) are overly vague; and (3) suffer from a constitutionally fatal overbreadth. Court conclude that the terms of the probation are reasonably related to the purposes of defendants probation, are not vague, and do not suffer from a constitutionally fatal overbreath. Therefore, Court affirm the judgment.

Defendant Cory Dean Allred pled no contest to robbery (Pen. Code, 211) and admitted personal use of a firearm (Pen. Code, 12022.53, subd. (b)) and an on bail allegation in case No. CRF061903, and pled no contest to second degree burglary (Pen. Code, 459) in case No. CRF060952. He was sentenced to the stipulated term of 14 years and eight months. The court also imposed $500 in actual restitution, a $2,800 restitution fine, $40 in court security fees, stayed a $2,800 parole revocation fine, and awarded 74 days (63 actual and 11 conduct) credit. Having undertaken an examination of the entire record, Court find no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant. The judgment is affirmed.

Defendant was charged with one count of possessing an inmate manufactured stabbing weapon while confined in a penal institution. The amended information also alleged that defendant had two prior felony convictions. The court bifurcated the two prior felony allegations from the possession charge.
Before trial the court denied defendants two motions to strike one of his prior felony convictions pursuant to Penal Code section 1385, subdivision (a), and People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 530. A jury subsequently found defendant guilty of the possession charge. Defendant waived a jury trial on the prior felony allegations and the trial court found those allegations to be true. The court then denied a renewed Romeromotion to strike one of the prior felony convictions. Subsequently, the court sentenced defendant to a term of 25 years to life in accordance with the three strikes law. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion by declining to dismiss one of [his] strike priors. Specifically, defendant contends the court did not give sufficient weight to the nature and circumstances of [his current] crime, but instead based its denial of [his] Romero motion on the nature of his [prior felony convictions]. Upon review of the proceedings, Court conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied defendants multiple motions to dismiss one of his prior felony convictions. Accordingly, Court affirm the judgment.

A jury found defendant Terrence Dewayne Jemison guilty of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor more than three years younger than himself. The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on formal probation for three years with conditions.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred by not giving a jury instruction on the lesser included offense of attempted unlawful sexual intercourse. The People assert the evidence of attempted unlawful sexual intercourse was not substantial enough to require the court to give a jury instruction on that offense. Court agree with the Peoples argument and therefore affirm.

Appellant, the mother of the minor, appeals from the juvenile courts orders denying the fathers request for modification and terminating parental rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.26, 388, 395.) Appellant contends the juvenile court erred by denying the fathers modification petition. Court affirm.

Derek N., father of the minors, appeals from orders entered at the six-month review hearing. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.21, subd. (e), 395.)Appellant contends the court abused its discretion in terminating his reunification services and there was no substantial evidence of detriment to support the courts order suspending his visitation. Court affirm.

Araceli S. (petitioner), the mother of L. M. (the minor), seeks an extraordinary writ to vacate orders of the juvenile court entered at the six-month review hearing terminating reunification services and setting a hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. (Further section references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.) Petitioner contends she was not provided reasonable reunification services and the juvenile court erred by not ordering additional services. She also claims there was insufficient evidence that there would be a substantial risk of harm to the minor if returned to her care. Disagreeing with these contentions, Court deny the petition and vacate the stay of proceedings previously granted.

The juvenile court declared T.S. a ward (Welf. & Inst. Code, 601) after entering a true finding she was a habitual truant ( 601, subd. (b)). The court placed T.S. on probation under the supervision of the probation department and included a probation condition that she be at home "between the hours of 6:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. unless in the company of his/her parent, legal guardian, or other adult person having legal care or custody of the minor, subject to modification at the Probation Officer's discretion." T.S. contends the trial court was unauthorized to impose curfew earlier than 10 p.m. At the disposition hearing, the court adopted the probation department recommendations except for a requirement that T.S. provide an essay on the importance of education. Included in the conditions was curfew from 6 p.m. to 6 a.m. The court advised T.S. that "[t]he only exceptions are school, religious activities or when you are with your mother. You are to complete 20 hours of community service at a nonprofit organization." T.S. did not object.
The juvenile court order setting T.S.'s curfew is affirmed.

A modification decision.

Timothy Fielder pleaded guilty to infliction of corporal injury on a cohabitant (Pen. Code, 273.5, subd. (a)) with personal infliction of great bodily injury ( 12022.7, subd. (e)), making a criminal threat ( 422), and three counts of failing to comply with the sex offender registration requirements ( 290, subd. (g)(2)).[2] He admitted three prior prison terms ( 667.5, subd. (b)), two serious felony prior convictions ( 667, subd. (a)(1)), and two strikes ( 667, subds. (b)-(i)). The court dismissed one of the strikes and sentenced him to 25 years in prison: six years (twice the middle term) for corporal injury to a spouse or roommate; four years for personal infliction of great bodily injury; 16 months (one third the middle term, doubled) for each failure to register; a stayed term for making a criminal threat ( 654); five years for each serious felony prior; and one year for one prison prior. Fielder appeals, contending he was improperly punished for three violations of section 290 for a single course of conduct. Court affirm.

Timothy Fielder pleaded guilty to infliction of corporal injury on a cohabitant (Pen. Code,[1] 273.5, subd. (a)) with personal infliction of great bodily injury ( 12022.7, subd. (e)), making a criminal threat ( 422), and three counts of failing to comply with the sex offender registration requirements ( 290, subd. (g)(2)).[2] He admitted three prior prison terms ( 667.5, subd. (b)), two serious felony prior convictions ( 667, subd. (a)(1)), and two strikes ( 667, subds. (b)-(i)). The court dismissed one of the strikes and sentenced him to 25 years in prison: six years (twice the middle term) for corporal injury to a spouse or roommate; four years for personal infliction of great bodily injury; 16 months (one third the middle term, doubled) for each failure to register; a stayed term for making a criminal threat ( 654); five years for each serious felony prior; and one year for one prison prior. Fielder appeals, contending he was improperly punished for three violations of section 290 for a single course of conduct. Court affirm.

A jury found Johnny Leon Rice guilty of five counts of robbery (Pen. Code,[1] 211; counts 1, 2, 3, 4 & 5) and one count of receiving stolen property ( 496d, subd. (a); count 6).[2] The jury also found true allegations that a principal was armed with a firearm during the commission of each offense ( 12022, subd. (a)(1)). After a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found true allegations Rice had suffered four "strike" convictions under the Three Strikes Law ( 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12) and had served three prior prison terms ( 667.5, subd. (b)). The court sentenced Rice to a total prison term of 154 years, consisting of six consecutive indeterminate 25-years-to-life terms for his convictions under the three strikes law, plus one year consecutive for the principal armed enhancement on count 1 (the others being stayed under 654) and three consecutive one-year terms for the prison priors.
Rice appeals, contending the trial court violated his constitutional rights by failing to preinstruct the jurors on the presumption of innocence and the standard of proof and prejudicially erred in instructing the jurors with CALJIC No. 2.52 on flight because identity was a contested issue and in failing to instruct the jurors on battery as a necessarily included offense of the count 2 robbery. Rice additionally asserts the court's failure to instruct on the necessarily included offense of battery constitutes federal constitutional error. Court affirm.

Douglass E., Jr., (Douglass) seeks review of juvenile court orders terminating his reunification services to his son, Douglass E., III (the minor), and setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing. He contends the court erred because substantial evidence does not support a finding he had not made substantial progress in the provisions of his reunification plan. Court deny the petition.

Stephanie S., defendant and appellant (hereafter mother), appeals from the trial courts order under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 terminating her parental rights to the younger two of her five children and from the order denying her motion under section 388, seeking modification of the trial courts earlier order terminating mothers reunification services. Mother contends first that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her motion under section 388 to reinstate reunification services. Next, mother contends that the beneficial relationship and sibling relationship exceptions to termination of parental rights apply in this case. Mother also contends that counsel for the children had an actual conflict of interest that requires reversal of the order terminating her parental rights. Finally, mother contends that she was denied the effective assistance of counsel because the preliminary adoption assessment required under section 366.21, subdivision (i) was inadequate and her attorney did not object. Court conclude that if any error occurred, it was harmless. Therefore Court affirm both orders.