CA Unpub Decisions

Anya L. appeals the findings and orders entered at the jurisdictional and dispositional hearing held pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code sections 360, subdivision (d) and 361, subdivision (c). Citing In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, she asks this court to exercise its discretion to review the record for error.
Anya L.'s counsel also requests leave for her to file a supplemental brief in propria persona. The request is denied.
The appeal is dismissed.

Y. L. appeals the findings and orders entered at the permanency planning hearing held pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Citing In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, she asks this court to exercise its discretion to review the record for error.
Y. L.'s counsel also requests leave for her to file a supplemental brief in propria persona. The request is denied. The appeal is dismissed.

Rosa H. appeals the findings and orders entered at the permanency planning hearing held pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Citing In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, she asks this court to exercise its discretion to review the record for error.
Rosa H.'s counsel also requests leave for her to file a supplemental brief in propria persona. The request is denied.
The appeal is dismissed.

Alexandra S. seeks review of a juvenile court order setting a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. She contends the San Diego Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) did not exercise a reasonably diligent parent search for her and therefore, the court erred when it found that her whereabouts were unknown. Alexandra also asserts she did not receive proper notice of the six-month review hearing or of the Agency's recommendations to bypass reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing. Petition denied.

Don Buhrman bought a pleasure boat that he insured with Old United Insurance Company (Old United). After Buhrman replaced the engine, the boat sank in a storm while anchored at Lake Mead. Old United refused to pay Buhrmans claim, which did not include the value of the new engine; cancelled and rescinded his insurance and refunded his premiums; and filed an action for rescission based on a material change in the boat. Buhrman filed a cross-complaint for tortious breach of contract, breach of contract, negligence, fraud, indemnity, contribution, and declaratory relief, claiming actual damages of $60,000 or more.
Based on a special verdict form prepared by Buhrman, the jury rendered a verdict of $17,091 for Buhrmans covered loss; $316,230 for economic loss, including lost wages; $184,000 for noneconomic damages; and $1 million in punitive damages.Old United and Western Marine Insurance Services, Inc. (Westmar), the insurance agent, appeal from the judgment against them. Court hold the punitive damages award should be stricken and the award for economic damages reduced to $60,245. Otherwise, Court affirm the judgment with directions.

Petitioner and appellant Allan Brown appeals from a family law judgment in favor of respondent Linda Brothers Brown (Brothers), awarding her as her sole and separate property a condominium she purchased while they were briefly married. (Code Civ. Proc., 904.1.)
Court conclude substantial evidence supports the courts findings that Brown effected a transmutation of the property ( 852), no undue influence occurred, and the condominium is Brotherss separate property. Court affirm the judgment.

A corporation agrees to sell its automobile dealership. The purchase agreement with the new buyer contains an arbitration provision. The president of the selling corporation agrees to enter personally into a separate noncompetition agreement with the new purchaser of the dealership. The separate agreement contains no arbitration provision. Does the arbitration provision included in the purchase agreement bind the president personally.
Court find that the arbitration agreement between the corporation and the new purchasers of the business does not bind the president of the selling corporation individually and his agreement to execute a noncompetition agreement as an individual does not obligate him personally to comply with the arbitration provision in the purchase agreement.

Robert Gonzales, Jr. transferred his ownership interest in his marital home to his wife, Tamarra, as her sole, separate property. Tamarra Gonzales appeals, challenging a judgment setting aside the interspousal transfer deed. Tamarra argues that there was insufficient evidence that she breached her fiduciary duty owed to Robert by requesting him to transfer his interest in the family residence; there was a valid transmutation of Roberts property interest under Family Code section 852; the trial court erroneously applied the preponderance of the evidence standard, rather than the clear and convincing evidence standard, in determining whether Robert rebutted Tamarras title to the property; and the trial court failed to make an express finding as to whether Tamarra rebutted the presumption of undue influence.
Court affirm the trial court ruling setting aside the interspousal transfer deed on the ground there was substantial evidence that Robert was at an unfair advantage when he signed the deed and Tamarra failed to rebut the presumption of undue influence and duress.

Nearly four years after the filing of the initial juvenile wardship petition, the filing of six supplemental petitions, two subsequent petitions, and minors placement in three separate foster care facilities, the trial court committed minor to the California Youth Authority when he admitted to the unlawful taking of a vehicle after leaving his then current placement without permission. On appeal, minor contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion in placing him at CYA. For the reasons set forth below, Court affirm the judgment.

Respondent Lincoln General Insurance Company issued a $10,000 bail bond for Michelle Ann Graham. Graham failed to appear, the bond was forfeited, and the trial court entered summary judgment against respondent. Penal Code section 1305 sets forth specific circumstances which allow for the forfeiture to be vacated if the defendant is returned to custody within 180 days of the forfeiture; that period is extended by five days, to 185 days, if the notice of forfeiture is mailed. ( 1305, subd. (b); People v. Ranger Ins. Co. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 605, 608.) Respondent subsequently learned Graham had been returned to custody and ordered to appear in court in the underlying case within the 185-day period, and moved to set aside the summary judgment and vacate the forfeiture. Appellant, the People of the State of California, conceded Graham had been returned to custody within the requisite period, but argued respondents motion to vacate was not timely because the motion itself was not filed within that 185 day period. The court granted the motion to set aside the summary judgment, vacated the forfeiture, and exonerated the bond. Appellant contends the court lacked jurisdiction to hear respondents motion because it was not timely filed. Court affirm.

On February 21, 2006, an information was filed in the Superior Court of Fresno County charging appellant Juan Orozco Tovar with count I, attempted murder (Pen. Code,[1] 664/187); count II, assault with a firearm ( 245, subd. (a)(2)); count III, ex-felon in possession of ammunition ( 12316, subd. (b)(1)); count IV, possession of a deadly weapon ( 12020, subd. (a)); count V, ex-felon in possession of a firearm ( 12021, subd. (a)(1)); and count VI, possession of marijuana for sale (Health & Saf. Code, 11359). As to count I, it was alleged appellant personally inflicted great bodily injury on the victim ( 12022.7, subd. (a)); inflicted great bodily injury or death as a result of discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle ( 12022.55); and personally and intentionally discharged a firearm which proximately caused great bodily injury or death ( 12022.53, subd. (d)). Appellant pleaded not guilty and denied the enhancements.
On May 1, 2006, the court granted the prosecutions motion to dismiss count VI, and appellants jury trial began. On May 3, 2006, the court granted the prosecutions motion to dismiss counts III and V. Appellant was found guilty of count I, attempted murder, count II, assault with a firearm, and count IV, possession of a deadly weapon, and the jury found the enhancements true.
On June 2, 2006, the court sentenced appellant as follows: count I, the upper term of nine years, with a consecutive term of 25 years to life for the section 12022.53, subdivision (d) enhancement, with the other enhancements stricken; count II, the upper term of four years, with the term and accompanying enhancements stayed pursuant to section 654; and count IV, the concurrent upper term of three years.
On July 28, 2006, appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.
The judgment is affirmed.

Wayne S. appeals from an order terminating his parental rights (Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.26) to his son John.[1] Appellant contends the order must be reversed because, at an earlier stage of the proceedings, the court and respondent Tulare County Health and Human Services Agency (the agency) failed to comply with the notice requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.; ICWA). The agency concedes it did not comply with the notice requirements and requests a limited remand. On review, Court reverse and remand the matter to assure compliance with ICWA notice requirements.

Appellant was convicted of first degree murder for fatally shooting his former girlfriend Kim OHara. On appeal, he faults the trial court for failing to preinstruct the jury on certain legal concepts and refusing his proposed instruction on heat of passion. He also contends the court erred in allowing evidence that OHara was afraid of him and that he had a propensity for domestic violence. court reject these contentions and, other than correcting a clerical error in the abstract of judgment, affirm the judgment in its entirety.

In these proceedings for dependent child James W., Sandra S. (mother) appeals an order of November 18, 2005, denying a modification petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, 388) in which, acting pro se, she sought to set aside/Dismiss all CPS and Court involvement in this case. Her appointed counsel on appeal does not attack that ruling on the merits, but claims error in the court having granted mother pro se status a year earlier, shortly before the court terminated her reunification services. Court find ourselves without jurisdiction to review the earlier orders and, lacking any showing that self representation prejudiced mother here, affirm the denial of modification.