CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant, the mother of K.B. (the minor), appeals following the juvenile courts jurisdictional and dispositional orders. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 360, subd. (d), 395.) Appellant contends the evidence was insufficient to support an allegation in the petition that she left the minor with an inappropriate caregiver. Concluding that appellants claim has merit, Court direct the juvenile court to strike the finding and affirm the orders.

Jose Alfredo Briceno appeals a judgment arising out of his conviction of possession of cocaine for sale and possession of marijuana for sale. He contends that the trial court erred in (1) denying his request to continue his trial to permit him to call as a witness a codefendant who had pleaded guilty and, in so doing, claimed sole responsibility for the charged offenses and (2) refusing to admit the codefendant's plea statement into evidence. Court reject Briceno's arguments and affirm.

Logan Michael Layton appeals the trial court's order denying a motion to suppress evidence and judgment convicting him of cultivating marijuana (Health & Saf. Code, 11358; count 1) and driving with a suspended license (Veh. Code, 14601.5(a); count 3). The People concede the trial court should have granted Layton's motion to suppress evidence, and petition that we reverse the judgment and remand to the trial court with directions to grant the motion. Court reverse the judgment convicting Layton of cultivation of marijuana, and remand with directions.

Christopher G., a minor, admitted that he committed a lewd act upon a victim under 14 years of age while in Arizona. The juvenile court dismissed seven remaining counts for the same conduct against two separate victims, one of which allegedly occurred in California, and committed Christopher to the California Youth Authority (CYA). Christopher contends that: (1) the juvenile court erred when it sustained the petition because it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the Arizona conduct; (2) his counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the lack of subject matter jurisdiction; and (3) the juvenile court abused its discretion when it placed him in the CYA.
The Attorney General concedes, and Court agree, that the juvenile court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the Arizona conduct. Accordingly, Court reverse the judgment thereby rendering the remaining issues moot. The sole question before us is the scope of the remand. Court conclude that the matter should be remanded to the juvenile court to resolve the California count and to possibly elicit additional jurisdictional facts as to the Arizona counts
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Susan S. appeals an order made after a Welfare and Institutions Code section 387 hearing (all statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code) that placed her child, Erick S., with a nonrelative extended family member in Oregon. She contends the court erred by not finding reasonable efforts had been made to prevent the need for Erick's removal from his home, and there was insufficient evidence to support a finding there had been reasonable efforts. She argues the court erred by placing Erick in Oregon. Court affirm the order.

Larry H. appeals an order of the juvenile court involving visitation with his dependent daughter Maranda H. Larry contends the court erred by giving complete discretion to Maranda's therapist to determine whether or not telephonic visits would occur. Court affirm the order.

Defendant and appellant Gregory Brandon Perez (defendant) is serving an eight-year sentence after suffering convictions in two separate cases for aggravated assault and use of force resulting in great bodily injury. In this appeal, he challenges the trial courts decision to sentence him to the upper term on the assault charge, based on the Supreme Courts recent decision in Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S.[127 S.Ct. 856] (Cunningham). Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in using the same fact to impose the upper term as to impose a three-year sentence for the great bodily injury enhancement. Court affirmed.

In October 2004, appellant, Israel Romero, pled no contest to felony possession of PCP (Health & Saf. Code, 11377, subd. (a)), and admitted allegations that he had (1) suffered a strike and (2) served a prison term for a prior felony conviction (Pen. Code, 667.5, subd. (b)). In January 2005, the court struck the strike and placed appellant on probation. In May 2006, appellant suffered a conviction of misdemeanor driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs (Veh. Code, 23152, subd. (a)), and based on that conviction, and on appellants admission of an allegation that he violated his probation by not remaining in contact with the probation department, the court denied reinstatement on probation and imposed a prison term of three years. At sentencing, the court also stated, Ill lift the stay on the 1202.44 fine of $200, given the violation and the state prison sentence.
Court turn now to an issue not raised by the parties, viz., whether the imposition of an upper term based on circumstances in aggravation not found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt violates a defendants constitutional right to trial by jury. Court deem it appropriate to address this issue because (1) it has been the subject of recent decisions by both the United States and California Supreme Courts; (2) this court, by its order of February 16, 2007, deemed this issue raised without further briefing; and (3) the court in the instant case imposed an upper term sentence based on factors in aggravation found not by the jury, but by the court. The superior court is directed to issue an amended abstract of judgment which omits all reference to a fine under section 1202.44. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

A modification decision.

Francine G. appeals from an order terminating her parental rights (Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.26) to her son, D. She contends the court erred because there was insufficient evidence of his adoptability. On review, Court affirm.

Petitioner seeks an extraordinary writ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.450 8.452) to vacate the orders of the juvenile court issued at a contested six-month review hearing terminating reunification services and setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing as to his daughter L. Court deny the petition.

A modification decision.

Defendants Miguel Angel Ruiz (Ruiz) and Juana Rodriguez Garcia (Garcia) were charged by separate informations with felony possession of cocaine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, 11351) and misdemeanor child endangerment (Pen. Code, 273a, subd. (b)). Ruiz was also charged with felony possession of heroin (Health & Saf. Code, 11350 subd. (a)).
Garcia filed a motion to set aside her information pursuant to sections 995 and 739. The court granted the motion as to the charged violation of section 273a, subdivision (b), but denied the motion as to the charged violation of Health and Safety Code section 11351. Court find that there was no knock-notice violation and that, even if there was, the evidence should not have been suppressed. Accordingly, Court reverse the order of dismissal and remand the matter to the trial court with directions to deny the motion to suppress.

Leroy Cisneros sued DRI Commercial Corporation and Bill Leinenweaver for false imprisonment, civil rights violations (Civ. Code, 51.7, 52.1), and intentional infliction of emotional distress arising out of an incident on a picket line. Defendants are appealing from the order denying their motion to strike the first amended complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute. (Code Civ. Proc., 425.16.) The issues are whether Leinenweaver made a citizens arrest of plaintiff, and, if so, whether the arrest was activity protected under the anti SLAPP law. It appears from the limited record before us that a citizens arrest transpired, and Court hold that such an arrest does not qualify as protected activity. Based on these conclusions, Court affirm the order denying the motion to strike.