CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant Lisa B., the mother of minors A.R. and N.R., appeals from an order terminating her parental rights. She contends (1) her retained counsel rendered ineffective assistance when he inexplicably failed to attend the hearing at which parental rights were terminated, (2) the juvenile court failed to ensure that the Sacramento County Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) complied with the notice provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.) by providing notice to the tribes of a reset jurisdiction and disposition hearing, and (3) the court failed to wait 60 days following two tribes receipt of their ICWA notices before concluding that ICWA does not apply to this case (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.664(f)(6)). Court affirm the judgment.

Yuba Street Developers, LLC (Developers), appeals the judgment dismissing it with prejudice as a petitioner and plaintiff in an action brought under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) (Pub. Resources Code, 21000 et seq.), after the trial court sustained the Department of Transportations (Caltrans) demurrer to the second amended petition for writ of mandate and complaint on the ground that the action by Developers was barred by the statute of limitations. Developers contends the trial court erred in ruling the second amended petition and complaint did not relate back to the original petition filed by Yuba Street Ventures, LLC (Ventures). Developers also contends the trial court erred in denying leave to amend the petition to add an after-formed organization under Public Resources Code section 21177, subdivision (c). Court agree with Developerss first contention, but conclude as to the second contention, Developers has not shown any abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying its request for leave to amend. Court reverse the judgment of the trial court with directions to enter a new order overruling Caltranss demurrer to the second amended petition for writ of mandate and complaint.

Autumn H. (petitioner), the mother of Dominik H. (the minor), seeks an extraordinary writ to vacate the orders of the juvenile court terminating her reunification services and setting a hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452.) Petitioner contends the implementation of her case plan was inadequate.
Court deny the petition.

This case involves a criminal conspiracy to defraud two home mortgage lender Bank of America and Washington Mutual Bank through a complicated real estate scheme of "flipping" 11 real properties in which the conspirators, acting together in different capacities, purchased distressed properties in the south central area of the City of Los Angeles, California, usually using false names, appraised the properties at values exceeding fair market value, prepared fraudulent loan documents, sold the properties at inflated prices to fictitious low income homebuyers, defaulted on the loan payment obligations, and stole the loan proceeds.
For reasons Court explain, we conclude the court erred in allowing Schwarzentraub to opine in effect that Penaranda was guilty, but such error was harmless. Court also conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Schwarzentraub to testify about Penaranda's prior reprimand, as her testimony was admissible under Evidence Code[4]sections 801, subdivision (b) (hereafter referred to as section 801(b)), 802, 1101, subdivision (b) (hereafter referred to as section 1101(b)), and 352; and substantial evidence supports Penaranda's convictions in this matter. Accordingly, Court affirm the judgment.

Petition for writ of review after the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board affirmed its previous decision, after reconsideration, of award of permanent disability. Charles W. Ellison, Judge. Affirmed.
Daniel Vera petitioned for review of a decision by the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB) denying his petition for reconsideration of a decision awarding him permanent disability benefits in the amount of $18,823.75. The WCAB's decision was premised on the application of the schedule for rating permanent disabilities that went into effect on January 1, 2005 (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, 9805), which Vera argues does not apply to his case.
Court granted review, and we now conclude that the WCAB properly denied the petition for reconsideration because the schedule for rating permanent disabilities that went into effect on January 1, 2005, applies to Vera's case. Accordingly, Court affirm the decision of the WCAB.

The City of San Diego (the City) petitioned for review of a decision by the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB) denying a petition for reconsideration of an award of permanent disability benefits to James W. Brooks in the amount of $30,940. The award was premised on the application of the schedule for rating permanent disabilities that went into effect on January 1, 2005. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, 9805.)
Court granted review, and Court now conclude that the WCAB did not err in denying the petition for reconsideration because the schedule for rating permanent disabilities that went into effect on January 1, 2005, applies to this case. Accordingly, Court affirm the decision of the WCAB.

Defendant pled guilty to two counts of lewd acts against a child. (Pen. Code, 288, subd. (a).) On appeal, he contends the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him to the maximum lid of eight years in state prison. The People assert the appeal should be dismissed because defendant waived his appeal rights as part of the plea agreement and because he failed to obtain a certificate of probable cause. Court conclude defendant did not waive his right to appeal from the trial courts exercise of its sentencing discretion, and that he was not required to obtain a certificate of probable cause. Nonetheless, Court conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant and, therefore, affirm the judgment below.

This case involves a tragic incident in which defendant Fidel Angel Quintanilla accidentally shot and killed a good friend while hunting quail on Jackrabbit Trail, off of Highway 60, in Riverside County.
Defendant appeals judgment entered after the jury found him guilty of negligent discharge of a firearm (count 2; Pen. Code, 246.3) and felon in possession of a firearm (count 3; 12021, subd. (e)). The jury also found true the allegations that defendant personally used a firearm in committing count 2 ( 12022.5, subd. (a)). The jury was unable to reach a verdict on count 1, involuntary manslaughter ( 192, subd. (b)). Defendant admitted two juvenile strike adjudications for negligent discharge of a firearm ( 246.3) and battery with serious bodily injury ( 243, subd. (d)). ( 667, subds. (c) & (e)(1) and 1170.12, subd. (c)(1).
The trial court sentenced defendant to a total prison term of 5 years 4 months; consisting of a two-year middle term, doubled to four years, for count 2, and a consecutive term of one year four months (one third the middle term) on count 3.
Defendant contends the trial court erred in allowing the prosecution to amend the information to add counts 2 and 3, and in giving misleading instructions on the burden of proof applied to the section 12021(e) offense. Defendant also contends the trial court erred in using defendants prior juvenile adjudications as a strike for purposes of sentencing defendant on count 2.
Court reject defendants contentions, with the exception the trial court committed sentencing error in using defendants prior juvenile adjudications as a strike. The trial court is accordingly instructed to reduce defendants sentence on count 2 to the two year base term. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

Defendant pled guilty to petty theft with a prior conviction. (Pen. Code, 666.) At the sentencing, defendant was sentenced for two different cases, one of which is the subject of this appeal. In both cases, defendant was sentenced to two years in state prison with the sentences to run concurrently. On appeal, defendant essentially contends that he was denied due process because he was charged with and convicted of a violation of section 666, and not a violation of a substantive offense.

Jennifer Nadine Justice was convicted of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, 211) and possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, 11377, subd. (a)). She argues (1) the only witness who connected her to the robbery was an accomplice, and (2) the trial court erred in failing to give accomplice instructions. Court affirm the judgment because the witness, Georgette Rowden, was not an accomplice.

This is an appeal from judgment against plaintiff and appellant William Opp (hereafter appellant). Judgment was entered after the court granted a motion for summary judgment filed by defendant and respondent St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company (hereafter respondent). Court affirm the judgment.

Appellants Kerncrest Audubon Society and Los Angeles Audubon Society, Inc., raise challenges under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) to approval of a project to construct and operate a wind farm. Appellants contest the sufficiency of the final environmental impact report/environmental assessment (FEIR) and complain that the trial court improperly denied their discovery motions. None of these arguments are persuasive; Court affirm.

Appellant City of Bakersfield (the City) appeals from a judgment in favor of respondent Essex Insurance Company (Essex) that held that Essex did not owe the City a duty to defend or indemnify it in a related lawsuit, Navarro v. Fulamex I (Super. Ct. Kern County, 2005, No. S-1500-CV-254712) (Navarro). The Navarro lawsuit arose from an automobile accident that allegedly was caused by a dangerous condition resulting from an event organized by the City. Essex had issued an insurance policy covering this event. The Navarro accident did not occur on the premises of the event, and the drivers of the vehicles involved in the accident were not employees or agents of the City or of any insured. The trial court interpreted an insurance contract provision that specifically excluded coverage for bodily injury or property damage arising out of, caused by or contributed to by the ownership, non-ownership, maintenance, use or entrustment to others of any auto as barring coverage for the Navarro lawsuit. Court reverse.

A jury convicted defendant Denise Belmontes of unlawfully taking a vehicle. (Veh. Code, 10851, subd. (a).) In a bifurcated trial, the court found Belmontes had been previously convicted of unlawfully taking a vehicle (Veh. Code, 10851, subd. (a)), had suffered two serious and violent felony convictions (Pen. Code, 667, subds. (d) & (e)(2)(A))[1], and had served three prior prison terms ( 667.5, subd. (b)). After exercising its discretion under section 1385 to strike one of defendants serious felony convictions, the court sentenced her to a total prison term of 11 years with custody credit for 823 days. Defendant contends the prosecutor committed misconduct by disparaging defense counsels character and integrity and the evidence did not support the courts finding she suffered a prior serious felony conviction. Court disagree and affirm the judgment.