CA Unpub Decisions

After contested postjudgment proceedings, the court below ordered R. M. (Robert) Cranston to pay his ex-wife, Mary E. Cranston, spousal support of $3,000 per month. Robert challenges the support order on appeal. He contends that the court failed to consider, weigh, and apply the statutory factors relevant for making an award of spousal support as required under Family Code section 4320. He argues further that the court abused its discretion by failing to consider the fact that he makes monthly expenditures of approximately $1,150 on behalf of the parties adult son for his college education. Robert also argues that there were miscellaneous errors in the trial courts award of spousal support that require reversal.
Court conclude that the lower court did not abuse its discretion by making the spousal support award of $3,000 per month. Accordingly, Court affirm.

Appellant Roger Schlafly, former husband of respondent Julie Schlafly, appeals from a June 20, 2006 order to pay a portion of Julies attorneys fees. Roger claims that the court erred by denying him the opportunity to cross examine Julies counsel regarding the claimed fees. Court affirm the attorneys fees order.

While serving a life term at the California Training Facility at Soledad, defendant, Alejandro Gonzales, was discovered with a razor blade in his shoe. After the trial court denied his motion to dismiss on the basis that his speedy trial rights had been violated, defendant pleaded guilty to one felony count of custodial manufacture of a weapon (Pen. Code, 4502, subd. (a)) and admitted a prior strike. (Pen. Code, 1170.12, subd. (c)(2).) Pursuant to stipulation, the trial court sentenced defendant to 32 months, to be served consecutively to his life sentence. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal and request for certificate of probable cause. After the certificate of probable cause was denied, the defendant filed an amended notice of appeal challenging only his sentence. Court appointed counsel to represent defendant in this court. Pursuant to our obligations, as set forth in People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, and People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal 4th 106, Court have reviewed the entire record, including the supplemental brief from defendant, and have concluded that there are no arguable issue on appeal. (People v. Kelly, supra, 40 Cal 4th at pp. 124 125.)
The judgment is affirmed.

Both Mink and Maccabee are lawyers. In October 1999, Maccabee referred an insurance bad faith case to Mink. The client's name was Scott Aden and the case arose out of the Northridge earthquake. The case settled in September 2000. On February 19, 2002, Maccabee sued Mink, seeking a referral fee. Maccabee alleged that in 1999, Mink promised him a reasonable referral fee, that in October or November of 2001, Mink received $400,000 in compensation for the bad faith case, and that Aden signed an acknowledgment and consent to the division of fees on or about February 15, 2002.
Court turn to Mink's contention that the award was not supported by the evidence. He cites Epstein's testimony that 20 to 25 percent would have been a reasonable referral fee in this case, and argues that Epstein, who was not familiar with some aspects of the underlying case, did not have enough information to competently offer that opinion. The argument ignores the fact that Epstein testified that referral fees are in general, in the Los Angeles legal community, 20 to 25 percent, and that other lawyers testified to similar ranges. Even if Epstein should not have testified about a reasonable fee in this case, the jury's verdict was supported by the evidence concerning the underlying case (including the evidence that Maccabee worked on the underlying case) and referral fees in the local legal community.
The judgment is affirmed.

Juan Mejia appeals from the judgment entered following his conviction by jury on one count of first degree murder with a drive by shooting special circumstance finding and one count of shooting at an occupied vehicle. Court affirm.

Paul R. Noble appeals from the July 9, 2006 probate court order removing him as trustee of The Randall B. Anderson Trust dated January 1, 1983 and directing him to render a full and complete accounting. Mr. Noble challenges that portion of the order removing him as trustee because he breached his fiduciary duties to The Randall B. Anderson Trust. Court affirm.

Hector Alvarado appeals from the judgment entered following a jury trial in which he was convicted of carjacking, robbery, and evading an officer while driving recklessly. He was sentenced to the upper term for carjacking and contends that the sentence violated Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S.[127 S.Ct. 856] (Cunningham). court affirm.

Princess M. appeals from the order terminating her parental rights as to her son, Damon O., Jr., and from the order denying her Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petition. Court affirm the orders.

John R. Ramirez (Ramirez) appeals the judgment entered following a jury trial which resulted in his conviction of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, 211),[1]during which he personally used a firearm ( 12022.53, subd. (b)), and attempted second degree robbery ( 664/211), during which he was armed with a firearm ( 12022, subd. (a)(1)). The trial court sentenced Ramirez to a term of 15 years, eight months in prison. Ramirez contends the trial court violated the mandate of Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. [127 S.Ct. 856] (Cunningham) and his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial by imposing the upper term of five years in prison for his conviction of second degree robbery based on aggravating factors not found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. We conclude, although the trial court failed to comply with the rule set forth in Cunningham, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, Court affirm the judgment.

Travis and Kelly Thomsons home was damaged by mudslides when heavy rainfall caused slope failure on the hill behind and to the side of their property. The Thomsons sued the owners of two adjacent properties alleging causes of action for negligence, nuisance, trespass and injunctive relief. After the owner of the parcel located on the hillside above the Thomsons settled, the trial court granted the remaining adjacent property owners motion for summary judgment, concluding the Thomsons had not offered admissible evidence sufficient to meet their burden of showing the existence of a triable issue of material fact. Court reverse.

In this juvenile dependency case, Tammy I., the mother of the dependent minor child Lorraina T. (Mother and Lorraina, respectively), challenges the trial courts denial of her Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petition and the courts termination of her parental rights. Mother asserts the court abused its discretion when it denied her section 388 request for a home of parent order to herself or alternatively, a resumption of reunification services and unmonitored visits with the minor. Mother also contends that termination of her parental rights was an error because there is insufficient evidence to support the courts finding that the minor is likely to be adopted, and because the evidence shows that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the minor because Mother and the minor have maintained regular contact and the minor would benefit from continuing their relationship.
Our review of the record shows that Mothers contentions are completely lacking in merit. Therefore, Court affirm the decisions to deny her section 388 petition and terminate her parental rights.

Shawn L., father of Anthony M. (born in 1997, declared a dependent ward on April 11, 2005, and placed with Shawns mother), timely appealed from a December 5, 2006 juvenile court order terminating his parental rights and making Anthony available for adoption by Shawns mother.Court appointed counsel to represent Shawn on this appeal. After reviewing the record, counsel filed a brief raising no issues and forwarded the appellate record to Shawn to facilitate his raising any issues he wished us to consider.
Court ordered the petition and appeal considered together and asked County Counsel to respond. County Counsel conceded Shawn made a sufficient showing of trial counsels inadequacy to warrant a hearing on that issue and informed us the record did not show compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). County Counsel asked us to issue an order to show cause (OSC) returnable before the juvenile court to hold relevant hearings. In reply, Shawn agreed with County Counsels recommendations. The appeal is dismissed as moot.

Appellant Rosa P. appeals from an order pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 terminating her parental rights over her two minor sons, Jacob D. and Gabriel P. Court affirm the order.

After a court trial, defendant Dale Brian Hamblin was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs causing injury (Veh. Code, 23153, subd. (a); undesignated section references are to this code; count 1) and driving with a blood-alcohol content of more than .08 percent causing injury ( 23153, subd. (b); count 2). The court found the following enhancement allegations to be true: defendant had a blood-alcohol content of .20 percent or more ( 23578) [now .15 percent or more]; defendant caused bodily injury to more than one person ( 23558); and defendant inflicted great bodily injury on two victims (Pen. Code, 12022.7). Defendant contends (1) counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to present evidence that the driver of the other vehicle may have been under the influence of methamphetamine at the time of the collision, and (2) the trial court erroneously imposed two $20 court security fees (Pen. Code, 1465.8).
Defendant has failed to demonstrate prior defense counsels performance was deficient. He is relegated to habeas corpus proceedings. The judgment is affirmed.