CA Unpub Decisions

Petitioner in pro. per. seeks an extraordinary writ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.450 8.452 (rule)) from the juvenile courts order setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing as to her son R. Court deny the petition.

Sometimes lawyers seem to forget that, in their professional capacities, they owe a duty of loyalty to their clients even when they no longer like them. And when a lawyer becomes convinced his client is on the wrong side of a particular legal dispute, the lawyer generally has the option of staying out of that dispute. He does not, however, have the option of switching sides and suing a client on behalf of a third party, alleging that the very settlement he obtained for the client in prior litigation actually belongs to the third party. And when the client objects to such an attempt, and sues the lawyer for breach of his professional obligations, the lawyer probably shouldnt cross complain back against her, apparently outraged that she has dragged him into the controversy and caused him to expend money to defend himself.
Court reverse the courts order denying the clients anti-SLAPP motion, and remand the case with directions to grant the motion as to the law firms causes of action for fraud and negligent misrepresentation. Court also direct the court to reconsider the issue of attorney fees under the anti-SLAPP statute in light of that changed circumstance.

Edgar Omar Gomez appeals from a judgment after a jury convicted him of second degree murder and street terrorism and found true he was a gang member who vicariously discharged a firearm causing death and he committed the murder for the benefit of a criminal street gang. Gomez argues there were instructional, evidentiary, and sentencing errors. None of his contentions have merit, and Court affirm the judgment.

Jay Raymond Barker appeals from a judgment after a jury convicted him of three counts of passing a forged check and three counts of second degree burglary. Barker argues the trial court erroneously denied his motion for acquittal (Pen. Code, 1118.1) because there was insufficient evidence he acted with the requisite intent to defraud when he passed the forged checks. Court disagree and affirm the judgment.

The juvenile court found Jonathan H. committed battery and declared him a ward of the court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602. Minor argues the court erred because the prosecution did not prove that he knew the wrongfulness of his acts. For the reasons expressed below, Court affirm.

Mitchell H. appeals from a dependency court disposition order removing his son, Eugene M., from his custody, and placing him in the custody of the Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA.) Mitchell argues that in light of the high burden of proof required to justify removing a child from parental custody, the court abused its discretion in doing so in this case. Court cannot agree. The order is affirmed.

Defendant pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine) while armed with a loaded firearm and admitted that he had two strike convictions and had served a prior prison term. (Health & Saf. Code, 11370.1; Pen. Code, 667, subds. (b)-(i), 667.5, subd. (b), 1170.12.) Under the Three Strikes law, the court imposed a term of 25 years to life.
Defendant appeals from the judgment. (See Pen. Code, 1538.5, subd. (m); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.304(b)(4)(A).) He claims the court erred in denying his motions to quash the search warrant and suppress evidence; and in connection with these motions, defendant claims the court abused its discretion in failing to personally interview a confidential informant. Defendant also claims the court erred in denying his motion to unseal a document on which the search warrant was based. Last, defendant claims the court erred in declining to dismiss at least one of his strike convictions. Court affirm the judgment.

Defendants Larry and Joey Howard were convicted by a jury of second degree robbery. (Pen. Code 211/212.5, subd. (c).) After a bifurcated court trial, Larry Howard was found to have been on bail at the time the robbery was committed. ( 12022.1.) Defendants were granted probation.
Court find merit in Larry Howards contention regarding the probation condition. Therefore, Court modify the judgment with respect to the probation condition and, as modified, Court affirm the judgment.

Following denial of defendants renewed motion to suppress evidence pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5, defendant submitted his case to the court for decision on the basis of the preliminary hearing transcript and a laboratory report and was convicted by the court of felony possession of methamphetamine (Health & Safety 11377, subd. (a)) in exchange for probation and a Proposition 36 referral. (Pen. Code 1210.) On appeal, defendant argues that he was illegally detained and searched, that counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that his detention was unduly prolonged, and that he was not properly advised prior to entering a slow plea and did not waive his right to a jury trial. (Bunnell v. Superior Court (1975) 13 Cal.3d 592 (Bunnell).) Court affirm.

Before their marriage in 1985, appellant Joan Bulik (Joan) and respondent Ronald Nordquist (Ronald) executed a premarital agreement concerning their separate property.[1] During their marital dissolution proceeding, an issue arose regarding the interpretation of the premarital agreement. Ronald argued that the premarital agreement should be interpreted to provide that Ronalds earnings during the marriage became his separate property when they were deposited into certain accounts expressly designated as his separate property by the terms of the premarital agreement. After the issue was bifurcated for trial, the trial court ruled in Ronalds favor.
On appeal, Joan contends that the trial court erred in determining that the premarital agreement effected a transmutation of Ronalds earnings during marriage because the premarital agreement is silent with respect to such earnings. For reasons that we will explain, we find that the premarital agreement is reasonably susceptible of the interpretation asserted by Ronald and that substantial evidence supports the trial courts factual findings. Therefore, Court affirm the judgment.

This is a collection action in which judgment in the amount of $482,669.68 was entered against defendants Augustine Rodriguez and Petra Rodriguez after a brief court trial. The judgment was entered on March 2, 2006. Plaintiffs counsel served written notice of entry of judgment on March 8, 2006.
The notice of appeal was accordingly untimely and the appeal is hereby dismissed.

Defendant Ranger Insurance Company (Ranger), as surety on a $60,000 bail bond, challenges the trial courts refusal to vacate forfeiture and exonerate the bond, which was given to secure the court appearance of Skip Myers. Myers had been arrested on charges of burglary in violation of Penal Code section 459[1] and conspiracy to commit burglary in violation of section 182 when the bond was posted. The initial felony complaint, filed three days later, did not charge the conspiracy violation, only the burglary. The complaint was later amended, without notice to Ranger, to add a prior strike allegation under sections 667, subdivisions (b) through (i), and 1170.12armed robbery. Myers thereafter failed to appear in court and the bond was forfeited.

Ranger contends that the bond was exonerated as a consequence of the complaints amendment. This resulted, it argues, because the amendment unilaterally and materially increased Rangers risk on the bond without the notice required under section 1303. We conclude that section 1303, which on pain of exoneration requires notice to the surety when a bond is transferred to a new complaint after dismissal of a prior one, does not apply to the circumstances of this case. Nor does section 1305, which concerns forfeiture of the bond and which also requires notice to the surety upon that event, which Ranger received here. We further conclude that the particular amendment to the complaint was encompassed within the terms of the bond and that it accordingly did not materially increase Rangers surety risk. Accordingly, Court affirm.

Melvin Lee Morris, Sr., appeals from a judgment committing him to prison after probation was revoked. He contends the trial courts action violated his federal due process rights. The judgment is affirmed.

Plaintiff Valerie Taybron appeals from a judgment dismissing her complaint against defendant Allstate Insurance Company. She correctly argues that the trial court erred in granting Allstates motion for summary judgment dismissing her causes of action for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Accordingly, Court reverse the judgment, direct modification of the order granting summary judgment, and remand the matter for further proceedings.