CA Unpub Decisions

Jolene Williams got into a fight while attending a party at the home of Tyrone Clark Steele, Sr., and was asked to leave. Moments later, her husband, defendant Delmas Raymond Williams, arrived outside Steeles home armed with a baseball bat and a buck knife. When Steele told defendant to go away, defendant raised his bat. Steele then tackled defendant, who stabbed Steele in the abdomen causing his death.
Defendant entered a negotiated plea of no contest to voluntary manslaughter, admitted that he personally used a knife in committing the crime, and agreed to a stipulated sentence of 12 years in prison, including the upper term of 11 years for the manslaughter. Having undertaken an examination of the entire record, Court find no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant. The judgment is affirmed.

Plaintiff Adele Sidock appeals from a judgment entered after the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of defendant City of Chula Vista (City). Sidock sued the City for retaliation and wrongful termination in violation of public policy after she left her job as an administrative office assistant in the City's police department. During her employment with the City, Sidock had a contentious relationship with her supervisor, Barbara Brookover. At one point during Sidock's employment with the police department, Brookover physically prevented Sidock from leaving Brookover's office by placing her hands on Sidock's shoulders and blocking Sidock's access to the door. Sidock reported this incident to Brookover's supervisor, who was a captain with the Chula Vista Police Department. Sidock alleges that after she reported this incident, Brookover retaliated against her, causing Sidock to leave her job with the City.
Court conclude that Sidock cannot establish, as a matter of law, that she suffered actionable retaliation or wrongful termination in violation of public policy at the hands of the City. Court therefore affirm the trial court's judgment.

William Thomas Panza entered guilty pleas to one count of attempted robbery (Pen. Code, 664/211),[1]and two robberies while released on bail ( 211, 12022.1, subd. (b)). He admitted two prior strikes ( 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, 668), and two prior serious felony convictions ( 667, subd. (a)(1)). The court struck one prior strike (People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497) and sentenced him to prison for 19 years four months: double the two-year lower term on one conviction of robbery with a prior strike, a consecutive two years for the second conviction of robbery with a prior strike (double one third the middle term), and 16 months for attempted robbery with a prior strike (double one third the middle term), enhanced by two 5 year terms for the prior serious felony convictions and two years for committing the robberies while released on bail. Panza contends the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences on the two robbery convictions. The judgment is affirmed.

Defendant appeals the judgment entered after a jury convicted him of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, 245, subd. (a)(1)), and possession of a deadly weapon, namely, a baseball bat ( 12020, subd. (a)). Imposition of sentence was suspended, and Leon was placed on three years probation. He contends the evidence is insufficient to support his assault conviction, and that the trial court committed prejudicial instructional errors. Court affirm.

A jury convicted Eddie Henry Hunter of carjacking (Pen. Code,[1] 215), two counts of second degree robbery ( 211), two counts of attempted second degree robbery ( 664/211), false imprisonment ( 236) and first degree residential robbery ( 211).
On appeal, Hunter contends there is no substantial evidence to support his conviction of first degree residential robbery. Hunter also contends CALCRIM No. 376 impermissibly allows the jury to draw an inference that the defendant is guilty of carjacking solely from his possession of the stolen car. Court affirm.

James Louis Burden was convicted after a jury trial of petty theft with priors (Pen. Code, 484, subd. (a), 666)[1]and second degree burglary ( 459). The jury also found he suffered three prior serious or violent felony convictions within the meaning of the three strikes law ( 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)). Burden represented himself at trial. The trial court denied his motion to strike his prior convictions, and sentenced him to 26 years to life. Court affirm.

When Guadalupe Rios Olvera (Guadalupe) died, title to her home was held by her adult daughter and son-in-law, Beatriz and Samuel Stotzer. Legal title to the property initially had been transferred by Guadalupe to Guadalupes brother, Jose Luis Rios Ramirez (Jose Luis) who ultimately transferred title to the Stotzers.

Anna Olvera, another daughter of Guadalupe and the administrator of her estate, brought a petition to determine that, although the Stotzers held legal title to the house, beneficial title was held by Guadalupe and therefore passed to her estate. A bench trial was held. The trial court determined that when Guadalupe had transferred title to Jose Luis, it was understood that legal title alone had transferred to Jose Luis, and Guadalupe had retained equitable title. The trial court further determined that when Jose Luis had transferred title to the Stotzers, it was similarly understood that Guadalupe had retained equitable title. The trial court therefore entered judgment reconveying the property to Guadalupes estate and distributing the property equally among her children. The Stotzers appeal, arguing the evidence is insufficient to support the trial courts judgment. Court disagree and affirm.

Plaintiffs and respondents Pedro Martinez and Ana Martinez (plaintiffs) sued defendant and appellant Jose Daniel Martinez (defendant)[1] for specific performance of an agreement to convey real property. The parties stipulated in the trial court to submit the dispute to binding arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause in their agreement, but defendant thereafter refused to cooperate in the selection of an arbitrator. After nine months of delay in the arbitration, plaintiffs filed in the trial court a request to enter defendants default with respect to an amended complaint, and the clerk entered a default. After several more months of delay by defendant, the trial court scheduled and held a hearing on plaintiffs motion for entry of judgment, granted the motion, and entered judgment on the default against defendant in the amount of $327,121.

On appeal from various orders and the judgment of the trial court, defendant contends, inter alia, that the trial court lacked the jurisdiction to enter a default judgment against him because the parties had stipulated to arbitrate their dispute pursuant to the arbitration clause in their agreement. We hold that once the parties stipulated to arbitrate their dispute and the trial court enforced that stipulation by referring the matter to arbitration, it lacked the power to enter a default judgment against defendant. Court therefore reverse the order granting plaintiffs motion to enter judgment and the judgment based on that order.

Defendant and appellant, Cory Stone, appeals from the judgment entered following his conviction, by jury trial, for murder, possession of a firearm by a felon, possession of an assault weapon, and possession of cocaine base for sale, with firearm use and gang enhancements (Pen. Code, 187, 12021, 12280, 12022.53, 186.22; Health & Saf. Code, 11351.5). Sentenced to state prison for 50 years to life, Stone claims there was trial error. The judgment is affirmed.

Appellant Placido Boet was convicted, following a jury trial, of two counts of selling a controlled substance, methamphetamine, in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11379, subdivision (a) and one count of possession for sale of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, in violation of section 11378. The trial court sentenced appellant to three years in state prison on the count 1 sale conviction, but suspended execution of the sentence and placed appellant on formal probation for a period of three years. The trial court imposed concurrent terms for the remaining two counts.
Appellant appeals from the judgment of conviction, contending that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence, admitting a criminalist's laboratory report and using CALCRIM No. 220 to instruct the jury on reasonable doubt. He contends that the errors violated his federal constitutional rights. Court affirm the judgment of conviction.

The minor, Richard G., appeals from the May 3, 2006 order declaring him a ward of the court and placing him in a camp community placement program. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 602.) The juvenile court sustained two of the allegations of a delinquency petition filed March 2, 2006, charging the minor with grand theft and live ammunition possession. (Pen. Code, 487, subd. (c), 12101, subd. (b)(1).) The juvenile court rescinded its August 31, 2005, order, which had placed the minor home on probation following his prior adjudication for firearm and ammunition possession. ( 12101, subds. (a)(1), (b)(1).) The juvenile court declared the grand theft a felony and the ammunition possession a misdemeanor. The juvenile court ordered the maximum confinement to be four years. The minor was given predisposition credit of 70 days. The minor argues the juvenile court: improperly set his confinement time beyond the statutory maximum; failed to exercise its discretion in setting the confinement term; and improperly calculated his predisposition credits. We affirm the wardship order but remand the matter with directions to calculate the precommitment custody credits and the maximum confinement term. The matter is remanded to the juvenile court with directions to: calculate the amount of precommitment custody credits on the record; set forth the calculation for the maximum confinement term based upon the current and prior sustained petitions on the record; and correct the minute order to reflect these calculations. The wardship order is affirmed in all other respects.

Court affirm the judgment of dismissal. The trial court correctly sustained respondents demurrer because the current lawsuit is barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Thirty years ago the court interpreted the parties partnership agreement in a manner that forecloses the current litigation.

The court originally sustained a petition filed May 19, 2005 pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, subdivision (a) alleging that he possessed a controlled substance in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11377, subdivision (a). The court ordered deferred entry of judgment pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 790.

A second Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition was filed November 28, 2005, alleging that appellant committed misdemeanor vandalism (Pen. Code, 595, subd. (a)). On June 2, 2006, appellant admitted the vandalism allegation; the court revoked the deferred entry of judgment order, and ordered appellant home on probation.

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, challenging the juvenile court's ruling on appellant's motion to suppress which had been denied on September 28, 2005 in connection with the first petition. Court appointed counsel to represent him on this appeal. After examination of the record, counsel filed an opening brief which contained an acknowledgment that they had been unable to find any arguable issues. Court have received no response to our letter to appellant advising him that he had 30 days in which to personally submit any contentions or issues which he wished us to consider. Court have examined the entire record and are satisfied that appellants appellate attorneys have fully complied with their responsibilities and that no arguable issues exist. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441.) The judgment is affirmed.

Kenneth Lamont Edwards appeals a judgment entered following his guilty plea to one count of selling cocaine, with admissions that he suffered a prior felony strike conviction and served a prior prison term. (Health & Saf. Code, 11352, subd. (a); Pen. Code, 667, subds. (b)-(d), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d), & 667.5, subd. (b).) We appointed counsel to represent him in this appeal. After counsel's examination of the record, he filed an opening brief raising no issues. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441.)
On January 24, 2007, Court advised Edwards that he had 30 days within which to personally submit any contentions or issues that he wished to raise on appeal. We have received a response from him contending that the trial court would have decided his motion to strike the prior felony conviction differently if it had known of his past attempts at drug rehabilitation. (People v. Superior Court(Romero) (1997) 13 Cal.4th 497.) Pursuant to People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 123-124, Court present a factual and procedural summary of the case, and a brief discussion of Edwards's contention. The judgment is affirmed.