CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant Patrick Keith McCaslin appeals from his conviction, following a plea of guilty to count two of the information, charging the unlawful taking of a motor vehicle. (Veh. Code, 10851, subd. (a).) His appellate counsel has raised no issues on appeal, and asks this court for an independent review of the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Appellant has also been informed of his right to file supplemental briefing, and he has not done so. We find no errors or other issues requiring further briefing, after our review of the entire record, and therefore affirm the judgment of conviction.
Court briefly summarize the factual and procedural history of this case as follows. On March 24, 2006, the police department of the City of Eureka received a report that a vehicle had been stolen from a parking lot at a food store. A security videotape from the store showed appellant removing the keys to the stolen vehicle from the personal effects of a store employee.
The judgment of conviction is affirmed.

Raven D. appeals from the juvenile courts orders sustaining a petition that alleged a probation violation and imposing a disposition for an admitted offense. Ravens counsel has raised no issue on appeal and asks this court for an independent review of the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues. (Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738; People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Appellant has not filed a supplementary brief. Court find no arguable issues and affirm.

Petitioner David Davenport is presently pursuing an appeal in case number A115394. The Attorney Generals brief in that appeal concedes that petitioner is entitled to an additional 44 actual custody credits, for a total of 168 days of credits (consisting of 112 actual credits and 56 good time credits). Asserting that petitioners appeal would not be resolved prior to his release date as revised to include the additional days of credits, petitioners counsel filed the petition for writ of habeas corpus herein, asserting, in part, that credits were incorrectly calculated.
the petition for writ of habeas corpus is granted insofar as petitioner claims that credits were not correctly calculated. A writ of habeas corpus issue commanding the superior court to forthwith amend the abstract of judgment to reflect appropriate credits consistent with this opinion, and immediately forward a certified copy of the amended abstract of judgment to the Department of Corrections. Petitioners counsel calculates petitioners new release date as falling on May 12, 2007, and while Court express no opinion on the validity of that calculation, the superior court comply with the writ of habeas corpus with all due haste to permit a prompt determination of petitioners release date.

This intentional severe emotional distress infliction lawsuit brought by plaintiff, Terry Hutton, is before us on transfer from the Supreme Court. It arises out of a series of lawsuits involving the Law Offices of Herbert Hafif and Herbert Hafif and Mr. Huttons wife, Terrie Hutton. Mr. Hutton, the plaintiff here, subsequently filed this intentional severe emotional distress infliction action against the Law Offices of Herbert Hafif, Mr. Hafif, Cynthia D. Hafif, and Gregory K. Hafif (collectively, the Hafifs). At issue is the Hafifs Code of Civil Procedure[1]section 425.16 special motion to strike. Retired Judge Gregory OBrien denied the special motion to strike. On appeal, we concluded the motion should have been granted. The Supreme Court granted review and then transferred this matter to us for reconsideration in light of Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299 (Flatley).
Mr. Hutton argues the Hafifs asserted protected conductthe lawsuit they brought against his wifeviolated Business and Professions Code section 6094, subdivision (a), was illegal as a matter of law, and thus did not fall within the purview of section 425.16. We find: the Hafifs made a threshold showing the challenged cause of action arose from protected activity; the Hafifs do not concede and the evidence does not conclusively establish illegality as a matter of law; and Mr. Hutton failed to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on his intentional severe emotional distress infliction claim. Therefore, the Hafifs special motion to strike should have been granted. Court reverse Retired Judge OBriens order denying the special motion to strike. Upon issuance of the remittitur, the special motion to strike is to be granted and any issue concerning attorneys fees is to be pursued in compliance with section 425.16, subdivision (c) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1702(c).

A modification decision.

Pedro Castro Perez appeals convictions for evading an officer causing injury (Veh. Code, 2800.3), leaving the scene of an accident (Veh. Code, 20001, subd. (a)), and driving without a valid driver's license (Veh. Code, 12500, subd. (a)). The jury found a true allegation that he had a prior serious or violent felony conviction. (Pen. Code, 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d).) Perez's 15-year sentence included a 5-year upper term for the evading an officer causing injury offense. Perez contends the trial court violated his constitutional right to self-representation, and erred in imposing an upper term sentence based on aggravating facts that were not found true by the jury. Court affirm the judgment, but remand for resentencing.

Following her display of curious behavior on a military air force base, appellant Sheila Cochran-McKinney was detained for just more than 72 hours by respondent County of Los Angeles (County) pursuant to Welfare & Institutions Code sections 5150[1]and 5250.[2] She later sued, under title 42 United States Code section 1983 (section 1983), the County and the individual medical personnel[3]who attended to her while she was detained. The trial court granted respondents motion for summary judgment, finding that the individual respondents had probable cause to detain, restrain, and administer drugs to appellant, and that the County does not have any policy, custom, or practice with respect to how the individuals handled appellants situation. Appellant challenges that order in the instant appeal. After review, Court conclude that the trial court properly awarded summary judgment to respondents. Accordingly, Court affirm.

In an amended information, the District Attorney of Los Angeles County charged appellant and his co-defendant, Antoinette Renee Falice, with robbery (Pen. Code 211, count 1)[1]and assault by means of force likely to cause great bodily injury ( 245, subd. (a)(1).) It was alleged as to both counts that appellant had suffered five prior convictions pursuant to section 1170.12, subdivisions (a) through (d) and 667, subdivision (b) through (i). It was further alleged that appellant had suffered two prior serious felony convictions within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (a)(1) and five prior convictions within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b).

Appellant pled not guilty and denied the allegations. His motion to bifurcate the prior convictions was granted. The case was tried to a jury and on December 13, 2005, appellant was found guilty as to both counts. On January 10, 2006, the trial court found all of the Three Strike Law prior convictions to be true, and two of the serious felony convictions to be true.

The court denied appellants request to strike the strike prior convictions and sentenced appellant to 35 years to life in state prison: 25 to life on count 1, plus 10 years for the prior serious felony convictions. A separate 25 to life sentence on count 2 was stayed pursuant to section 654. Appellant was ordered to pay a restitution fine of $7,500 pursuant to section 1202.4, subdivision (b) and a parole revocation fine of $7,000 pursuant to section 1202.45. Appellant was given credit for 198 days of presentence custody plus an additional 29 days for good time/work time. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.
The judgment is affirmed.

The District Attorney of Los Angeles County filed an information charging defendant and appellant Victor Martinez (defendant) with two counts of violating Penal Code section 288.5, subdivision (a)[1](the child abuse case). The trial court thereafter amended the information by interlineation to add Count 3, violation of section 288, subdivision (a) (lewd act upon a child under the age of 14). Defendant entered a voluntary plea of no contest to Count 3, and was convicted on that Count. Counts 1 and 2 were dismissed. Defendant was placed on formal, supervised probation, and imposition of sentence on the child abuse case was suspended. Defendants probation included a condition that he was not to consume alcoholic beverages and was to stay out of places where they are the chief item of sale. Defendant was given 399 days of presentence custody credit, consisting of 267 days of actual credit and 132 days of conduct credit. Prior to the retrial of the murder case, the trial court decided to sentence defendant in the child abuse case. It sentenced defendant to the midterm of six years. Defendant was given 913 days of preentence custody credit comprised of (i) the 399 days of credit previously awarded; (ii) 447 days of additional actual custody credit; and (iii) 67 additional days of conduct credit.
The judgment is affirmed.

Eduardo Quezada (Quezada) appeals the judgment entered following his plea of no contest to failing to register as a sex offender (Pen. Code, 290, subd. (e)(2))[1]and his admission he had previously been convicted of a felony within the meaning of the Three Strikes law ( 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)). The trial court sentenced Quezada to a term of 32 months in state prison. Court affirm the judgment.

In January 2003, defendant Marlon Raye was arrested for driving while his drivers license was suspended or revoked. An inventory of his car revealed five grams of methamphetamine, a glass smoking pipe, and two straws with residue. Defendant pled no contest to transporting methamphetamine and admitted that he committed the crime while released on bail or his own recognizance following his arrest for a felony. He was placed on Proposition 36 probation.
In August 2004 and again in September 2005, defendant admitted violating conditions of his Proposition 36 probation. Each time, probation was reinstated.
Court's review of the record discloses that the abstract of judgment must be corrected to reflect that the laboratory analysis fee is $50 (not $170 as shown on the abstract), and that the court imposed an $85 penalty assessment on the laboratory analysis fee and a $250 penalty assessment on the drug program fee. All fines and fees must be set forth in the abstract of judgment. [Citation.] (People v. High (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1192, 1200.)

Appellant, the mother of minors K.G. and A.P., appeals from the juvenile courts jurisdictional and dispositional orders. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 360, subd. (d), 395.)[1] Appellant claims there was insufficient evidence to support jurisdiction and removal as to K.G. We conclude there was substantial evidence to support the juvenile courts findings and orders. Accordingly, Court affirm.

Stanley M., father of the minor, appeals from orders terminating his parental rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.26, 395; further undesignated statutory references are to this code.) Appellant contends reversal is required because the court failed to ensure compliance with the notice provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). (25 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.) Court reverse to permit proper notice to be given to the relevant tribes.

In this marital dissolution action between petitioner/appellant Charles Hood and respondent Edit-Gonzalez Hood, Charles appeals from "the statement of decision and order entered on December 6, 2005," which was a supplemental judgment that in part denied him reimbursement for certain payments and contributions, and characterized his bank accounts as community property. Charles contends he was denied due process when the trial court excluded "relevant documentary evidence because the documents had not been attached as exhibits to [his] settlement brief as required by the Local Rules." Court affirm.