CA Unpub Decisions

Kathleen Dent worked for Farmers Insurance Group of Companies as an agent. Farmers fired Dent. Dent sued Farmers, related entities, and individual defendants (Tony Nunes, Paul Crosetti, Laura Day, and Ron Coble) for, among other things, promissory fraud, breach of contract, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. A jury found in Dents favor on the fraud claims, but against her on the contractual claims. The jury also awarded Dent punitive damages. Farmers, Day, and Crosetti now appeal, contending that the evidence is insufficient to support liability and damages on the fraud claims, including punitive damages. Dent cross-appeals, requesting that the judgment on the contract claims be reversed if the judgment on the fraud claims is reversed.
Court hold that there is insufficient evidence of fraud, namely, there is insufficient evidence that any of the alleged misrepresentations were fraudulent. We therefore reverse the judgment in Dents favor on the claims for intentional and negligent misrepresentation causes of action. But because the special verdict form with respect to the breach of contract claim was defective, Court reverse the judgment in Farmerss favor on that claim and remand for further proceedings. Court otherwise affirm the judgment.

Court issue this opinion after granting respondents petition for rehearing to our previous unpublished opinion in this case.The juvenile court found that appellant Ralph M. came within the provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, for committing first degree residential burglary. It committed him to the camp community placement program for six months.
Prior to our order of rehearing, Ralph raised these issues: (1) the juvenile court sustained the petition without finding that the charges were proved beyond a reasonable doubt, (2) his predisposition credits were improperly computed, and (3) some of the probation conditions are improper. Court resolve this case based on the record and the sufficiency issue, and do not address certain other issues that have been raised by appellant after our order granting rehearing. Applying the applicable standard of review, we reverse because the record does not contain substantial evidence, evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value such that a reasonable trier of fact could find [appellant] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053; In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358, 368.)

A modification decision.

Plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging multiple defendants had engaged in a conspiracy to defraud them of the equity in their property. The trial court sustained the defendants demurrer without leave to amend on statute of limitations and other grounds. Plaintiffs appeal. Court reverse.

A modification decision.

Plaintiff 9901 Alameda, LLC, appeals from a judgment after court trial in favor of defendant Shama, LLC, in an action for specific performance and related claims. The principal issue, which the court determined in defendants favor, was whether defendant legitimately terminated the escrow. The courts holding was based upon a related conclusion, that plaintiff had disapproved an environmental contingency in the contract. Court conclude, however, that under the undisputed evidence plaintiff did not disapprove this contingency, and defendants termination of the escrow was unjustified improper.

After the 2003 wild fires destroyed the dwellings of homeowners, they filed claims under their homeowners policies. Their insurers later offered to renew their policies for the same coverage limits and premiums, even though the homes were total losses and the homeowners had not rebuilt them. After paying their premiums, the homeowners filed class actions against their insurers alleging the full premiums charged for their nonexistent dwellings violated Californias Unfair Competition Law (Bus. & Prof. Code, 17200 et seq.) (the UCL). The trial court sustained the insurers demurrers and dismissed the actions. Court affirm.

Defendant Smith DeJesus Penarojas appeals his conviction on one count of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, 211) with a true finding he personally used a firearm (Pen. Code, 12022.53, subd. (b).) On appeal he contends that the trial court erred in failing to order a competency evaluation pursuant to Penal Code sections 1368 and 1369;[1] in finding he was not incompetent based upon ex parte statements; in putting him in a stealth belt without cause, which forced defendant to absent himself from the courtroom; and in denying his motion to represent himself and failing to continue the matter to accommodate his request. Defendant further contends his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the ex parte statements. Court affirm.

In this appeal, we consider whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff and respondent Scottman D. Wall, the owner of a condominium unit in the 40-unit Granville Towers building in the City of West Hollywood (City). In his verified complaint against defendant and appellant Granville Towers Home Owners Association (HOA), Wall alleged the HOA refused to permit him to use a second parking space in the building, despite Walls having been granted an easement for two parking spaces. Wall sought injunctive relief and damages. The trial court ruled Wall was legally entitled to a favorable judgment because he was the owner of a parking easement that originated in the 1988 grant deed to the first owner of Walls unit, Zenon Kesik, and the easement had not been abandoned. The judgment is affirmed.

Defendant was charged with 20 counts of felony vandalism of buses belonging to the Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA). He pleaded no contest to three counts. Defendant entered into a Harvey waiver,[1] and was sentenced to five years of probation and 500 hours of graffiti removal. The court further ordered defendant to pay MTA restitution in the amount of $34,814 pursuant to Penal Code section 1202.4. Defendant appeals, contending there was insufficient evidence to justify the trial courts restitution order. We hold there was insufficient evidence to support a portion of the restitution order, and direct that the order be modified to reflect an award of $30,814.

The jury convicted defendant Daquan Ramone Houston of four counts of second degree robbery with use of a firearm and two counts of possession of a firearm by a felon. (Pen. Code, 211, 12022.53, subd. (b), 12021, subd. (a)(1).) The jury also found that defendant committed these crimes in furtherance of a criminal street gang. ( 186.22.) Court affirm.

Dawn M. and Bryce H., parents of Skyler H., appeal the juvenile courts termination of their parental rights (Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.26) and the courts denial of Dawns petition under section 388. Court affirm.

A jury found defendant John Salazar guilty of the second degree robbery[1] of Thuy Tran (Pen. Code, 211).[2] The jury deadlocked on the allegations that defendant personally and intentionally discharged a handgun ( 12022.53, subd. (c)) and personally used a handgun ( 12022.53, subd. (b)). In a bifurcated court trial, four prior felonies were found true under the three strikes law ( 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d) and 667, subds. (b)-(i)) and section 667, subdivision (a)(1) (serious felony priors). Seven prior prison term allegations ( 667.5, subdivision (b)) were also found true. After striking five prior prison term allegations, the trial court sentenced defendant to a term of 47 years to life, calculated as 25 years to life on the robbery conviction pursuant to the three strikes law, plus a total of 20 years for the four serious felony priors and two additional years for the prior prison terms.
Defendant contends the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel by permitting him to represent himself without adequate warnings as required by Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 (Faretta). Defendant further contends the trial courts exclusion of his proffered impeachment of Tran deprived him of his constitutional rights to present a defense and confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him. Defendant also contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it excused juror
number one based on a finding of bias. Court conclude the trial court properly advised defendant of the risks and dangers of self representation, reasonably exercised its broad discretion to exclude irrelevant evidence, and properly discharged juror number one for concealment and bias. Accordingly, Court affirm the judgment.

Plaintiff and appellant Jose Mendoza appeals from the judgment in favor of respondent Daniel Mellinkoff, entered after Mellinkoff's motion for summary judgment was granted. Court affirm.