CA Unpub Decisions

The trial court summarily adjudicated certain causes of action alleged by Lynne Bielska in favor of her former employer, Aspire Home Health Care, Inc. (Aspire). After the trial court denied Bielska's request for leave to amend her complaint, the parties entered into a stipulated judgment. Bielska appeals, contending the trial court erred by summarily adjudicating her causes of action for retaliatory discharge under Labor Code section 6310 and wrongful termination in violation of public policy, and by denying her leave to amend. We affirm.

Sergio A. Haros appeals from a trial court order denying a motion to set aside a default judgment in the amount of $566,600 in favor of plaintiff Juan Alonso. On appeal, Haros argues that the court clerk erred in entering a default because Alonso sought entry of default on the original complaint rather than on the operative first amended complaint. Haros further contends that a subsequently entered default judgment premised on the allegedly erroneously entered default is void. In a related argument, Haros argues that the default judgment is void because the original complaint did not allege that Alonso suffered any specific amount of damages. Haros also contends that the default judgment is void because Alonso failed to serve a statement of punitive damages (Code of Civ. Pro., § 425.115) prior to the entry of the default.

The People charged Cameron David Mercurio in four misdemeanor cases. Over Mercurio’s objection, the trial court continued the trial setting date to the 30th day after Mercurio entered his pleas of not guilty in the cases. Mercurio was ready for trial on the 30th day, but the trial court continued the matter over Mercurio’s objection. Mercurio moved to dismiss all four cases pursuant to Penal Code section 1382, subd. (a)(3) [dismissal for failure to bring misdemeanor case to trial within 30 days after plea] and his right to a speedy trial, and when his requests for relief were denied by the trial court and its appellate division, he petitioned this court for a writ of mandate or prohibition.
We will grant the petition for writ of mandate. The matter was continued past the 30th day without a showing of good cause and Mercurio did not waive his right to a speedy trial, either expressly or implicitly. Dismissal is required under section 1382.

Appointed counsel for defendant Brandon Shane Reynolds has filed an opening brief that sets forth the facts of the case and asks this court to review the record and determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) We affirm the judgment.

Appointed counsel for defendant Joseph David Lewis asks this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we will affirm the judgment.
We provide the following brief description of the facts and procedural history of defendant’s two cases. (See People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 110, 124.)

Appointed counsel for defendant Shawn Edward Sell has filed an opening brief that sets forth the facts of the case and asks this court to review the record and determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) We affirm the judgment.

A jury found defendant Adam Walker Gilson IV guilty of conspiracy to commit second degree burglary along with attempted second degree burglary. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in failing to stay execution of sentence for the attempted burglary count under Penal Code section 654. The People agree, and so do we.

Plaintiff Gilbert E. Maines challenged the nonjudicial foreclosure of his home. He alleged the foreclosure was wrongful and fraudulent. The trial court dismissed the action after sustaining the defendants’ demurrer without leave to amend. It found plaintiff had no standing to bring the action because his claims belonged to his bankruptcy estate. The court also ruled that plaintiff did not and could not plead he tendered performance or plead fraud with specificity.
Plaintiff challenges the trial court’s ruling, and the defendants contend a judgment in adversary proceedings defendants filed in his bankruptcy case bars this action under res judicata.
We conclude res judicata does not apply and plaintiff has standing to bring this action. However, we affirm the judgment of dismissal in all other respects.

The Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office charged Bulmario G. Torres (Torres) and his codefendants with second degree robbery (count 3), attempted second degree robbery (count 4), and attempted first degree murder (count 5). The district attorney also charged Torres with attempted first degree murder (count 6) as well as attempted second degree robbery (count 7). As to counts 5, 6, and 7, the district attorney alleged that Torres personally used a firearm. Further, as to counts 5 and 6, the district attorney alleged that Torres personally and intentionally discharged a firearm and personally and intentionally discharged a firearm, causing great bodily injury or death. As to count 6, the district attorney alleged that Torres personally inflicted great bodily injury.

Wendy M. (mother) and Mario F. (father) are the parents of J.F., who was born in September 2013. The juvenile court found that J.F. was a person described by Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b), due to the parents engaging in domestic violence. On appeal, mother and father contend that the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings are not supported by substantial evidence. Father also challenges the juvenile court’s order removing J.F. from his custody. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

Defendant Raymond Javier Garcia appeals an order denying his petition to reduce his 1993 felony conviction for receiving stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496) to a misdemeanor pursuant to Proposition 47 (§ 1170.18, subd. (f)). The trial court denied Garcia’s petition without prejudice on the basis that he was ineligible for relief because he failed to provide any evidence that the value of the stolen property did not exceed $950, as required to establish eligibility under section 1170.18.
Garcia contends he made a prima facie case that he is eligible for relief under section 1170.18, subdivision (f).
We agree that Garcia has met his initial burden of establishing eligibility.

Victor Tapia Vargas appeals from an order denying his petition for recall of sentence and resentencing under Proposition 36, the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (Pen. Code, § 1170.126). We affirm.

Father E.K. appeals the juvenile court’s finding that placement of his son, S.K., with father would be detrimental to his safety and well-being. Finding substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s order, we affirm.

On February 6, 2018, defendant David Dion Picaza rejected a proposed plea agreement with a proposed six-year-four-month prison term. The case was transferred to another department for trial. After an additional opportunity to discuss the proposed plea agreement, the parties announced they had reached a plea deal.
Defendant pled no contest to kidnapping (Pen. Code, § 207, subd. (a)), which the trial court noted was a serious and violent felony. Defendant pled no contest to inflicting corporal injury having previously committed the same offense (§ 273.5, subd. (f)(1)). Defendant admitted prior convictions for violating sections 273.5, subdivision (a) (willful infliction of corporal injury) and 243, subdivision (a) (battery). In return, several other charges and an enhancement were dismissed. Defendant was sentenced to prison for an agreed upon term of six years four months.