CA Unpub Decisions

C.R. (Mother) seeks review of juvenile court orders terminating family reunification services and setting a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. She contends the evidence is insufficient to support a finding of detriment, as that standard is defined in David B. v. Superior Court (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 768 (David B.). Court grant the petition.

A jury convicted Demetrio Armenta of first degree murder (Pen. Code, 187, subd.(a)), during a carjacking (Pen. Code, 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(L)), carjacking (Pen. Code, 215, subd. (a)) and possession of a handgun by an ex-felon. (Pen. Code, 12021, subd. (a).) With regard to the murder and carjacking, the jury further found that defendant had discharged a firearm, causing death. (Pen. Code, 12022.53, subd. (d).) He was sentenced to prison for 25 years to life and life without the possibility of parole. He appeals, claiming evidence was improperly admitted and insufficient evidence supports the discharge true findings and his conviction of being an ex felon in possession of a firearm. Court reject his contentions and affirm, while directing the trial court to amend the abstract of judgment to correct an omission in it.

Defendant and appellant Christopher Allen Ford, Jr., pleaded guilty to corporal injury to a cohabitant, in violation of Penal Code section 273.5, subdivision (a). The trial court sentenced defendant to three years probation on various conditions. On appeal, defendant contends that (1) the probation condition requiring him to keep the probation officer informed of whether he owns any pets is invalid; and (2) the probation revocation fine imposed by the trial court should be reduced. Court reject defendants challenge to the pet probation condition; however, Court agree with defendant that his probation revocation fine should be reduced.

Defendant Chasity Fox appeals from a superior court order recommitting her to involuntary treatment as a mentally disordered offender pursuant to Penal Code section 2970 et seq. In an evidentiary hearing on the Peoples petition for continued involuntary treatment, defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion by allowing a psychiatrist, who was the sole testifying expert, to recount the details of a report by a non testifying expert. Absent the alleged error, defendant believes the trial court would have concluded she is suitable for outpatient treatment.

Defendant and appellant Tyrone Ingram contends that trial court imposed an illegal sentence when it resentenced defendant after we remanded the case back to the trial court for resentencing. We find that defendants argument is barred by the doctrine of the law of the case.
In a supplemental brief, defendant contends that the imposition of the aggravated term violates the United States Supreme Courts recent decision in Cunningham v. California (2007) U.S., [127 S.Ct. 856, 166 L.Ed.2d 856] (Cunningham). Court agree that the imposition of the aggravated term violates Cunningham. Therefore, Court remand the matter to the trial court for resentencing.

On May 12, 2006, in case No. FSB052974, the District Attorney of San Bernardino County filed an information which alleged in counts one, two and three, violations of Penal Code section 422, criminal threats. On May 15, 2006, defendant, represented by counsel pled guilty as charged. Thereafter, on July 5, 2006, defendant was committed to state prison for 16 months and in accordance with the negotiated disposition and the Vargas waiver, counts two and three (Pen. Code, 422) were dismissed and defendant was awarded the appropriate custody credits.
Court have now concluded our independent review of the record and find no arguable issues.
The judgment is affirmed.

On December 4, 2006, in case No. FVI025067, pursuant to Penal Code section 859a, defendant, represented by counsel, pled nolo contendere to a violation of Vehicle Code section 23152(a), driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Defendant also admitted the special allegation of a prior conviction charged pursuant to that Vehicle Code provision. Thereafter, defendant was committed to state prison for 16 months less custody credits and in accordance with the negotiated disposition, defendants sentence in case No. FVI 020425 was ordered to run concurrent to the underlying offense. Defendant appealed.
Court have now concluded our independent review of the record and find no arguable issues.
The judgment is affirmed.

This is the second appeal in this case. In the first appeal we issued an unpublished opinion (People v. Dexter (Sept. 27, 2006, E039469)) affirming the judgment of conviction, but we remanded the case for resentencing. We found that the imposition of unstayed sentences as to two counts, for assault and criminal threats, ran afoul of Penal Code section 654,[1]and that the sentence for a third count, for false imprisonment, might also be in error for the same reason depending on the courts factual determination as to whether one of two possible incidents would provide the factual basis and justification for the imposition of an unstayed sentence as to that count.[2]

After remand to the trial court, it resentenced defendant on January 12, 2007. At that time, the court determined that section 654 did apply to the false imprisonment count. Both the prosecutor and the defense attorney agreed with that determination. The court stayed imposition of sentence then on all three of the counts for which we ordered the remand for resentencing (count 2, criminal threats; count 3, false imprisonment; and count 6, assault with a deadly weapon). Court have now completed our independent review of the record and find no arguable issues.
The judgment is affirmed.

Sonja L. (the mother) appeals from an order terminating parental rights to her infant son, J.L. Her sole appellate contention is that the juvenile court erred by finding that J.L. was adoptable. Court hold that the adoptability finding was supported by sufficient evidence. Hence, Court affirm.

On November 17, 2006, defendant, represented by counsel, pleaded guilty to one count of possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, 11377, subd. (a)); in return, the remaining allegations were dismissed, and defendant was promised a grant of formal probation under Proposition 36. The parties stipulated that there was a factual basis for the plea. On the same day, in accordance with the negotiated disposition, defendant was placed on formal probation under various terms and conditions, including completing a drug program. Proceedings were then continued to December 8, 2006, for proof of enrollment.
On December 8, 2006, defendant failed to appear, a warrant was issued for his arrest, and probation was revoked.
On January 10, 2007, defendant filed a notice of appeal from the November 17, 2006, judgment. He also requested a certificate of probable cause, which was granted on January 22, 2007.
Court have now concluded our independent review of the record and find no arguable issues.

When defendant and his attorney of record, Cynthia Secula (hereafter appellant), failed to appear for defendants duly noticed deposition, a motion to compel attendance at deposition and for monetary sanctions was filed by plaintiff. The court granted the motion, and imposed monetary sanctions against appellant in the sum of $1,548 for misuse of the discovery process. Appellant now appeals from the sanctions order on the grounds that the trial court impermissibly imposed sanctions against her without adequate notice and abused its discretion. Court affirm.

Our opinion in this case was originally filed on August 25, 2006. The California Supreme Court denied review. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. On April 4, 2007, it vacated the judgment and remanded the case to us for further consideration in light of Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. [127 S.Ct. 856] (Cunningham).
Involved in an altercation with a former girlfriend, defendant Jackie Ray Reed appeals from a conviction of inflicting corporal injury on a former cohabitant. Defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to establish that he was a former cohabitant of the victim. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to establish that defendant and his victim were former cohabitants. Our discussion of this issue is the same as in our original opinion.
Defendant also argues that, in imposing the upper term, the court erred under Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296 (Blakely) as applied in Cunningham. Having considered the case in light of Cunningham, Court conclude that the sentence was proper. Any sentencing error under Cunningham or Blakely was harmless. Court affirm the judgment.

Following the denial of his motion to suppress evidence, defendant Jose Omar Hernandez pled no contest to one count of transporting methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, 11379, subd. (a)) and was sentenced to three years probation. On appeal, defendant contends (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress, and (2) the trial court imposed unconstitutionally overbroad probation terms. Court conclude that the trial court did not err in denying the suppression motion, but that the probation terms and conditions of the judgment must be modified. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

Appellant stands convicted, following a jury trial, of receiving a stolen motor vehicle (Pen. Code, 496d, subd. (a); count 2) and receiving stolen property ( 496, subd. (a); count 3), both felonies, and resisting arrest ( 148, subd. (a)(1); count 4) and possession of a burglary tool ( 466; count 5), both misdemeanors.[2] He admitted having suffered a prior conviction under the Three Strikes Law ( 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)), having served a prior prison term ( 667.5, subd. (b)), and having previously been convicted of vehicle theft ( 666.5). Sentenced to a total unstayed term of seven years in prison plus 288 days in jail, he now appeals, claiming the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction on count 5 and imposition of the upper term on count 2 violated his constitutional rights. For the reasons that follow, Court affirm.