CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant appeals from the trial courts denial of his motion to dismiss his case for want of prosecution pursuant to Penal Code section 1382, subdivision (a)(2).
Court have examined the entire record and are satisfied that appellants attorney has fully complied with her responsibilities and that no arguable issues exist. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441.) The judgment is affirmed.

Christian Conner appeals from the judgment entered upon revocation of probation that had been granted in conjunction with his negotiated plea of guilty to possession of a controlled substance for the purpose of sale. He contends that he was improperly sentenced to the upper term. Court conclude that the appeal must be dismissed based on defendants failure to secure a certificate of probable cause.

Monroe has not responded. Based on our independent examination of the record, we are satisfied that no arguable issues exist. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436; People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106.) The judgment is affirmed.

In re Y.M. Monroe has not responded. Based on our independent examination of the record, Court are satisfied that no arguable issues exist.court have examined the entire record and are satisfied that appellant's attorney has fully complied with his responsibilities and that no arguable issues exist. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. 441.)The order of wardship is affirmed.
(People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436; People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106.)
The judgment is affirmed.

Brandon H., a minor, was declared a ward of the juvenile court (Welf. & Inst. Code, 602) after admitting to having committed a lewd or lascivious act with a child under 14 years of age in violation of Penal Code, section 288, subdivision (a), a felony. A second similar count was dismissed with a Harvey[1]waiver. The court placed him on probation and ordered out-of-home placement. Over the course of approximately four years, the minor was placed in a number of residential facilities, admitted violating probation on several occasions by failing to follow all rules at several of those facilities, and ultimately exhausted all suitable placements, either due to his continuing status as a sexual predator/pedophile, his age or both. The court finally committed the minor to the California Youth Authority (CYA; sometimes referred to as the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Justice, or DJJ) for six years and ordered that he register as a sex offender. On appeal, the minor contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by committing him to the CYA, violating his rights under Welfare and Institutions Code, section 734 and denying him due process. Court disagree and affirm the order.

A jury convicted Buster Lee Rhoads of first-degree murder and sustained three firearm enhancements. (Pen. Code, 187, subd. (b); 12022.53, subds. (b)-(d).) The trial court sent him to prison for 50 years to life.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court should have granted his motions to relieve appointed counsel. (See People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden).) Court disagree.

Defendant entered a negotiated no contest plea to transporting methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, 11379, subd. (a)). He also entered no contest pleas to misdemeanor possession of a smoking device (Health & Saf. Code, 11364) and driving on a suspended license (Veh. Code, 14601.1, subd. (a)), and admitted he had served a prior prison term.
As Court have pointed out, an exception to this rule is that the trial court may increase the penalty for a crime based upon the defendants prior convictions, without having this aggravating factor submitted to the jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. (Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 490.) That is what occurred in this case. The court cited defendants prior criminal convictions he has three prior felony convictions, two prior prison commits, and again, an extensive record with felonies as the sole basis for imposing the upper term. Since defendants prior convictions were not subject to the rule of Apprendi and Blakely, and were legally sufficient to expose him to the upper term, there was no error.

Appellant, the mother of the minor, appeals following a permanent plan hearing at which a plan of guardianship was ordered for the minor. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.26, 395; unspecified section references that follow are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.) Appellant challenges the juvenile courts visitation order, claiming it granted too much discretion to the guardians. Court agree. Accordingly, Court reverse the order dismissing dependency jurisdiction and remand the matter with directions to conduct further proceedings and enter a new visitation order.

Prior to entering a plea of guilty to possession of an assault weapon (Pen. Code, 12280, subd. (b); further undesignated references are to this code) and resisting or obstructing a police officer ( 148), defendant Dennis Dwight Cato, Jr. filed, and the trial court denied, a motion to suppress evidence obtained after a warrantless entry and search of defendants residence. ( 1538.5.)
On appeal, defendant contends the warrantless entry violated the Fourth Amendment because there were no exigent circumstances to justify it and, even if the entry was permissible, there was no justification for the warrantless search. Court reverse the judgment.

J.C., mother of the minor, appeals from the judgment of disposition of the juvenile court. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 358, 361, 395; unspecified statutory references that follow are to this code.) Appellant contends substantial evidence does not support the courts order denying her services and the court failed to consider placing the minor with the maternal grandmother. Court affirm.

Defendant Jeffrey Franklin Randolph, who had been traveling with the circus and was found living in Indiana, admitted that he had in his possession a cell phone stolen from a home burglarized in Colusa County, California, on May 6, 2006. Defendant bought other property including a laptop and a camera stolen from the burglarized home but subsequently sold the property.
Having undertaken an examination of the entire record, we find no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant.
The judgment is affirmed.

Anne Peik and Ralph Anders (the Plaintiffs) appeal a judgment entered after the superior court granted summary judgment in favor of Glenn Kawesch, M.D. and Southwest Eye Center, Inc. (collectively, Kawesch) on their claims for medical negligence and fraud. The Plaintiffs contend that the court erred in granting summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds because the evidence showed that their complaint was timely filed and that the court also erred in denying their prior motion for leave to amend their complaint to assert a claim for punitive damages against Kawesch. Because Kawesch died during the pendency of this action, the latter argument has become moot as to him individually. However, we agree with the Plaintiffs' statute of limitations arguments and their argument regarding the sufficiency of their showing in support of their punitive damage claim against the corporate defendant. Accordingly, Court reverse the judgment in those respects.

Florence A. Walker entered negotiated guilty pleas to two counts of assault with a deadly weapon. (Pen. Code, 245, subd. (a)(1).) She admitted personally using a deadly weapon, (Pen. Code, 1192.7, subd. (c)(23)), a prior strike (Pen. Code, 667 subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, 668) and a prior serious felony conviction. (Pen. Code, 667,
subd. (a)(1).) Walker initialed a Blakely waiver (Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296), as part of the plea bargain. The court denied a motion to strike the prior strike (People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497) and sentenced her to a prison term of 15 years: double the four-year upper term on one count of assault with a deadly weapon with a prior strike, and a consecutive term of two years on the second count (double one third the middle term), enhanced five years for the prior serious felony conviction. At a victim restitution hearing, the court ordered Walker to pay $9,746 victim restitution pursuant to a stipulation. The record does not include a certificate of probable cause. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.304(b).)
review of the entire record pursuant to People v. Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436, including the possible issues referred to pursuant to Anders v. California, supra, 386 U.S. 738, has disclosed no reasonably arguable appellate issue. Competent counsel has represented Walker on this appeal.
The judgment is affirmed.

Erin K. appeals a judgment of the juvenile court terminating her parental rights to her minor daughter Aliya K. under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Erin challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court's finding the beneficial parent-child relationship exception of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) did not apply to preclude terminating her parental rights. Court affirm the judgment.