CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction for vehicle burglary and assault with a firearm. As explained post, Court affirm.

Brittney Chavez sued Dr. Richard A. Mandel for professional negligence, alleging she suffered third degree burns on her left cheek while undergoing facial reconstructive surgery he performed on July 23, 2002. She was a minor at the time of the surgery. On July 22, 2005, Chavez served a notice of intention to commence action pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 364, subdivision (a) (all further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure). She filed her complaint against Mandel for professional negligence on October 24, 2005. The trial court sustained Mandels demurrer to the third amended complaint without leave to amend on the ground the lawsuit was untimely under the three year statute of limitations of section 340.5. Chavez appealed from the resulting judgment.
The judgment is reversed and the matter remanded.

For the fifth time, petitions us for a writ, contending the two attorneys we appointed to represent him for purposes of his appeal and the consolidated first petition for writ of habeas corpus rendered ineffective assistance to him in those proceedings. He also requests we take judicial notice of our files in cases G036476 and G034723, which we grant. In this petition, he makes a myriad of contentions, essentially attacking one attorneys failure to argue certain issues on appeal and then attacking habeas counsels actions in the writ proceeding. As most of the issues were already held by us to be lacking in merit in our prior opinion in the consolidated cases numbered G034723 and G036476, and Soderstroms ad hominem attacks on counsel are irremediable via habeas petition, Court summarily deny his petition without further evidentiary hearing.

Juan T. appeals from the orders summarily denying his petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388, which requested reunification services, and terminating his parental rights to his daughter, Miracle T. He contends he made a prima facie case that circumstances had changed and reunification services would be in Miracles best interests; accordingly, he should have received a full evidentiary hearing. Court find no error and affirm.

Eight week old C. L. was taken into protective custody in December 2005 after her mother, Andrea L. (Mother), and father, Thomas L. (Father), were arrested in C.s presence for being under the influence of a controlled substance, placing her at risk of harm or death, and leaving her without a caretaker. The Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) filed a juvenile dependency petition alleging C.s parents failed to protect C. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 300, subd. (b).) (All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise specified.)
After the juvenile court terminated reunification services and set a permanency hearing under section 366.26, Mother and Father each filed a petition under section 388 seeking the return of C. to their care or, alternatively, additional reunification services. The juvenile court summarily denied the petitions. Following a hearing, the court terminated Fathers and Mothers parental rights. Although evidence at the permanency hearing showed Mother and Father regularly visited C., they did not satisfy their burden to show that severing their relationship with C. would deprive her of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that [C.] would be greatly harmed. (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575.) The orders are affirmed.

Father and Mother appeal from the juvenile courts order sustaining dependency jurisdiction over their daughters, A., age 16, and J., age 15. The parents challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the order. They contend father posed no risk of serious physical harm, emotional damage, or sexual abuse to the girls, and consequently mother did not neglect the children by failing to protect them from father. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 300, subds. (a), (b), (c) & (d); all further statutory references are to this code unless specified otherwise.) Alternatively, they contend the children should have been left in mothers care. Court conclude ample evidence supports the courts order, and Court therefore affirm.

Petitioner, filed a Pitchess motion to discover incidents of dishonesty and complaints of force and violence against five Buena Park police officers. Zavala contends the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion on the basis that he failed to satisfy the good cause requirement pursuant to Evidence Code section 1043. Court agree and the petition is granted.

Defendant was convicted by jury trial of aggravated assault (Pen. Code, 245, subd. (a)(1)), and the jury found true allegations that he had personally used a dangerous or deadly weapon (Pen. Code, 667, 1192.7, subd. (c)(23)) and personally inflicted great bodily injury (Pen. Code, 12022.7, subd. (a)) on the victim of the assault. The jury also found true an allegation that defendant had committed the assault while out of custody on bail (Pen. Code, 12022.1). On appeal, defendant claims that the trial court prejudicially erred in denying his motion to exclude his statements to the police. He also asserts that the courts instruction of the jury with the group beating portion of CALJIC 17.20 was prejudicial error. Court conclude that the the court did not err in denying his motion, and that the trial court did not prejudicially err in instructing the jury with the group beating portion of CALJIC 17.20. Consequently, Court affirm the judgment.

Appellant was charged with five counts of committing lewd acts on a child under the age of 14, with an allegation of substantial sexual conduct as to one count, and one count of dissuading a witness. Following a court trial, appellant was sentenced to 10 years in prison. He contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to substitute counsel and in sentencing him to the aggravated term. Court reverse. Appellant has also filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus contending that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. By separate order filed this day, Court issue an order to show cause returnable to the superior court.

In a petition for an extraordinary writ pursuant to California Rules of Court rule 8.450, the mother in this juvenile dependency case challenges orders after a contested six month review hearing terminating reunification services and setting a hearing to select a permanent plan under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. The court found that returning the child to her parents would create a substantial risk of detriment to her safety, protection and physical or emotional well being; that the mother had not made substantive progress on her reunification plan; that there was not a substantial probability that the child would be returned home if further services were offered; and that reasonable services had been provided or offered. The mother contends that these findings were not supported by the evidence. After reviewing the record, Court conclude that substantial evidence supports the courts findings. Court therefore deny the writ petition.

The Mendocino County Board of Supervisors (County), as lead agency under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), approved a use permit for a composting facility operated by Cold Creek Compost, Inc. and Martin Mileck on land owned by Charles Guntly, after certifying that a final environmental impact report (FEIR) showed the project as mitigated would have no significant effect on the environment.
Preserve Country Neighborhoods (PCN), an unincorporated association of landowners in the vicinity of the facility, petitioned for a writ of mandate challenging the FEIR and the issuance of the use permit, and several nearby property owners alleged a nuisance claim seeking damages and injunctive relief. The action was bifurcated. The court initially denied the petition for a writ of mandate on the grounds that the County proceedings complied with CEQA, and the decision to certify the FEIR was supported by substantial evidence. Later, a jury returned a verdict that found the facility to be an abatable private nuisance and awarded five property owners compensatory damages, ranging from $9,375 to $43,750. After further proceedings without a jury, the court issued an injunction designed to abate the nuisance. In these consolidated appeals, PCN challenges the denial of its petition for a writ of mandate on the ground the FEIR did not comply with CEQA. Cold Creek Compost, Inc., Mileck and Guntly challenge certain trial court rulings, the jurys findings, and the injunction. Court reject the parties arguments, and accordingly, affirm.

Defendant challenges the jury instruction given at his civil commitment trial under the Sexually Violent Predators Act (SVPA). (Welf. & Inst. Code, former 6600 et seq.) Court dismiss the appeal as moot.

Appellant appeals from the dismissal of his lawsuit filed against the California Department of Employment Development and its former and current directors (collectively referred to hereafter in the singular form as EDD) following the sustaining of a demurrer to Matas second amended complaint (SAC). Mata, a state disability insurance (SDI) recipient, sued after he was not provided with alternative communication services to assist him during an independent medical examination performed by QTC Medical Group (QTC) at the request of EDD. He contends that this omission constituted a discriminatory denial of access to state benefits for which he is entitled to injunctive relief against EDD.
Court conclude that Matas claim is fatally defective, in that he has failed to allege that he sustained, and is at risk of sustaining in the future, any appreciable harm as a result of the alleged discriminatory conduct. Accordingly, dismissal of his claims against EDD was warranted.

Defendant appeals a judgment entered upon a jury verdict finding him guilty of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, 245, subd. (a)(1)), and finding true enhancement allegations that he had personally inflicted great bodily injury ( 12022.7, subd. (a)) and had personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon ( 667, 1192.7). Court affirm.