CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant and appellant, Jamel McCoy, entered a guilty plea to the court to false imprisonment (count 1; Pen. Code, § 236) and two counts of robbery (counts 2 & 3; § 211). Defendant additionally admitted that a person with whom he committed the counts 1 and 2 offenses was armed (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)) and that he himself was personally armed while he committed the count 3 offense (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)). As indicated, the court sentenced defendant to an aggregate sentence of 15 years of imprisonment. The court later granted a request pursuant to an ex parte letter from defense counsel and stayed punishment on the count 1 offense and attached enhancement, resulting in reduction of defendant’s aggregate sentence to 14 years four months of imprisonment.

J.G. (sometimes father) begat a child with a woman who was already in a long-standing relationship with another man. Due to the mother’s drug use and child welfare history, Children and Family Services (CFS) detained the child at birth and filed a dependency petition concerning her. At the time, the father was incarcerated, serving a sentence for second degree burglary; he was due to be released four months after the jurisdictional/dispositional hearing. Nevertheless, he appeared at all relevant hearings. He requested a paternity test, which showed that he was indeed the child’s father. He then requested reunification services, which the juvenile court denied.
We will hold that, because the evidence showed that reunification services were likely to overcome the father’s criminality and drug use, this was an abuse of discretion.

Defendant and appellant Paul Hupp contends the trial court abused its discretion in issuing a restraining order against him in a civil harassment proceeding under the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15600 et seq.; the Elder Abuse Act) brought by plaintiff and respondent Richard A. Beyl. Hupp argues that (1) the evidence is insufficient to establish harassment because his trespass on Beyl’s property was de minimis and for the purpose of trimming the hedge as mandated by the homeowner’s association; and (2) Beyl may not complain of Hupp’s trespass because Beyl implicitly consented to it by failing to object. We conclude that the evidence shows that Hupp’s repeated trespass constituted harassment, and Beyl never consented to it. We therefore affirm, finding no abuse of discretion.

Defendant and appellant, Robert Ray Arnaiz, pled guilty to assault by means of force likely to cause great bodily injury (count 2; Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4)) and admitted suffering a prior strike conviction (§ 667, subds. (c), (e)(2)(A)) pursuant to a plea agreement in Superior Court case No. BAF1600088. Defendant contemporaneously pled guilty to possessing a dirk or dagger (count 1; § 21310) and admitted suffering a prior strike conviction (§ 667, subds. (c), (e)(2)(A)) pursuant to a plea agreement in Superior Court case No. SWF1403383. In accordance with the plea agreements, the court sentenced defendant to six years of incarceration in BAF1600088 and a consecutive 16 months of incarceration in SWF1403383.

Minh Cong Dang appeals from an injunction forbidding him to harass Julie Anna Putney. We will conclude that all of his challenges to the injunction have been forfeited, lack merit, or both. Hence, we will affirm.

Plaintiff and appellant Belen Cordero (Cordero) sued defendants and respondents City of Adelanto (the City), Richard Kerr (Kerr), Jermaine Wright (Wright), and John Woodard, Jr. (Woodard) for (1) hostile work environment; (2) slander; and (3) violating her right of due process. The City, Kerr, Wright, and Woodard (collectively, Defendants) filed an anti-SLAPP motion. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16; hereinafter, § 425.16.) The trial court granted the motion. Cordero contends the trial court erred by granting the motion. We reverse.

In this medical negligence action, the court granted the summary judgment motion of defendants and respondents, Franklin K. Torres, M.D. and West Coast Surgical Specialists. Plaintiff and appellant, Mattlone E. Drink, contends the court erred because there were triable issues of material fact. But the record she designated on appeal does not include key documents, such as the complaint and defendants’ moving papers. We therefore affirm the presumptively correct judgment.

A jury found David Len Williams guilty of battery with serious bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (d)) and assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)), and found true attached allegations that he personally inflicted great bodily injury on another person who was not an accomplice (§§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(8), 12022.7, subd. (a)). The trial court sentenced Williams to prison for three years on the assault conviction (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)), plus a consecutive term of three years for the great bodily injury enhancement (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)), and imposed and stayed execution of a three-year term on the battery conviction (§§ 243, subd. (d), 654, subd. (a)). Appointed appellate counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders) and People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) raising no claims of error and inviting this court to review the record independently for error. We affirm the judgment.

Defendant Richard Dean Raisor and F. R. were married and had children together. In February 2017, defendant was at F. R.’s residence visiting their children. Defendant tried to choke F. R. with his hands. As she began to blackout, their daughter opened the door and told defendant to stop. Defendant walked outside and F. R. locked the door and armed herself with a steak knife. A few minutes later, defendant pounded on the door, demanding entry. When F. R. did not open the door, defendant kicked it open; he followed F. R. to the bedroom and tried to strangle her with a shoelace. F. R. stabbed him in the hand, and defendant left.
Defendant was charged with assault with a deadly weapon, assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury, petty theft, vandalism under $400, and cruelty to a child.

P.A., mother of the minor, appeals from the juvenile court’s orders removing the minor from her custody, awarding custody to the minor’s father, and terminating dependency jurisdiction. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 395.) She contends insufficient evidence supported the removal order and that the juvenile court abused its discretion in terminating dependency jurisdiction and ordering her visits be supervised. Disagreeing, we shall affirm.

Appointed counsel for defendant William Grayson filed an opening brief that set forth the facts of the case and asked that this court review the record and determine whether there were any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Defendant filed a supplemental brief, claiming (1) that his speedy trial rights were violated due to continuances of his trial requested by his counsel and granted over his objection, (2) counsel wrongly filed a motion to suppress evidence, and (3) insufficient evidence was offered at trial to prove his identity.

Plaintiff and appellant Christina Chavez (Chavez), individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, sued defendant and respondent Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company (MassMutual) on causes of action of breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, fraud, and unfair competition. The trial court certified a subclass of less than 300 people in California who purchased or were beneficiaries under one group of insurance policies, commonly known as T20G policies, sold or serviced through a general agency of MassMutual. The court dismissed the remainder of the asserted subclasses at issue without prejudice to plaintiffs seeking certification of those subclasses after the T20G claims were tried.

Steven Gayles (Gayles) appeals from a judgment of conviction after a bench trial. Finding no error, we affirm.

Defendants Park Regency Care, LLC dba Park Regency Care Center (Park Regency) and Sun Mar Management Services, Inc. appeal from the denial of their petition to compel arbitration. Defendants contend plaintiff Gay Jordan (Gay) entered into an arbitration agreement as part of her admission into a skilled nursing facility run by Park Regency. Gay is now deceased and represented here by her son and successor in interest Craig Jordan (Craig). Craig and plaintiff Sarah Kaufold (Sarah), Gay’s daughter, also sued individually. Plaintiffs argue that when Craig signed the admission paperwork on behalf of Gay, he was not authorized as Gay’s agent to agree to arbitration. We affirm.