CA Unpub Decisions

Sandy Kay Mall appeals from the orders denying her petition to probate a holographic will of the decedent, Russell L. Brandl (Brandl), and granting a petition for letters of administration filed by the decedent's son, Robert L. Brandl, respondent. Court affirm.

This defamation action arises from a Finnish newspapers coverage of a press conference. The press conference was held at the Four Seasons Hotel near Beverly Hills in connection with the release of a motion picture, Into the Blue (Columbia TriStar 2005). The movie was filmed in the Bahamas. The newspaper and on-line articles contained statements about and suggestions of sexual conduct occurring at parties and publicity events attended by the films stars and crew. These events were held at the Bahamian residence of an internationally known clothing manufacturer and publishera fashion celebrity. The Bahamian property is recognized as one of the most beautiful and unique homes in the world. It has been featured on television programs including Life of Luxury. The trial court denied defendants motion to strike the complaint pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure[1]section 425.16. The trial court found plaintiffs defamation claim did not arise from an act in furtherance of defendants constitutional free speech right in connection with a public issue. Court reverse the order. Court conclude a newspapers coverage of a press conference concerning the movie industry and sexual conduct within the confines of a renowned Bahamian residence owned by a fashion industry magnate was any act . . . in furtherance of [defendants] right of . . . free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue within the meaning of section 425.16, subdivision (b)(1). Court further find plaintiffs failed to establish a probability of prevailing on the merits in that they failed to present any evidence defendants acted with actual malice. Court direct the trial court to enter an order granting defendants special motion and striking the complaint. In addition, on remand, defendants are entitled to recover their attorneys fees and costs, including those incurred on appeal.

Appellant appeals from the judgment entered following the revocation of probation, sentencing him to prison, granting 313 days custody credit, and imposing an $800 restitution fine and an $800 parole revocation fine. Court modify and affirm.

Luis P. was found to be a person described in Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 after the juvenile court sustained a petition alleging that Luis committed a battery upon his mother in violation of Penal Code section 242. In this timely appeal from the judgment, Luis challenges the juvenile courts admission of evidence relevant only to disposition at the adjudication stage of proceedings, the sufficiency of the evidence, and the validity of the curfew conditions of probation. Court hold the juvenile court committed error by admitting evidence relevant only to disposition at the adjudication, but the error was not prejudicial. Court further hold the record contains the required substantial evidence to uphold the judgment. Finally, Court remand the cause to the juvenile court to resolve the discrepancy between the reporters transcript and clerks transcript regarding the hours of curfew imposed as a condition of probation.

Volare P., mother of Ti.C. and Ty.P., appeals from the juvenile courts order granting legal guardianship of the girls to Ti.s paternal grandmother. She contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying her counsels oral request for a continuance of the Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing at which the guardianship order was entered. Finding no abuse of discretion, and also finding that ample evidence supported the courts order granting guardianship to the grandmother, Court affirm.

Appellant came to the attention of the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) in March 2005, when both she and her newborn daughter, Marissa O., tested positive for amphetamine. Marissa and appellants two other children, Julissa R. and Jonathan O., were detained. The petition charged that appellant failed to protect the children within the meaning of Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b) -- failure to provide regular care due to substance abuse. The order terminating parental rights is affirmed.

Defendant was convicted after a jury trial of burglary (count one), two counts of rape (counts two and five), penetration by foreign object (count three), forcible oral copulation (count four), and robbery (count six). The jury also found he had committed the rapes during the commission of a burglary and that he bound or tied the victim during the forcible oral copulation. The trial court found true a prior strike conviction for rape in 1988.
In this appeal, defendant contends: (1) the trial court erred in imposing fully consecutive sentences on counts three, four, and five; (2) imposition of fully consecutive and upper terms based upon factors not presented to the jury violated the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution as interpreted in Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296 [159 L.Ed.2d 403]; (Blakely) and (3) his 115 years to life sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. In a supplemental letter brief, defendant further contends that imposition of the upper terms violated the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution as interpreted in Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. [166 L.Ed.2d 856]. Court affirm.

A jury convicted defendant Lon Delaney of manufacturing methamphetamine, possessing pseudoephedrine with intent to manufacture methamphetamine, and transportation of methamphetamine. The trial court found true the district attorneys allegation that defendant had two prior drug convictions. The court sentenced defendant to the middle term of five years for manufacturing methamphetamine. It stayed the sentence for possession of pseudoephedrine and imposed a concurrent term for transportation of methamphetamine. Finally, it struck one prior drug conviction allegation and imposed a consecutive three year term for the other, for a total state prison term of eight years.
On appeal, defendant asserts (1) the trial court erred in admitting defendants statement, (2) there is insufficient evidence of methamphetamine manufacturing, (3) the court erred in allowing amendment of the information late in the trial, and (4) the court improperly admitted defendants mugshot. Finding no error, Court affirm.

Defendant was convicted by a jury of possession of a firearm within 10 years of having been convicted of misdemeanor battery. (Pen. Code, 12021, subd. (c)(1).) Imposition of sentence was suspended and defendant was placed on probation for five years. He appeals, challenging the denial of his suppression motion and one of the conditions of probation. Court affirm the judgment.

A modification decision.

Defendant who is both a college graduate and a veteran of the criminal justice system, contends he was duped into entering a no contest plea to one count of forgery (Pen. Code, 470, subd. (d)) in exchange for the dismissal of four other counts of forgery. He claims his lawyer had assured him he would be placed on probation, but instead he was sentenced to the upper term of three years in state prison. Finding no abuse of discretion, Court affirm the order denying defendants request to withdraw his plea. Court agree with defendant, however, that his aggravated term must be reversed and the case remanded to the trial court for resentencing because Court cannot say the courts judicial fact-finding in violation of the Sixth Amendment is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

In March 2005, defendant Raleigh Figueras pleaded no contest to one count each of identity theft in two 2004 felony complaints. In April 2005, he pleaded no contest to one count of receiving stolen property in the first 2005 felony complaint. The trial court suspended the imposition of sentence and placed him on probation, ordering the payment of a $200 restitution fine in each case. On appeal, the defendant contends the trial court erred in failing to make an express determination that he had the ability to pay the $10 fine for crime prevention programs. He also asks that we avoid any possible ambiguity in the abstract of judgment by amending it to indicate expressly that the $200 restitution fines in the earlier three cases were the subject of an earlier court order, in order to prevent any double collection. Court affirm.

A jury convicted in case No. SF098984A of one count of possession of methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, 11378) and two counts of possession of a forged drivers license (Pen. Code, 470b). Defendant was sentenced to two years in prison.
On appeal, defendant raises three issues: first, her convictions under counts 2 and 3 (possession of forged drivers licenses; 470b) were not based on substantial evidence; second, the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on Vehicle Code section 14610 as a lesser included offense of section 470b; and third, the trial court erred in instructing the jury on consciousness of guilt under Judicial Council of California Criminal Jury Instructions (2006-2007) CALCRIM No. 362. Court affirm the judgment.

Reema Sareen (wife) appeals the trial courts grant of (husband) Vikas Sareens motion to quash jurisdiction in wifes child custody petition. Wife contends the trial court erred in concluding India was their childs home state under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA or Act) (Fam. Code, 3400 et seq.)[1]and that, absent an order from the court in India declining jurisdiction, California did not have jurisdiction. Wife contends California has jurisdiction under the UCCJEA. Court agree with wife and reverse the order granting husbands motion to quash.