CA Unpub Decisions

Phillip and Liz M., maternal grandparents of the minor, appeal from orders entered at the contested disposition hearing. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 358, 360, 395.) Appellants contend the juvenile court erred in denying them visitation. Court affirm.

Wyatt A. Ray sued San Diego State University (the University), Mike Johnson, Shawdalyn Catlett and Hans Warren (collectively, the Defendants) after he was terminated from his position as a probationary police officer for the University. He appeals from a judgment of dismissal after the superior court sustained the Defendants' demurrers to his complaint on the ground that he failed to comply with the California Tort Claims Act (Gov. Code, 810 et seq. (the Claims Act); all further statutory references are to the Government Code). Ray contends that his claim was timely filed and, if it was not, the Defendants are precluded from asserting any objection to its untimeliness because he did not receive the notice required by section 911.3, subdivision (a) of the Claims Act. Court find his arguments unavailing and affirm.

Petitioner, and certain business entities are the named defendants in a complaint for damages, labeled a derivative and direct action, brought by real party in interest Balbinder Thiara (Thiara), and arising from business dealings between Thiara and Kiernan. By timely petition for writ of mandate (Code Civ. Proc., 418.10, subd. (c)), Kiernan challenges an order denying his motions to quash service of summons for lack of personal jurisdiction ( 418.10, subd. (a)(1)) and/or to stay or dismiss the action ( 418.10, subd. (a)(2)).
Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue, commanding respondent, County of San Francisco Superior Court, to set aside its order filed February 5, 2007, denying defendant Robert E. Kiernan IIIs motion to quash service of summons and his motion to dismiss based on an exclusive forum selection clause, and to instead grant the motions.

Appellant (Perpetual) sued respondent Musick, Peeler & Garrett, LLP (Musick) for malpractice, claiming that Musicks negligence resulted in Perpetual being deprived of about $7 million from the estate of Perpetuals deceased founder, L. Owen Traynor (Owen). Musick moved for summary judgment, inter alia,[1]on the grounds that Perpetual made an admission that Musick met the standard of care and therefore could not establish breach of that standard. Instead of offering conflicting evidencesuch as an expert declaration establishing a breach of the standard of carePerpetual opted to attack the admissibility of Musicks evidence on limited grounds. The trial court granted summary judgment for Musick. Perpetual appeals, contending that the trial court erred when it found that Musicks evidence was admissible. But this appeal lacks merit. Perpetuals attack on the admissibility of Musicks evidence cannot carry the day. And having chosen a strategy of attacking Musicks evidence rather than submitting its own evidenceeven though Perpetual couldhave submitted an expert declaration, as it repeatedly informs us in its appellate briefsPerpetual is wed to its strategy. Therefore, there are no triable issues and summary judgment is affirmed.

A jury found guilty of continuous sexual abuse of a person under 14 years of age, as alleged in count 1 (Pen. Code, 288.5, subd. (a)); oral copulation with a person under 16, as alleged in count 4 ( 288, subd. (b)(2)); and oral copulation with a person under 18, as alleged in count 5 ( 288, subd. (b)(1)). The jury acquitted Osorio on counts alleging sodomy of a person under 16, assault with a deadly weapon and making criminal threats. Osorio was sentenced to 17 years and 4 months in prison. The trial court imposed the upper term on count 1 with consecutive terms on counts 4 and 5. Court reverse the sentence as to count 1, and remand for resentencing pursuant to Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. [166 L.Ed.2d 856].)

Defendant appeals from the judgment entered following revocation of probation previously granted upon his guilty plea to inflicting corporal injury on a spouse/cohabitant (Pen. Code, 273.5, subd. (a)). Defendant admitted personal infliction of great bodily injury within the meaning of section 12022.7, subdivision (e) and the alleged factors in aggravation. At defendants probation violation hearing, the trial court found that he had violated the conditions of probation that he (1) seek and maintain employment, and (2) attend 52 weeks of domestic violence classes. It revoked defendants probation and sentenced him to an aggregate state prison term of five years. Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it revoked probation and sentenced him to prison. Court affirm.

Sellers under a real estate contract appeal a judgment granting buyers specific performance. Court affirm.

Cynthia Marie Ewing was severely injured in an automobile accident. She sued Santa Barbara County (the County), alleging that the accident had been caused by the dangerous condition of a public roadway. The County moved for summary judgment. In support of its motion it offered the expert declarations of two traffic engineers who opined that the portion of the roadway where the accident occurred did not constitute a dangerous condition or contribute to the cause of the accident. Ewing opposed the motion by submitting the declarations of two experts which came to opposite conclusions. The trial court granted the County's objections to virtually all of Ewing's experts' opinions as speculative and lacking in foundation. An objection to all of the opinions stated in one of the declarations was also sustained on the ground that the declarant had failed to demonstrate he was qualified to render opinions on the relevant issues. The court accordingly granted summary judgment in favor of the County. Ewing now appeals from that judgment. Because the case is essentially a "battle of the experts," its resolution turns on the parties' respective expert declarations. Court conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in sustaining the County's objections to the opinions of Ewing's experts, which were speculative, lacking in foundation, and which ignored undisputed facts that fatally undermined their conclusions. The court also properly exercised its discretion in finding that one of Ewing's proffered experts was not qualified to render the opinion stated in his declaration. Accordingly, Court affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor of the County.

Defendant appeals an order recommitting him to the California Department of Mental Health for treatment as a mentally disordered offender (Pen. Code, 2962, 2966) following his conviction of continuous sexual abuse of a child ( 288.5). Court conclude, among other things, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering Trebas to wear a leg restraint during his jury trial. Court affirm.

Appellant appeals from the judgment entered following a jury trial that resulted in her conviction of selling a controlled substance in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11352, subdivision (a). The trial court sentenced appellant to the midterm of four years in prison. The trial court dismissed two allegations pursuant to Health and Safety Code section 11370.2, subdivision (a), which, if found true, would have resulted in two consecutive three-year terms based on appellants prior drug sale convictions. Court have examined the entire record and are satisfied that appellants attorney has fully complied with his responsibilities and that no arguable issues exist. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441.) The judgment is affirmed.

Luis, the father of minors Daisy, Gizelle and Precious, appeals from the order terminating his parental rights. Father contends the court erred when it denied his Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petition requesting six months of reunification services and when it found the section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) exception to termination did not apply. Court affirm.

In his notice of appeal, defendant challenges the trial courts order that required him upon conviction of the offense of arson to pay restitution in the amount of $170,604.20 to Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) the arson victim. Court affirm the order.

Defendant appeals from the judgment and sentence imposed after he entered a guilty plea to one count of inflicting corporal injury on a cohabitant (Pen. Code, 273.5, subd. (a)) and admitted the truth of a prior conviction for that same offense committed within the last seven years. ( 273.5, subd. (e)(1).) Finding the circumstances in aggravation outweighed the circumstances in mitigation, the trial court imposed the upper term of imprisonment of five years. In so doing, the court found two circumstances in mitigation and six circumstances in aggravation. As to those six, three of them are based upon defendants prior convictions and three are based on other facts found by the court. On appeal, defendant argues that imposition of the upper term of imprisonment violated his right to a jury trial and due process under Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296 [159 L.Ed.2d 403] (Blakely).

We find no error and shall affirm the judgment.

Defendant pled guilty to one count of possessing cocaine base with intent to sell (Health & Saf. Code, 11351.5), and admitted having suffered various prior convictions. Harris later filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, on the ground that his counsel had a conflict of interest in representing him, and that as a result, his counsel was ineffective, rendering Harris's guilty plea involuntary. The trial court denied Harris's motion to withdraw his guilty plea and sentenced Harris to a stipulated term of 12 years in prison. On appeal, Harris claims the trial court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Court affirm the judgment.