CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant was employed by Firsthand Capital Management, Inc. (Firsthand), a San Jose-based investment management company that provided investment advice to certain mutual funds. The president, chief executive officer, and majority shareholder of Firsthand is respondent Kevin M. Landis (Landis). Witt was terminated in April 2003 after seven years of employment with Firsthand. Shortly before his termination, he and Landis entered into a one-page agreement (drafted by Witt and his attorney-wife) entitled Privacy Agreement that is the subject of the instant appeal. Witt brought a wrongful termination suit against Firsthand and Landis in August 2003. In the second amended complaint, Witt asserted a claim for breach of the Privacy Agreement. Landis in turn filed a cross-complaint against Witt for breach of the same agreement. Witt moved to strike the cross-complaint under the anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuits against public participation) statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16.[1] Witt alleged in the motion that Landis, through the cross-complaint, was seek[ing] to have Witt pay speculative damages for allegedly exercising his First Amendment right to criticize [Firsthand] in a public forum and his constitutional right to seek redress for his grievances. The court below denied the motion.
Witt appeals from that order. He claims that the motion to strike should have been granted because (1) he established that the activity that was the subject of the cross complaint was protected speech under the anti SLAPP statute, and (2) Landis failed to meet his burden of demonstrating a probability of success. Witt contends (among other things) that the confidentiality provisions of the Privacy Agreement that he allegedly breached must be construed as applying only to the public disclosure of information shared privately between Witt and Landis after execution of the agreement. Because (Witt argues) the parties had no post-execution private communications, Landiss breach of contract claim is without merit. Court agree with the trial court that the agreement is ambiguous and is reasonably susceptible to Landiss interpretation that it prohibits disclosure of pre-execution private communications. Court therefore conclude that Landis met his burden under section 425.16 of establishing that his claim was meritorious. Accordingly, Court affirm the order denying the anti-SLAPP motion to strike.

This case returns to us on a remand from the Supreme Court. In the first appeal, we reversed a judgment in favor of plaintiffs Ray and Jo Kinsman because we concluded instructions read to the jury did not reflect the limitations on premises liability required by Privette v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 689 and related cases. The Supreme Court granted review, and in Kinsman v. Unocal Corp. (2005) 37 Cal.4th 659, the court announced a new rule for determining a premises owners liability for injuries to an independent contractors employee caused by a dangerous condition on the property.[1] Although the Supreme Court also concluded a new trial was required due to instructional error (id. at pp. 682-683), the court remanded the case to us to decide a sufficiency of evidence issue we did not reach in our first opinion. (Id. at pp. 683, fn. 8 and 684.)
Court conclude substantial evidence supports the jurys verdict of negligence and the trial court properly denied Unocals motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Accordingly, Court remand the matter for a new trial to be conducted in accordance with the principles set forth in the Supreme Courts opinion. (See Kinsman v. Unocal Corp., supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 678-683.)

A modification decision.

Defendant appeals from a judgment entered in favor of plaintiff law firm Dillingham & Murphy, LLP (D&M), on its complaint for unpaid legal fees. Geiche, who appeared in propria persona in the trial court but is represented by counsel on appeal, contends that the trial court erred in granting D&Ms motion for summary judgment. Many of the arguments asserted by Geiche in the trial court were barely comprehensible. Some are plainly wrong. Many of the arguments asserted on appeal were not raised below. Nonetheless, a fair review of Geiches papers submitted in opposition to the motion for summary judgment reveals several triable issues of material fact that preclude summary adjudication. Accordingly, Court reverse the judgment and remand for further proceedings.

Appellant appeal the trial courts ruling that concluded they were not prevailing parties and denied them attorney fees and costs. Court find no abuse of discretion and affirm.

Appellant appeal from a judgment awarding damages to former employee Brian Levy for RPMAs failure to timely pay wages. Court conclude Miller, a corporate officer of RPMA, is not personally liable for the judgment, but otherwise affirm. Appellants also appeal from a postjudgment award of attorney fees and costs. Court similarly conclude Miller was not personally liable for attorney fees and costs, but otherwise affirm that order.

Appellant appeals from a dispositional order committing him to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Juvenile Justice (DJJ). He contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion in ordering a DJJ commitment and that the matter must be remanded to permit the court to exercise its discretion pursuant to section 731, subdivision (b) in setting the maximum term of confinement. Court affirm.

Plaintiffs appeal from a judgment entered after the court sustained defendant Stephen Frasers demurrer to their second amended complaint without leave to amend. The Muranos maintain the court erred when it determined they could not state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty against Fraser. Court affirm.

Humberto P. appeals from jurisdictional and dispositional orders declaring his sons, Geno and Arturo P., dependent children and placing them in out of home care. He contends there was insufficient evidence to support either the jurisdictional finding under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (j), or the order continuing the removal of the children from appellants custody. Court affirm.

In this appeal from a dispositional order, Christina H. contends the court erred by calculating the date for the six-month review hearing from the date M. H. was placed in foster care, instead of from the date of the dispositional hearing. Court hold that the court correctly set the six month review hearing, and affirm the order.

K. I., a minor, appeals from a judgment following an order continuing him as a ward of the juvenile court and the imposition of terms and conditions of probation. His counsel has raised no issues and asks this court for an independent review of the record to determine whether there are any issues that would, if resolved favorably to appellant, result in reversal or modification of the judgment. (People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106; People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436; see Smith v. Robbins (2000) 528 U.S. 259.) Upon independent review of the record, Court conclude that no arguable issues are presented for review, and affirm the order.

Defendant appeals from a judgment and sentence following his guilty plea. His court-appointed counsel has filed a brief seeking our independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. Court find no such issues and affirm.

On June 14, 2004, Paige Covell filed an action against Peter W. Gilson and Hamilton Potter, former officers of Covell's previous employer, alleging causes of action for breach of contract and fraud. Gilson and Potter answered the complaint and following discovery, moved for summary judgment. Deposition testimony, declarations, and documentary evidence.The judgment is affirmed.

Appellant appeals from the trial courts order denying his motion to vacate default and to set aside the default judgment for $98,637.16 entered in favor of Mike Pavich in this action for conversion. Court reverse.