CA Unpub Decisions

Plaintiff sued her employer defendant and respondent County of Los Angeles (County),alleging five causes of action for various violations of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA).[1] Plaintiff also sued her supervisor, Betty Brennan (Brennan), alleging two causes of action for racial harassment and retaliation in violation of FEHA. The County and Brennan successfully moved the trial court for an order granting summary judgment.
Court hold that plaintiff has raised triable issues of fact with respect to her claims for race discrimination, harassment based on race, and retaliation; that her second cause of action against Brennan for harassment is not barred under Government Code section 820.2; that her third cause of action under section 12940, subdivision (k) is barred due to her failure to exhaust administrative remedies; and that she has failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to her fourth cause of action for age discrimination. We therefore reverse the judgment based on the trial courts order granting summary judgment, and remand the matter to the trial court with directions to modify its order so as to deny summary adjudication as to the first, second, and fifth causes of action. As noted, the trial court properly granted the Countys motion for summary adjudication as to the third and fourth causes of action.

Plaintiff appeals judgment after a bench trial in favor of State Farm Fire and Casualty Company in his action for breach of contract arising from State Farms denial of his insurance claim relating to additional damages to his house suffered in the Northridge Earthquake. Plaintiff contends on appeal the trial court erred in finding that the evidence did not support his claim and in awarding certain costs.
The judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed.

Petitioner appeals from the denial of a petition for writ of mandate that sought to overturn respondent California Department of Health Services (Department) determination that he received an overpayment for orthopedic shoes he dispensed to MediCal beneficiaries. Dr. Frazier, a podiatrist, contends that the statutory requirement that such shoes be attached to a prosthesis or brace before MediCal will pay for them does not apply to podiatrists, and the Department did not meet its burden of proving that the shoes were not attached to a prosthesis or brace after he dispensed them. Court affirm.

Plaintiff appeals from a judgment enforcing a settlement agreement relating to the purchase of real property from the Estate of Mark Johansen (Estate) and the trial courts denial of his motion for new trial. LeCuyer contends that the trial court erred (1) in enforcing the settlement agreement based upon parol evidence and in finding his cashing of the settlement check constituted acceptance of the terms of the settlement agreement; (2) in awarding attorneys fees to defendant; and (3) in failing to admit critical evidence in support of his new trial motion. Steven Johansen, the Special Administrator of the Estate, contends the appeal is frivolous and seeks sanctions and attorneys fees on appeal. Court affirm.

Mark J. Holman was convicted by jury of deterring an officer (Pen,. Code, 69)[1], resisting an officer in the performance of his duties ( 69), resisting, obstructing or delaying a peace officer ( 148, subd. (a)(1)), and battery on State Park Peace Officer Matthew Yarbrough ( 243, subd. (b)). The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and granted probation. Holman appeals, contending that the trial court erred in permitting the prosecution to cross examine him about a 1997 police altercation. Court affirm.

Defendant was convicted by plea in two cases (Case No. KA061583 and Case No. KA074017) and was sentenced to three years state prison. He appeals, contending that the trial court erred in imposing duplicative restitution fines in Case No. KA061583. (Pen. Code, 1202.4, subd. (b).) Appellant also claims that the $20 court security fee ( 1465.8. subd. (a)(1)) and $200 parole revocation fine ( 1202.45) imposed in Case No. KA061583 violate ex post facto principles.
Court strike the $200 parole revocation fine in Case No. KA061583 and add a second $20 court security court fee. As modified, the judgments are affirmed.

Defendant appeals from the trial courts April 22, 2006 order denying her motion pursuant to Penal Code section 1016.5 to set aside her 1991 negotiated no contest plea to one count of possession for sale of cocaine. Court affirm.

In this litigation, plaintiffs and respondents, (collectively Yu), filed suit against defendant and appellant, Leung Kei Hui (Hui), to vacate a default judgment in favor of Hui in a separate case (the underlying litigation). The trial court entered judgment in favor of Yu, vacating the default judgment in the underlying litigation. The trial court found that service of a petition to confirm an arbitration award in the underlying litigation had been ineffective. The trial court awarded Yu attorney fees in the amount of $12,887.50 based upon an attorney fee provision in a written agreement. The trial court also awarded Yu costs in the amount of $975.30.
Hui appeals the post-judgment order awarding attorney fees and costs. Hui asserts that because the underlying litigation was not final, the trial court in this litigation erred by finding Yu to be the prevailing party and awarding attorney fees and costs.
Court affirm. The trial court did not err by awarding attorney fees and costs in the case. In this discrete and independent equity action to vacate the judgment in the underlying litigation, Yu was the prevailing party on the only issue presented, i.e., whether Hui performed valid service of process in the underlying action. Yu was therefore entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs pursuant to a contractual attorney fee provision.

Appellant was convicted, following a jury trial, of one count of indecent exposure in violation of Penal Code section 314, subdivision (a). Appellant admitted that he had suffered a prior conviction for the same offense. The trial court sentenced appellant to two years in state prison, but suspended the sentence and placed him on probation for a period of five years.
Appellant appeals from the judgment of conviction, contending that there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction. Court affirm the judgment of conviction.

After defendant was arrested for entering a bank with the intention of cashing a forged check, she pleaded no contest to committing second degree commercial burglary (Pen. Code, 459) and admitted having suffered a prior serious or violent felony conviction with the meaning of the Three Strikes law ( 667, subds. (b)-(i); 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)). Audelo was sentenced to a state prison term of 32 months (the lower term of 16 months doubled for a second-strike offender under the Three Strikes law) in accordance with the plea agreement. Audelo received presentence custody credit of 32 days (22 actual days and 10 days of conduct credit). The court imposed a $400 restitution fine ( 1202.4, subd. (b)), a $20 security surcharge ( 1465.8, subd. (a)(1)), and a $10 theft fine ( 1202.5). A $400 parole revocation fine ( 1202.45) was imposed and suspended. The remaining special allegation was dismissed on the Peoples motion. On appeal Audelo challenges the imposition of the fine pursuant to section 1202.5.[
The May 22, 2006, minute order and abstract of judgment are ordered to conform to the trial courts oral pronouncement of judgment to reflect an award of 62 days of presentence custody credit (42 actual and 20 days of conduct credit). As modified the judgment is affirmed. The trial court is directed to forward a corrected abstract of judgment to the Department of Corrections.

Phillip S., the alleged father of Anthony S., appeals from the juvenile courts order, made at the six-month review hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.21, subdivision (e), limiting his visitation with Anthony. Court dismiss Phillips appeal because he lacks standing.

Jan H. and Frank H. appeal from an order terminating their parental rights to their son Robert. On appeal, Mother contends that the order must be reversed because the trial court abused its discretion when it denied her request for a continuance of the Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing. Father contends that if the order is reversed as to Mother, it must be reversed as to him, too. Court affirm.

Defendant guilty to one count of possession of a controlled substance in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11377 and two misdemeanor violations and admitted that he had served two prior prison terms within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b). In exchange for his plea, appellant was sentenced to the upper term of three years on the possession conviction, plus two one-year enhancements pursuant to section 667.5. Execution of sentence was suspended and appellant was placed on probation for a period of three years. He was subsequently found to have violated the terms of his probation. The trial court imposed the original sentence.
Appellant appeals from the judgment of conviction, contending that the imposition of the upper term violates his federal constitutional rights as set forth in Cunningham v. California (2007) U.S., and further contending that the trial court erred in failing to award him presentence credit. Appellant did not obtain a certificate of probable cause from the trial court. Court dismiss the appeal.

On February 20, 2007, the United States Supreme Court granted a petition for writ of certiorari in this case, vacated the judgment of this court and remanded the case to us for further consideration in light of Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. [166 L.Ed.2d 856] (Cunningham). Court directed the parties to submit supplemental briefs addressing the Cunningham issues only. Upon further consideration of the issues, Court remand for resentencing pursuant to Cunningham, but otherwise affirm the judgment. Court reissue our previous opinion as follows with a new section dealing with the Cunningham issues.